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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores the relevance of the news media as facilitators of social change with 
regard to domestic violence in Hungary between 2002 and 2013. Specifically, domestic 
violence against women, once entirely “invisible” and “unheard of” under state socialism, 
and only sporadically noted in the 1990s, by the 2000s had acquired significant public 
visibility in the country. It is this rise in the public visibility of the issue, and the ways in 
which domestic violence has been progressively introduced and narrated in the Hungarian 
media in the 21st century, that forms the focus of the present thesis. In contrast to previous 
feminist literature, which tends to present the media as an institution of social control, this 
thesis investigates the role of the news media in discursively constructing domestic 
violence and engaging the emotions and moral judgements of the public, and thereby 
contributing to laying the foundations for social interventions against violence. It therefore 
understands domestic violence as discourse, and the media as both social institution and 
symbolic space with the power to influence our perception of the social world (including 
that of domestic violence); and it focuses on the agency of media texts in emotionally, 
morally or politically engaging publics with public issues and the suffering of others. It 
uses Faircloughian Critical Discourse Analysis, applied to a historically comparative case-
study design consisting of three cases from the mainstream Hungarian broadcast news 
media, which were selected on the basis of their data richness and relevance. The thesis 
seeks to illuminate the complexities and contradictions involved in the emergence of 
domestic violence as a mediated discourse of public interest, and to address gaps both in 
the Anglo-Saxon literature on domestic violence in the media, and in the Central-Eastern 
Europe literature on domestic violence, which currently tends to overlook the role of the 
media. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In 1991, just after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, a 69-year-old Hungarian woman, Alaine 
Polcz, published an autobiographical novel titled One Woman in the War (Asszony a 
fronton) (1991/2002). The novel was based on her experiences during the Second World 
War and focused on her traumatic first marriage in 1944 and the subsequent months she 
spent as a civilian on the frontline, when the Red Army occupied Hungary and Soviet 
soldiers repeatedly raped her. The novel quickly brought literary fame for Polcz, who until 
then was only known as a child psychologist and thanatologist (therapist specialising in 
grief, loss and dying), and critics praised especially the “rigorous sincerity” with which she 
recalled her wartime rape. Indeed, the mass rapes perpetrated by the Red Army during the 
Second World War had been a taboo topic for decades in Hungary (see Pető, 1999, 2003, 
2018a) and in other European post-communist countries (see e.g. Anonymous, 1953/2011 
from Germany), and in this sense Polcz had indeed broken a long-standing silence with her 
account.  
 Interestingly, however, up until as late as 2010 critics failed to notice that the book 
in fact recalled in detail not only one, but (at least) two types of violence, both of a 
gendered nature, and that the first violence that Polcz had to endure did not happen during 
wartime, at the hands of foreign soldiers, but in peacetime, in her civilian life, at the hands 
of a known man: her husband (Vasvari, 2010). In fact, the first part of the book was about 
Polcz's marriage, and her heavy-drinking, unreliable husband, who abused her emotionally, 
sexually and (to a lesser extent) economically during their marriage, and to whom Polcz – 
despite being aware of the fact that the man did not love her – still felt a strong bond. 
While Hungarian critics could, right from the start, take note of violence against a woman 
if it was restricted to specific episodes of use of physical force by (armed) strangers under 
extreme conditions (such as the wartime rape that Polcz suffered at the hands of soldiers), 
they had difficulties in acknowledging violence if it occurred in everyday life, on an 
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ongoing basis, in various forms, and was perpetrated by somebody close, a husband.1 
 The explanation for this difference in perceptions, I argue, is to be found – as well 
as in the specific political situation in which Polcz's book was published – in the fact that 
certain forms of violence are easier to acknowledge than others, due to their marked failure 
to conform to “legitimate” forms of exercising control over fellow human beings (Carter & 
Weaver, 2003, p. 23). Ultimately, what is perceived as violence (and how severe an 
instance of violence it might be perceived as) is largely dependent on the extent to which 
these actions diverge from unspoken social and cultural norms about “who is allowed to do 
what to whom” – in other words, violence is also a form of social inequality, with the 
violence of superordinate groups typically receiving less attention and more easily passing 
as non-violence (Hearn, 1998, p. 15).  
 From the perspective of gender and gendered inequalities, specifically, in modern 
societies there is a complex network of hidden assumptions about “normal” gendered 
social arrangements and human behaviours – for example, that “real” families should be 
under patriarchal control, or that men should show “dominance”. This ultimately enables 
many forms of violence to pass as an accepted and unnoticed form of exercising masculine 
control over women (Bourdieu, 1979/1984; 1998/2001). The actual positioning of these 
actions on the violence–non-violence spectrum, i.e. whether a type of violence gets noticed 
and condemned or passes unnoticed and/or is accepted, is linked to unspoken social and 
cultural gender norms. Kelly (1988, pp. 74-137) describes this spectrum connecting the 
myriad forms of sexism that women encounter every day (from seemingly small-scale 
actions that are often excused as trivial and harmless to more “serious” or even 
criminalised forms of male violence like threats, assault, rape or even murder) as a 
continuum of violence (1988, p. 74).2 Within this continuum, domestic violence against 
women, especially its non-physical forms, typically falls into the more prevalent, and 
therefore more normalised and more “difficult to spot”, part of the violence–non-violence 
                                                 
1 In this respect, literary critic Pócsik's understanding of Polcz's marriage can be regarded as typical: in 
Pócsik's view, Polcz's marriage was not abusive, but “traditional”, since her husband “expected a 
traditional feminine role from her […], total submission and compliance” (2008, p. 64). 
2 Violence as a continuum means that the various forms of male violence against women – in Kelly's words, 
sexist violence (1988, p. 74) – are not understood as distinctly separate categories or as isolated incidents, 
but as elements of a repeated pattern of abuse: they are interconnected acts without sharp boundaries that 
reinforce each other, and are all rooted in broader social structures of male domination that they reproduce 
on a constant basis (1988, 2012). On how sexism intersects with other power inequalities, including 
racism, see Crenshaw (1991).  
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spectrum, and the reception of Polcz's book also demonstrates this.  
 In fact, given that around 2010 critics began to notice the domestic violence 
component of the story, the other important element in this anecdote about Polcz's book is 
the fact that the social perception of domestic violence can change. The findings of two 
large-scale surveys conducted among the Hungarian population in 1999 and 2010 (Gregor, 
2014; Tóth, 1999a) on the social perception of domestic violence further confirm what the 
Polcz anecdote was already indicative of:3 that there was a major transformation in 
Hungary in this field in the 2000s, and also a significant increase of awareness around the 
issue.4  
 In accordance with this change in the individual perceptions of survey respondents, 
the issue of domestic violence has also gone through some major changes in the Hungarian 
public sphere in this same time period. As discussed in detail later in this thesis, since the 
early 2000s Hungary has adopted, among others, a number of legislative and policy 
measures against domestic violence, and also experienced waves of successful public 
mobilisation of (such as demonstrations, protests, petitions) on the issue. Furthermore, the 
topic of domestic violence, which, according to a retrospective account by a female 
journalist, was in the mid-1990s mostly treated as non-existent, unbelievable and was an 
“object of public ridicule” in editorial offices and newsrooms (Margit, 2002), by the mid-
2000s began to appear in headlines and in prime-time news bulletins on a regular basis 
(Hüse & Konyáriné, 2008, p. 55), and by the early 2010s had even become a hot topic in 
                                                 
3 Without giving a full overview of the findings of these two large-scale surveys conducted in 1999 (Tóth, 
1999a) and 2010 (Gregor, 2014), I note that it was especially the social perception of emotional abuse in 
marriage that changed strikingly in 11 years. While in 1999 the overwhelming majority of respondents 
(88%) did not perceive emotional and verbal abuse in marriage (such as humiliating put-downs) as an 
instance of violence (Tóth, 1999a, p. 38), in 2010 only 5.5% of respondents thought of emotional abuse as 
a “not severe” or “not very severe” problem, while 55.4% already thought of it as “very severe” (Gregor, 
2014, p. 23). The change in the perception of physical violence inflicted on wives was less spectacular, 
but is still worthy of mention: in 1999 16% of respondents thought that battering a wife with a fist or an 
object would be still “entirely a family matter” (Tóth 1999a, p. 38), while in 2010 only 3.8% of 
respondents thought so, and 74.9% answered that physical violence inflicted on a wife would qualify as a 
“very severe” problem (Gregor, 2014, p. 23). 
4 It needs to be noted that this radical change in perception and attitudes is probably not country-specific at 
all, given that a comparison of the results of two Europe-wide surveys conducted similarly in 1999 and 
2010 indicates that “a major societal shift” happened in this field in other parts of Europe too, including in 
a number of older member states, for example Denmark, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal 
(European Commission, 2010, pp. 47-48). However, with only 74.9% of Hungarian respondents 
classifying physical violence as “very severe”, and only 55.4% of Hungarian respondents considering 
emotional-psychological abuse in similar terms, in 2010 Hungary showed the sixth and fifth lowest 
awareness of these two forms of domestic violence among the 27 EU member countries (pp. 54, 58-59).  
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the Hungarian media. In brief, domestic violence against women, once entirely “invisible” 
and “unheard of” under state socialism, and only sporadically noted in the 1990s (Parti, 
2001, p. 245; Tóth, 2014, especially pp. 305-306), by the 2000s had gathered significant 
public visibility in the country. It is this rise in the public visibility of the issue and the ways 
in which domestic violence has been progressively introduced and narrated in the 
Hungarian media in the 21st century that forms the core focus of the present thesis.  
 I focus here on media representations and their ever-changing social and media-
related contexts. I take the media as having a key role in the cultural and political 
construction of social life (Couldry & Hepp, 2013; Livingstone, 2009) and as thus being an 
institution with a crucial role in shaping public awareness and opinion with regard to 
domestic violence. As I argue in the following chapters, definitions of domestic violence 
are inevitably mediated: narratives that offer a set of possible meanings of and attitudes 
towards domestic violence are typically regulated by the media in modern societies, as has 
been confirmed by a series of previous research studies from the EU (European 
Commission, 2010, pp. 12-22), the US (as cited in Berns, 2004, p. 24), and also from 
Hungary (Gregor, 2014, p. 21). In these studies, 70-93% of respondents answered that they 
were informed about the existence of domestic violence by the media and especially by 
television. Specifically, in Hungary the top three sources by which citizens indicated that 
they were being informed about domestic violence were all institutions of mass media: 
television (93.2%), print media (45.2%) and radio (36.3%) (Gregor 2014, p. 21).  
 Therefore, in the following pages I focus on the media and their role in making 
domestic violence an issue of public concern to a broad Hungarian public, and shaping it as 
such, as well as their role in circulating diverse social meanings of domestic violence in 
Hungarian society since the early 2000s. My core interest is in discursive change – the 
ongoing re-distribution, restructuring and re-utilisation of available discursive elements and 
the ways in which new meanings of domestic violence have been circulated in broader 
Hungarian society by the media – and in how this ongoing change has ultimately fed into 
long-term shifts in dominant meanings alongside a developing range of media platforms 
and technologies. Contrary to traditional perspectives that approach domestic violence 
against women as a sporadic occurrence, I employ a feminist perspective and view it as a 
frequent type of structural and symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1998/2001) that is primarily 
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enabled by gendered inequalities, but also intersects with other power relations (Crenshaw, 
1991; Hearn, 1998; Johnson, 1995). 
 Despite the prominent role of the media in shaping perceptions and constructing 
public issues, existing literature does not have much to say about the relationship between 
domestic violence and the media in Hungary. As of 2018, the media portrayal of domestic 
violence in Hungary is severely under-researched, with only two pieces of literature 
published on the subject: the contributions to a round-table discussion collected in one 
volume with three brief essays (23 pages in total) on the topic of “women in the media as 
victims of violence” (Balogh, Kassa & Sinkó, 2011) and a scholarly article on the portrayal 
of domestic violence in a popular Hungarian daily soap (Császár & Gregor, 2016), both 
available only in Hungarian.5 A third article, available in English, discusses an Amnesty 
International campaign video against violence against women that ran in Hungary in 2009 
(Goering, Renegar & Puhl, 2017). 
 Therefore in the following sections of this Introduction, after giving a preliminary 
outline of domestic violence issues in Hungary since 1989, I present an overview of 
existing literature, with special emphasis on its gaps around media-related aspects of 
domestic violence as a public issue in a Central-Eastern European (CEE) country like 
Hungary. I go on to connect this repeated omission of the media from the research to a 
particular type of feminist activism – legal fetishism – which, since the early 2000s, has 
become dominant in this region and which strongly prioritises legislative and policy 
measures against domestic violence at the expense of reaching out to broader publics and 
raising public attention to the issue. I argue that this prioritisation ignores the entire domain 
of the (mediated) public sphere and the power of the media to construct domestic violence 
as a public issue. Moreover, it also thereby fails to come to terms with the power of the 
media to enable citizens to develop a moral, political or emotional engagement with 
domestic violence, and the concomitant potential of the media to contribute to society's 
collective learning processes about gender and violence, and – without questioning that 
societal change is multi-factoral – to facilitate societal change.  
 
                                                 
5 I should note that, of the three brief essays in the volume from 2011, only two were dedicated to the issue 
of domestic violence, while the third discussed a case of rape.  
14 
 
1.2 Domestic violence in Hungary since 1989: How the issue emerged from silence and 
became a hot topic. Preliminary country outline and historical overview 
 
While in English-speaking Western countries domestic violence has been extensively 
researched since the 1970s, and its “discovery” was originally closely connected to the 
advent of second-wave feminism, in Hungary the discourse on domestic violence does not 
date back for such a long time, still less the study of its media portrayal. This is mainly due 
to Hungary having been a Soviet satellite state between 1949 and 1989, which resulted in 
the country remaining untouched by second-wave feminism until the 1990s (see e.g. Gal & 
Kligman, 2000; Mudure, 2004). Specifically, although the first-wave feminist movement 
had been present in the country from the 1890s (Acsady, 1999; Arpad & Marinovich, 1995, 
pp. 82-88; Szapor, 2004), in the aftermath of the Second World War, when the Soviets took 
control of Hungary as part of their political expansion into Central-Eastern Europe, the 
feminist movement was systematically silenced (Pető, 1998). In the subsequent decades 
feminism was proclaimed unnecessary, with the explanation that equality between the 
sexes would be achieved with the advent of communism (DeSilva, 993).  
 This resulted, among other things, in domestic violence remaining invisible, and 
this began to change only slowly after 1989 (Johnson & Brunell, 2006, p. 576). With the 
fall of the Berlin Wall many gender-related issues could become subjects of political 
discussion for the first time in four decades, and a small network of anti-violence feminist 
NGOs was even established (MONA, NANE, Habeas Corpus and later Patent, among 
others), and in the 1990s the broader public as well as relevant professions – such as 
journalists, legislators, police officers, social welfare workers, lawyers or judges – 
“generally resisted acknowledging” the existence of domestic violence (Fabian, 2010b, p. 
225; Margit, 2002). This ignorance around the issue was also supported by the general 
resistance of the Hungarian population towards politics “intruding” into private matters of 
citizens’ lives (a widespread reaction developed under the former political regime, see 
Konrád, 1984), and by Hungarian people’s conservative views on gender roles (Murinkó, 
2014; Tóth, 2009, p. 1591;). Gender inequalities permeated – and still permeate – all strata 
of Hungarian society, including the political system; since 1989 Hungary has repeatedly 
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produced gender-imbalanced parliaments, with the highest percentage (11.6%) of women 
MPs reached in April 2018, which is still one of the lowest numbers in the European 
Union. Although Hungary adopted the Beijing Declaration of the Fourth World Conference 
on Women (CEDAW) in 1995 and the EU recommendations on gender equality also had 
some impact on Hungarian legislation from the early 2000s, when preparations for EU 
membership in 2004 started, these international and supranational institutions did not have 
any enforceable powers on a national level (Fabian, 2010c, pp. 54-55).  
 While after 1989 women, just like men, found themselves in a society largely 
defined by a neo-liberal market economy, Hungarians, like the citizens of other CEE 
societies, tended to see the public sphere as a “man’s world” and politics as a “dirty 
business best left to men” (Einhorn, 2006, p. 147), an opinion reproduced also by the 
governments in power, which repeatedly addressed women in their roles as mothers (and 
not as economic or political subjects operating in the public sphere). Women's issues were 
conflated with family, population and reproduction policies, thereby attempting to relegate 
women to an ostensibly “apolitical” private sphere, and this did not favour acknowledging 
the existence of domestic violence (see Einhorn, 2006; Fabian, 2010a, pp. 16-17; Nikolić-
Ristanović, 2004). 
 Nevertheless, after 1989 there were some changes in the Hungarian legal system 
that affected general gender equality issues (for instance the 2003 Equal Treatment Act, 
which addressed discrimination against, among others, “women and mothers”)6 and 
concrete issues related to domestic violence (the criminalisation of marital rape in 1997, 
the 2007 Police Guidelines on Domestic Violence, the 2009 Act on Restraining Orders due 
to Intimate Partner Violence, and the 2013 Act on Intimate Partner Violence). Despite the 
improving legislative framework, the situation has changed only slowly, and Hungary has 
been repeatedly cautioned by international human rights organisations and EU institutions 
because of its inadequate treatment of gender equality issues (Amnesty International, 2007; 
Council of Europe, 2006; European Parliament, 2013), with one investigation directly 
focusing on domestic violence (Human Rights Watch, 2013). This last report gave a 
shocking picture of a country where victims routinely faced barriers to reporting violence, 
                                                 
6 For how the new Fundamental Law, entering into force on 1 January 2012, took an opposite turn and 
reinforced traditional gender roles through the definition of marriage, see Annus, 2014, esp. pp. 6-8. 
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received an inadequate response from the police, social welfare and medical institutions, 
and had very little chance of getting into one of the very few shelter spaces available. The 
poor quality of state support for victims of domestic violence was similarly pointed out in a 
Report of the European Parliament, which concluded that “combating violence against 
women and helping victims of domestic violence are typically left to NGOs and charitable 
organizations” (European Parliament, 2013, p.10). 
 On the other hand, literature on domestic violence started to emerge in the country 
as early as the 1990s. Until then, scientific publication and research had only sporadically 
differentiated between violence within and outside families – and moreover the available 
criminal statistics supported this distinction since until 2013 domestic violence was not a 
separate entry in the Criminal Code and, accordingly, statistics typically did not 
differentiate between violence committed by family members and by strangers (Tóth & 
Róbert, 2010, pp. 31-36).7 The first, ground-breaking works were published at the end of 
the 1990s (Morvai, 1998; Tóth, 1999a), and approached domestic violence from a women-
centred, feminist point of view, although one (Tóth, 1999a) equated domestic violence with 
male violence against spouses and children.8  
 Since the early 2000s, a relative abundance of literature has been published on 
domestic violence (családon belüli erőszak / violence in the family), extending from 
feminist approaches (see e.g. Betlen, 2005; Gregor, 2014; Spronz, 2016; Tóth, 2003; Wirth, 
2009);  to family-violence approaches (see e.g. Grád, 2015; Herczog & Gyurkó, 2006; 
Ranschburg, 2006; Szeibert, 2015; Tamási, 2003; Virág, 2004a, 2005a, 2005b, 2006), with 
an increased focus on child abuse in families (see e.g. Farkas, 2013; Gyurkó, 2005; 
Herczog, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2007; Herczog & Kovács, 2004; Herczog, Neményi & Rácz, 
2002; Kerezsi, 1995, 1996; Lakner, Tordainé Vida & Tordai 1997; Lénárd, 1997; Révész, 
2004; Széchey, 2006; Trencsényi, Maleczkyné Hallók, Rucska & Prémné Horváth, 2008; 
                                                 
7 For an attempt to reconstruct the prevalence of domestic violence based on available statistical data from 
between 1997 and 2002, see Windt, 2005. For a brief overview of Hungarian-language literature on 
domestic violence in the 2000s see Tóth & Róbert, 2010, pp. 31-36. 
8 Morvai (1998) presented a qualitative study based on in-depth interviews with victims and people 
working in the judicial sphere, whereas Tóth's work (1999a) was a large-sample empirical study of, 
among other things, the prevalence of this issue. Nőszemély, a short-lived feminist zine from the 1990s 
(1991-1998) published by Feminista Hálózat (Feminist Network), a feminist grassroots organisation 
founded in June 1990, is also worthy of mention here. In 1995 it dedicated an entire issue to the topic of 
violence against women on the occasion of the Beijing Declaration (see Acsády, Bozzi, Bullain & Elekes, 
1995). Nőszemély was available only in Budapest.  
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Tóth, 1999b; Virág 2004b), sporadically touching also on elder abuse (see e.g. Gyurkó, 
2008), and even discussing such a controversial phenomenon as domestic violence against 
men (Hüse & Konyáriné, 2008; Tamási, 2005a, 2005b). This literature, although it included 
some prevalence studies, predominantly discussed the issue from a criminal, juridical or 
psychological point of view, or was written as guidelines for people in relevant professions, 
like police officers or child-care workers (but never journalists). As Tóth and Róbert note, a 
significant proportion of this literature has an overtly anti-feminist tone, as a reaction to the 
first-wave feminist studies on the issue, and is centred around the claim that victims are 
men and women equally (2010, pp. 32-33).9 
 The term “domestic violence” (családon belüli erőszak), as the above list 
demonstrates, had a relatively extended meaning – it included, for example, child abuse, 
which may look odd to Anglo-American readers – and moreover encompassed both 
feminist and family-violence approaches that – as in the Anglo-American world – 
characteristically clashed over the significance of the gender aspect (for these two 
approaches in the US, see Kurz, 1989). No wonder, therefore, that scholars repeatedly 
reported that people in relevant professions still tended to be confused about the meaning 
of this type of violence (Herczog, 2009; Tóth, 2014).10  
Nevertheless, domestic violence has recently become a “hot topic” in Hungary due 
to a number of cultural and political factors. The political scandal that surrounded the 
passage of the Intimate Partner Violence Act in 2013, the growing number since the 2010s 
of (female) public personalities disclosing that they are survivors of domestic violence and 
the recent spread of new, networked forms of feminist media activism that reach a broader 
public than the traditional feminist media activism of preceding years have all contributed 
to domestic violence now being at the centre of public attention in Hungary. Overall, it is 
this historical process, here briefly outlined, during which domestic violence emerged from 
                                                 
9 It is worth noting that this rise of scholarly publications on the issue was accompanied by a number of not 
strictly academic pieces of writing, typically written for a broader public and predominantly employing a 
feminist approach: fieldwork-based, book-length essays (Haas, 2005; Hercsel, 2018; Nagy, 2005), 
information booklets (e.g. NANE, 1999; Szil, 2005) or mixed-genre publications (Bonino & Szil, 2006). 
Translations of English-language resources were also on the rise (e.g. Evans, 1992/2004; Johnsson-
Latham, 2005/2007; McMillan, 2007/2009).  
10 The National Institute of Criminology (OKRI) defined domestic violence (családon belüli erőszak) in 
2005 in the following way: “violence, abuse, ill-treatment that includes all forms of physical, sexual, 
emotional abuse or neglect, and occurs between individuals who live in the same household and depend 
one on another in physical, emotional, financial, legal terms” (see Virág, 2005b). 
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silence and became a hot topic in the country over the past decades, that the present thesis 
focuses on, with special attention to the role of the media in this. 
 
 
1.3 The Hungarian media from a feminist perspective: Gaps in the existing literature 
 
Although the rapid changes that took place in the media systems of CEE countries after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall attracted significant international scholarly attention, these studies, 
especially initially, predominantly focused on media regulation, policy changes and their 
function in fostering new democracies. Much less attention fell on the investigation of the 
broader cultural and ideological significance of these changes, or their contribution to 
reproducing existing social inequalities such as that between the sexes (see Havens, Imre & 
Lustyik, 2013, pp. 2-3). Although recently CEE countries – and even the broader region of 
EU countries from the former Soviet bloc – have started to attract the attention of feminist 
media scholars (for research on Hungarian media specifically, see e.g. Barát, 2011; Imre, 
2008, 2009, 2012; Norocel, 2018; Rédai, 2012), English-language literature on the media 
portrayal of domestic violence in these countries remains at best sporadic (for a notable 
exception see Băluţă, 2015 from Romania). As indicated earlier, Hungary has produced 
only one piece of English-language scholarly writing on the subject, an article discussing 
an anti-violence campaign video (Goehring, Renegar & Puhl, 2017). 
 Similarly to English-language publications, Hungarian-language literature on the 
media portrayal of domestic violence is limited, indeed restricted, as noted earlier, to only 
two publications (Balogh, Kassa & Sinkó, 2011; Császár & Gregor, 2016). Moreover, even 
the broader field of gender and the media is currently largely under-explored in Hungarian-
language research. While the media have been intensively explored from feminist 
perspectives in English-speaking Western countries since the 1970s (for overview see e.g. 
Gallagher 2003; Mendes & Carter 2008), in Hungary this perspective has started to emerge 
only since the early 2000s, and has not produced much research. Lately linguists working 
on gender in language have begun to fill this gap, producing a body of research that 
explores the intersections of gender and the media in Hungary through the analysis of 
media texts (see e.g. Dér, 2007, 2009; Eklics, 2013; Kegyesné Szekeres, 2007; Virágh, 
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2013). Kegyesné Szekeres's (2007) analysis, for example, focuses on the textual strategies 
that Hungarian print media texts have typically employed in the 2000s in order to push 
successful women professionals back into conservative gender roles. Similarly, Margit 
(2002), in one of the very first publications, used interviews to map out the gendered 
aspects of editorial practices of major Hungarian daily newspapers, and gave a shocking 
snapshot of the sexist newsroom culture in the country in the 1990s.11  
 It is also worth noting the Global Media Monitoring Project (GMMP), an 
international project registering the presence of women in national news discourses, the 
Hungary country report for which was produced by a local gender equality NGO (Igen 
Egyesület) and which was made available in both Hungarian and English: the report 
established the gendered patterns of Hungarian news omissions and stereotyping (2005, 
2010).12  The GMMP report from 2010 also claimed that, compared with 2005, there had 
been a slight increase in news stories that addressed issues of gender equality, but there 
were “still four times more news stories [...] that reinforced gender stereotypes than stories 
that challenged them” (p. 4). 
 While the aforementioned research has been done by independent researchers, 
lately the Hungarian state, too, has begun to investigate the subject. In 2016 the National 
Media and Infocommunications Authority (Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság) 
published a 136-page-long report on the representation of women on Hungarian television, 
and to a lesser extent radio, and respective audience attitudes. It encompassed four media 
genres (broadcast magazine programmes, soap operas, cartoon series for children and 
advertisements) and contained an additional chapter on “Abused Women in the Media”, the 
latter dedicated exclusively to the news media coverage of one case, a sexual assault at a 
                                                 
11 Margit diagnosed, among other things, a strong resistance from editors' side to so-called “feminist issues” 
such as abortion or violence against women, as a result of which these issues were pushed into a “spiral of 
silence”, as she stated, that is they were repeatedly blocked at all levels of decision processes in 
newsrooms. The two excerpts below from the interviews she carried out with female journalists are very 
illustrative in this respect: “I wanted to write about violence against women in 1995. I had a fight ending 
in shouting with my editor, who told me that I was lying. He told me that it was impossible that a woman 
would put up with her husband battering, humiliating and raping her for years”. “Once I was writing 
about marital rape: I was subject to public ridicule in the editorial room” (Margit, 2002).  
12 Specifically, in 2005 only 12% of news subjects were women in Hungary and in 2010 25% (the global 
averages in these two years were 21% and 24%). The stereotypical representation of women in news 
discourse manifested, among other ways, as their very rare appearance in prestigious occupations (such as 
politicians or businesspeople), and the fact that they had the most chance of appearing on screens as 
celebrities, housewives or sexual objects (GMMP, 2005, p. 10). Women, in general, tended to appear as 
private persons or as representatives of popular opinion (GMMP, 2010, p. 4).  
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university in 2014 (therefore not relevant from the point of view of domestic violence) (pp. 
65-75). This state-financed report did not contain an overall conclusion, and its quality was 
questionable, both in terms of its unclear research methodology and of the lack of relevant 
literature, which resulted in over-optimistic, uninformed conclusions and a lack of overall 
evaluation of the findings.  
 This relative lack of awareness of gender dimension in the media in Hungary, as 
exemplified by the above-mentioned scarcity of relevant literature on the subject, is also 
underlined to some extent by today’s still widespread ignorance and insensitivity of media 
professionals with regard to gender issues in the country. Although MÚOSZ, the 
Association of Journalists in Hungary, does have a “Women’s Department”, which has in 
the past organised a limited number of conferences on the subject of women and the media, 
and there are also NGOs (NANE, MONA, Igen Egyesület) providing gender-training 
seminars for journalists, their impact on mainstream media professionals is rather small 
(although in the last couple of years, compared with earlier times, there has been a notable 
increase). Currently, awareness of gender in the media does not form part of journalists’ 
formal training. However, recently a 48-page-long textbook aimed at raising journalists’ 
gender awareness was published by Független Médiaközpont, an NGO promoting ethical 
journalism in the country (2014), and similarly Macharia and Morinière's Learning 
Resource Kit for Gender-Ethical Journalism has been published in Hungarian translation 
(2012/2014). 
 In conclusion, currently both international and domestic media scholars tend to 
overlook the gendered aspects of the Hungarian media, and consequently literature 
considering domestic violence from a media-related point of view is scarce. Therefore, in 
the next section I turn my attention to international literature that explores more broadly 
domestic violence as a public issue in Hungary. I argue that, although this research line 
brings us closer to the core focus of my thesis, still this literature repeatedly ignores the 
media-related aspects of the domestic violence story, and this omission is characteristic not 
only of Hungary, but also of other CEE countries. 
 
 
1.4 The constraints of the “legal fetishism” perspective in Central-Eastern European 
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countries and its implications for discussing domestic violence as a public issue  
 
At present, there is a lack in existing literature regarding how discourses on domestic 
violence have changed in the mediated public sphere over time in Hungary. Existing 
Hungarian-language research on domestic violence, as noted in section 1.1, is mostly 
limited to discussing the issue from criminal, juridical or psychological points of view. 
English-language research – which often discusses the case of Hungary within the 
framework of cross-country comparisons – although relatively abundant in publications 
that consider domestic violence as an object of public discourses in Hungary, is strongly 
public-policy-oriented and therefore tends to overlook the role of the media (see Dombos, 
Horváth & Krizsán, 2007; Fabian, 2010c, 2014a, 2017; Krizsán, Paantjens & Lamoen, 
2005; Krizsán & Popa, 2010, 2014; Krizsán & Roggeband, 2018a; Tóth 2014). This 
literature reproduces the kind of “legal fetishism” that Slovak-Hungarian-American scholar 
Vanya identified in 2006 as a crucial aspect of anti-violence feminist activism in the CEE 
region (2006a, p. v.). Specifically, legal fetishism, as Vanya states, involves a strong 
prioritisation of lobbying for legislative and other public policy measures against domestic 
violence, such as the introduction of separate laws on domestic violence, restraining orders 
or policy guidelines, at the expense of reaching out to broader publics, raising public 
awareness of the issue, and in general transforming broader cultural perceptions about 
gender and violence (Vanya, 2006a, pp. 164-168).13  
 Accordingly, this body of English-language literature mostly focuses on legislative 
and policy changes and the parliamentary debates around these, such as the first wave of 
anti-domestic violence measures introduced in the country between 2003 and 2009 (police 
guidelines and restraining orders) and, most recently, the adoption of a Law on Intimate 
Partner Violence in 2013 (on the latter see especially Fabian, 2014a; for a brief overview 
                                                 
13 These measures too can have a “symbolic message” for the broader public: the criminalisation of 
domestic violence, for example, can powerfully disseminate the idea that domestic violence is a form of 
violence, and therefore unacceptable. Vanya, however, argues that an exclusive focus on legal and policy 
changes, and the concomitant neglect of society's collective learning process about domestic violence, 
may well pose a risk to the effectiveness of the legislative measures already introduced (2006a, pp. 167-
168). This insufficiency of legal remedies and public policies alone is indeed starting to be acknowledged 
by existing literature, which, after its initial optimism following the first gains in the field of legal 
remedies, has now become more sceptical about the effectiveness of top-down interventions only, and is 
increasingly connecting this lack of effectiveness to the “conservative views” that CEE societies share 
about gender and families (see e.g. Krizsán & Popa, 2014; Krizsán & Roggeband, 2018a; Tóth, 2014). 
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see Krizsán & Roggeband, 2018b). There is also a small body of scholarly literature on 
domestic violence as an object of the feminist social movement in the country (Fabian, 
2009, 2010b, 2014b; Vanya, 2006b), but these texts similarly focus heavily on legislative 
and policy changes, and only sporadically touch upon the issue of media activism against 
domestic violence.  
 To be sure, the investigation of legislative and other state-level policy measures 
against domestic violence is an important field of study, and contributes greatly to 
understanding what has happened in Hungary in the field of domestic violence since the 
issue emerged in the country's national public sphere in the early 2000s. An increased 
research focus on these policy instruments, however, has been combined with neglect of 
other, similarly important, aspects of the domestic violence story: most importantly, the 
role of the media and their power to construct domestic violence for a broader public, and 
thereby enable citizens on the one hand to learn more about gender and violence or on the 
other hand to develop any moral, political or emotional engagement at all towards the 
issue. This potential role of the media in raising public awareness of domestic violence and 
contributing to broader transformations in social perceptions of domestic violence – a 
transformation that Polcz's book and its changing interpretations, discussed earlier, well 
exemplify – is currently severely under-researched with regard not only to Hungary, but, as 
I demonstrate in section 1.2, to the entire CEE region. 
 The existing literature, besides focusing on legislative and policy changes, as 
mentioned, also tends to employ narratives and analytical frameworks that leave out the 
role of the media in these changes. Instead, changes are examined as products of backstage 
negotiations between local political authorities and anti-violence activists or feminist lobby 
groups, or understood as outcomes of external pressure executed on the Hungarian (or 
other CEE) state by international and supranational institutions, notably the European 
Union. Even if the role of the media is noticed here and there, this role is quickly 
downplayed, or – as is typical in the literature on Hungary – converted into an appreciation 
of the individual efforts of feminist activists in the country, and the underlying media-
related mechanisms are not investigated at all (see e.g. Fabian, 2010a, p. 21; Fabian, 2014, 
pp. 161-162; Vanya, 2006b, p. 122-124). There are even entire forms of feminist activism 
that have fallen through the gaps of research, such as, for example, the recently emerging 
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digital feminist activism against domestic violence in Hungary, which relies strongly on 
social media tools. This novel form of activism remains outside the national research 
agenda, despite the fact that it was launched against a failed inclusion of domestic violence 
in the parliamentary agenda in 2012, so the topic is clearly connected to current legislative 
and policy agenda. 
 
 
1.5 Domestic violence as a public issue: Shifting the existing focus from legislative and 
policy changes to the media and mediated public discourse 
 
A shift of focus from legislative and policy changes to the public sphere and media-related 
developments implies, first of all, a change of vocabulary. Previous literature has made 
sense of the past through the lens of such notions as the adoption of specific laws or 
international norms, policy changes, measures and outcomes, implementation mechanisms. 
In contrast to this vocabulary, a media-focused approach to domestic violence requires the 
exploration of the subject through such notions as, for example, public visibility and public 
awareness, the inclusion/exclusion of the issue in the media/public agenda, the discursive 
construction of domestic violence in media texts, the diffusion in broader society of certain 
ideas, perspectives and discourses on domestic violence, relevant media discussions or lack 
of discussion of the issue. As the latter list illustrates, this domain, which forms the core 
focus of my thesis, is in many respects different from what has been covered by previous 
research in Hungary.  
 At the same time, however, it needs to be acknowledged that the three areas of 
domestic violence touched upon in the previous section, that is domestic violence as a 
public issue constructed by the media, domestic violence as an object of legislative and 
policy changes, and finally domestic violence as an object of feminist social movement and 
activism, are all mutually interrelated territories, and therefore cannot be fully separated. A 
goal of this thesis, in this respect, is, rather than offering a separate account of the media 
portrayal of domestic violence in Hungary, to shed light on the media-related and public-
sphere-related aspect of the domestic violence story – an aspect that previous literature has 
so far ignored. In the following chapters, I enquire into the role of the news media in 
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constructing domestic violence in the public eye. In Hungary, in contrast to the UK, it was 
originally the news media that brought domestic violence to public attention, specifically in 
2002 in connection with a tragic case of parricide (a teenage girl, Kitti Simek, shot dead 
her abusive stepfather). As I later explain in more detail, the news media have been actively 
circulating discourses on domestic violence in Hungarian society and participating in 
shaping public narratives around it since the issue first erupted into public attention during 
the case of Kitti Simek.   
 The place of this 2002 case in existing literature further illustrates why a media-
focused approach would be fruitful here. This literature repeatedly identifies the launch of 
Hungarian feminist activism against domestic violence with the “decisive moment” on 20 
September 2002 when Krisztina Morvai – a “lone feminist legal scholar” (Fabian, 2010a, 
p. 21) and long-time advocate of the criminalisation of domestic violence – appeared in a 
public debate on child abuse broadcast live on television, and at one moment turned 
directly to television viewers and asked for their support for the criminalisation of domestic 
violence (see e.g. Fabian, 2014, pp. 161-162; Morvai, 2004; Vanya, 2006b, pp.122-124). 
These authors convincingly argue that Morvai's passionate invocation of public support 
was met with approval, and in the following months a previously unforeseen number of 
supporting signatures poured into the offices of feminist NGOs.14 Elected officials also 
embraced the issue and in subsequent years, for the first time in the history of the country, a 
wave of policy changes came into effect that addressed domestic violence. What is not 
addressed in these accounts, however, is the fact that the issue of domestic violence was 
not brought into public awareness by Morvai alone, since by the time she appeared on 
television the issue had already been extensively discussed in the media for weeks in the 
context of the tragic case of Kitti Simek.  
 The process by which domestic violence emerged into the limelight and began to 
receive public support in the country is, in other words, much more complex and much less 
uni-directional than tends to be portrayed in the accounts currently available. The story 
about the “lone feminist scholar” who spoke up against domestic violence on television 
                                                 
14 The so-far most detailed account of interactions between Hungarian feminist activists and the media can 
be found in Vanya (2006a), where the author – drawing on the accounts of activists who either witnessed 
this process in person or heard about it – recalls the “decisive moment” in 2002 and the subsequent flow 
of supporting signatures into the offices of groups active against domestic violence.  
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and made the whole country step up against the issue is catchy, but simplifying. Such 
“decisive moments” usually have their own social and historical conditions and – given 
that this one happened in a TV studio – media-related conditions as well. Specifically, with 
the issue of domestic violence temporarily a hot topic in the Hungarian media, Hungarian 
feminist activists cleverly recognised the strategic importance of this situation and made 
use of it. But the reasons for this “hotness” were outside the control of Hungarian feminists 
– who back in 2002 did not have any impact on media agendas – and were probably more 
rooted in Hungarian media practices, for example the fact that teenage murderers had high 
newsworthiness in Hungarian newsrooms.  
 In summary, from a feminist media studies perspective, the narrative of Hungarian 
domestic violence that has been constructed by existing research – which currently reads as 
a story of legislative and policy changes generated by backstage negotiations between local 
political authorities and anti-violence activists or understood as outcomes of external 
pressure exerted on the Hungarian state – raises a number of questions, all connected to the 
media-related aspects of this story. Therefore, the task is to fill these media-related “gaps” 
that the current narrative has failed to reflect on. The opening and closing years for my 
research, therefore, are 2002 and 2013, two years already acknowledged in existing 
literature as key moments in this story, although their media-related aspects have so far not 
been considered, but only their relevance to legal/policy changes or feminist activism (see 
e.g. Fabian, 2014, p. 161-165; Krizsán & Roggeband, 2018b; Morvai, 2004; Vanya, 2006b, 
p.122-124;).  
 Specifically, I have taken the year of 2002 as a starting point because – as the 
archive of the Hungarian news agency MTI (Magyar Távirati Iroda, n.d.) demonstrates – 
domestic violence had previously  been mentioned only sporadically in the Hungarian 
media. I argue that the issue entered the media agenda through the tragic story of Kitti 
Simek (even before feminist activism would have raised public attention). As a closing 
point to my research period, I take the years 2012-2013. In these years, similarly to 2002, 
domestic violence was a “hot” media story. It was also an object of feminist media 
activism, with a push for criminalisation – and in the immediate aftermath of a domestic-
violence-related political scandal that the news media had covered extensively a Law on 
Intimate Partner Violence entered into force in 2013 (a policy instrument that feminist 
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activists had been lobbying for since 2002). This narrative, therefore, offers an opportunity 
to investigate the ways in which domestic violence emerged into public visibility and was 
progressively introduced into, and narrated in, the Hungarian media in the period until its 
criminalisation, when domestic violence was officially acknowledged as a type of violence. 
 
 
1.6 Opening the “black box” from the period between 2002 and 2013: Mediated 
discourses of domestic violence, discursive change and the agency of media texts in 
facilitating social change 
 
The years 2002, then, was when domestic violence first emerged into the Hungarian 
mediated public sphere, and 2013 was when both feminist activism and legal changes 
marked an, at least temporarily, new stage with the criminalisation of domestic violence in 
the country. The goal of this thesis is to open the “black box” from the period between 
these two dates and to shed light on how public discourse on domestic violence changed 
historically in the given time period, alongside the media platforms and technologies 
becoming available in an ever-changing media environment. My core interest is, as noted 
earlier, that of discursive change – the ongoing re-distribution, restructuring and re-
utilisation of available discursive elements in order to progressively produce new meanings 
of domestic violence and circulate these in broader society through the media – and how 
this ongoing change has ultimately fed into long-term shifts in dominant meanings and 
produced a qualitative difference between the situations in 2002 and in 2013. Discourses 
will be of central importance in my study, as they re-present the world to us and also relate 
and orient us towards others in this world (Chouliaraki, 2008b, pp. 688-691; Foucault, 
1969/1972, 1975/1977). Since the given period was also rich in rapid changes in the media 
environment – first commercial broadcasting and later a rapid spread of networked media – 
the mediation of discourses of domestic violence also needs to be explored from the point 
of view of historical change in the available set of media platforms and technologies, and 
the impact of these changes on discourse, perspectives and voices with regard to domestic 
violence.  
 In summary, my research brings together domestic violence as discourse, the 
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symbolic power of the media to influence our collective constructions of the social world 
through their capacity to circulate discourses – including discourses on domestic violence – 
in societies (Couldry, 2003), and ultimately the agency of media texts in (emotionally, 
morally, or politically) engaging publics with public issues and with the suffering of 
victims of violence, and thereby contributing to societal change (Chouliaraki, 2006, 
2008a).  
 Based on the above, my research questions are the following:  
 
1. (main question) What specific discourses did the portrayal of domestic violence 
in the Hungarian news media use, combine and/or challenge between 2002 and 
2013?  
 
2. (supplementary question 1) What forms of emotion and moral norms did the 
media discursively articulate with regard to the suffering of the victims of domestic 
violence during this period? And, related, how did the media discursively activate 
certain moral and emotional proposals for engagement with victims and 
perpetrators, and more generally when faced with the issue of domestic violence?  
 
3. (supplementary question 2) What were the implications of the above-mentioned 
discourses for power inequalities and practices of social intervention? 
 
4. (supplementary question 3) How might the historical changes in media ecology 
have also contributed to changing the discourses on domestic violence in the 
Hungarian media? 
 
In order to answer these questions, in Chapter 2 I interconnect three distinct but 
complementary theoretical perspectives in order to obtain an overall theoretical framework 
for investigating the issue of domestic violence in Hungary between 2002 and 2013. 
Specifically, I bring together: i) a Foucauldian understanding of domestic violence as 
discourse, combined with the concept of hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001); ii) the media 
as both a social institution and a symbolic space with symbolic power to impact our 
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perception of the social world (including that of domestic violence); and finally iii) the 
agency of media texts in emotionally, morally, or politically engaging publics with public 
issues and the suffering of others. 
 In Chapter 3 I elaborate on the methodological framework of my research and 
specifically the choice of Faircloughian Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and its 
application to media texts selected from the mainstream Hungarian broadcast news media 
(television), employed in a historically comparative case study research design. This 
chapter also aims to clarify the rationale behind my choice of cases, and their relation to the 
ever-changing media ecology that the genre of television news faced between 2002 and 
2013 in Hungary. I also discuss here why historical analysis and television journalism still 
matter, despite today's general tendency in media studies to focus on the present and the 
latest technological innovations.   
 Chapters 4, 5 and 6 discuss my three cases, from 2002, 2010 and 2012-13 
respectively. The case of 14-year-old Kitti Simek from 2002, discussed in Chapter 4, has a 
special importance in my narrative, since it was through this news story that the issue of 
domestic violence entered the Hungarian mediated public sphere, that it was named, and 
that it came to be represented as a special type of violence. This new act of naming 
indicated the emergence of a new discourse, although at that time the issue was mostly 
constructed with a focus on children as victims. Here my major argument is that, although 
the media portrayal of this case was suitable for raising public attention to the existence of 
domestic violence and constructing it as an issue of public concern, this did not hold true 
with regard to the nature of domestic violence. This case was mostly portrayed as unique 
and extraordinary and therefore the chance to present domestic violence as having high 
prevalence in societies was missed. Moreover, the gender aspect of violence was sidelined, 
and a discourse of gender-neutral victimhood emerged. 
 The 2010 case of Roland Damu, a Hungarian soap opera actor and television 
celebrity who raped and battered his ex-girlfriend, discussed in Chapter 5, became 
particularly relevant because it introduced a novel focus on adult women as typical victims, 
and thereby unambiguously gendered domestic violence in the public eye, while at the 
same time also powerfully introducing victim-blaming in media discussions of the issue. 
As I argue, this case, by giving prolonged and extensive coverage to a case of domestic 
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violence that involved a prevalent type of male violence against women, leading to the 
incarceration of the perpetrator, the Hungarian news media successfully raised attention to 
domestic violence both as gendered and as criminalised by Hungarian law. On the other 
hand, the public debate that this case provoked ultimately closed down possibilities for 
challenging patriarchal assumptions about domestic violence, including on issues of 
agency and victimhood, as well as the emotions associated with these. 
 My final case is that of politician József Balogh, from 2012-2013, discussed in 
Chapter 6, which explores how the discursive terrain around domestic violence had shifted 
by 2012-2013 so that this could develop into a fully-fledged political scandal and inflate 
public emotions around the issue. As I argue in this chapter, at stake in this case was the re-
opening of a public and symbolic space where the boundaries of public morality in the face 
of domestic violence could be discussed, negotiated and affirmed, and the socially accepted 
expressions of public emotion with regard to domestic violence shaped and settled. 
Chapter 7 is dedicated to reflecting on the empirical chapters and on how the results in 
these answer the research questions. Here I summarise my findings and also consider ways 
forward for future research.  
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2. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In the following pages, I describe and interconnect three distinct but complementary 
theoretical perspectives in order to obtain an overall theoretical framework for 
investigating the issue of domestic violence in Hungary between 2002 and 2013. This 
framework aims to bring together: i) an understanding of domestic violence as discourse 
(without questioning the physical/carnal materiality of the violence); ii) the media as both a 
social institution and a symbolic space with symbolic power to influence our perception of 
the social world (including that of domestic violence); and finally, iii) the agency of media 
texts in emotionally, morally or politically engaging publics with public issues and the 
suffering of others (and thereby acting as facilitators of social change). This framework 
also introduces the basic conceptual vocabulary that I use in the following chapters. 
 Firstly, I approach domestic violence – in line with post-structuralist insights – as 
discursively constructed, that is inevitably relying on semiotic systems such as language 
and image in order to become at all meaningful or identifiable in the social world. Here I 
present domestic violence as a discursive object which, ever since it originally emerged in 
second-wave feminism in the UK and the US, has been repeatedly and inevitably exposed 
to attempted redefinition by hegemonic interventions. At the same time, after giving a brief 
overview of the literature on domestic violence, I argue that it is a prevalent form of 
gendered interpersonal, structural and symbolic violence, enabled by existing gender 
inequalities and also characteristically relegated to the domain of private matters. By 
pointing out that exclusion from the domain of public matters is constitutive of domestic 
violence, since the “private” nature of this type of violence is a widespread justification for 
social actors to abstain from intervention or from acknowledging the prevalence of the 
issue, I place it in strong connection with the private-public divide and thereby also with 
the matter of achieving public visibility.  
 Secondly, I identify the media as having a key role in shaping and circulating the 
social meanings of domestic violence in modern societies, through the symbolic power 
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they possess not only to reflect but to construct our perception of the social world, and also 
their institutional power to give publicity to – that is, to draw public attention to – certain 
issues, and thereby endow these with (various degrees of) public relevance. In so doing, I 
argue that the media are indispensable for reaching a change in the perception of domestic 
violence at a broader social level and effectively questioning what is considered “common 
sense” regarding this type of violence. Based on the legacy of the Arendtian concept of the 
public sphere (1958) as a space of appearance, I argue that it is in the mainstream media 
that the social meanings of domestic violence are most powerfully produced, in strong 
connection with the large amount of public attention concentrated there. Moreover, my 
analytical focus falls on news as the genre most indicative of what counts as of interest to 
society as a whole, and news has indeed played a crucial role in Hungary in bringing 
domestic violence to citizens' attention. 
 Thirdly, I bring together literature on the mediation of suffering and on the feminist 
study of media representations of domestic violence, in order to further develop my 
analytical framework with attention both to gender bias in texts and to the agency of these 
same texts in emotionally, morally or politically engaging publics with the actors involved 
in domestic violence. In this section, I maintain that, while previous feminist literature 
convincingly argues that the mainstream media tend to downplay the prevalence of 
domestic violence in society (by presenting it as rare and/or marginal), to deem 
newsworthy only less prevalent, “exceptional” cases, and to differentiate between female 
victims on the basis of their degree of conformity to the current social order and to 
patriarchal ideals of femininity, this literature tends overall to cast the media as an 
institution of social control and therefore pays less attention to cases where the media may 
act as a facilitator of social change. Theories of the mediation of suffering, meanwhile, are 
typically less focused on gendered types of violence (such as domestic violence), but have 
a well-developed theory to capture the agency of media texts in engaging their publics 
morally and emotionally with spectacles of human suffering, as well as their agency in 
offering paradigmatic forms of feeling, of public conduct, and proposed forms of action on 
human suffering. 
 By bringing these two theoretical lenses together and entwining them in a 
Foucauldian framework combined with an insight into the symbolic power of the media, I 
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hope ultimately to reach an overall theoretical viewpoint from which the Hungarian news 
media’s portrayal of domestic violence can be analysed as a mediation of suffering where 
meaning-making claims regarding domestic violence are strongly intertwined with 
performative enactments of public emotions and with imagined moral and/or affective 
communities. This power of the news media to engage their publics morally and 
emotionally with human suffering and to set norms of acceptable public conduct vis-à-vis 
specific instances of domestic violence is a useful theoretical premise that makes it possible 
to link media texts to engaged publics and, through these engaged publics, to the potential 
for social action – thereby ultimately also acknowledging the capacity of the news media to 
facilitate social change with regard to domestic violence. This potential of the news media 
is of particular importance to the present study because it is seeking to grasp the role that 
the Hungarian news media played in shaping the understanding of domestic violence 
among a broader public over a period of 12 years. Specifically, the study seeks to capture a 
time period in Hungary when the issue of domestic violence reached the awareness of the 
media and of broader populations for the first time, entered the legislative system, 
generated changes in state policies, and also repeatedly provoked bottom-up public actions 
(such as petitions and demonstrations). In short, with a focus on domestic violence, this 
study sets out to analyse how, in a transitional period, the media and their narratives 
facilitated public awareness, encouraged collective action and participated in a broader 
process of social change.   
 
 
2.2 Epistemological foundations: Domestic violence as a discursive construction 
 
As a starting point, I take domestic violence as discursively constructed. This means that, 
while domestic violence has an irreducible dimension of bodily/emotional harm, it also 
inevitably relies on discourse in order to be at all thinkable or meaningful in the social 
world. Discursive constructed-ness here means acknowledging the fact that our perception 
of the social world is inevitably dependent on semiotic systems such as language and 
image, and it is these systems that control which elements of the continuum of reality (and 
in what combination) can become a meaningful unit. For example, in a case of domestic 
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violence, constructed-ness refers to the available social meanings that enable us, in the first 
place, to imagine: whether intimate partner relationships can be abusive; in which segments 
of society we tend to locate such relationships; what we think about the motivations and 
agency of people in these relationships; what assumptions we make about the prevalence of 
domestic violence in society, and even its possible causes or solutions. Acknowledging the 
discursive nature of domestic violence does not mean a denial of its material nature (that it 
causes physical and/or emotional suffering), neither does it turn domestic violence into an 
object of subjective judgement. Rather, this approach helps us to explain the contested 
nature and the relative fluidity of definitions of domestic violence and its cognate terms 
currently in use in the public sphere, in line with the epistemological models now widely 
accepted (including those of third-wave feminism).15 Moreover, this approach makes it 
                                                 
15 Naturally, third-wave feminism is by no means a unified category;  it is better to speak instead of third-
wave feminisms in the plural. At the same time, however, this wave is generally characterised by a 
suspicion of essentialising and universalising categories of thinking and, accordingly, a tendency to use 
epistemological models that fit with this suspicion, like those of postmodernism and post-structuralism, 
which offer themselves as natural allies of a sort in doing away with metaphysical assumptions inherited 
from the past, and has generally presumed the (discursive) constructed-ness of the social. The strong 
impact of post-structuralism on third-wave feminism can be illustrated by the fact that in the 1990s, that is 
the decade usually indicated as when third-wave feminism started, there was an intensive and years-long 
public discussion in the main academic forums of feminism about what potential contributions post-
structuralism could make to feminism and how feminism could embrace this kind of thinking. Quite a 
number of leading feminist thinkers participated in this discussion, including Nancy Fraser, Judith Butler, 
Linda J. Nicholson and Seyla Benhabib. (On third-wave feminism, see Kroløkke & Sørensen, 2006. On 
the above-mentioned  public discussions in the 1990s, see Nicholson, 1990 and 1994. On other 
theorisations of the relationship between feminism and postmodern and post-structural thinking at the 
beginning of the 1990s, see Butler, 1990; Cornell 1992; Fraser & Bartky, 1992; Fraser & Nicholson, 
1988; Hutcheon, 1989; Wicke & Ferguson, 1994. On the various stages of Western feminism, and what 
was mostly at stake in these, see Kroløkke & Sørensen, 2006).  
 Generally speaking, these days the history of the feminist movement in the Western world is mostly 
told through the analytical category of “waves”. This history of “waves” inevitably includes (as does any 
historical periodisation) simplifications and generalisations, which I too inevitably make when briefly 
recalling here the most widely cited significant aspects of these waves, in order to better contextualise 
third-wave feminism. The three fundamental waves of Western feminism are today understood as : i) first-
wave feminism, usually understood as lasting from the last decades of the 1800s to the early 1900s, and 
mostly narrated as focusing on gaining equal access and rights for women in fields where their social 
inequality was explicit (for example, their right to vote, rights to education or employment); ii) second-
wave feminism, lasting from the late 1960s or early 1970s to the turn of the 1980s/1990s, and understood 
as having risen in the context of other leftist movements in Western societies (like the 1968 student 
protests in Europe, or the civil rights and black power movements in the US). As Kroløkke and Sørensen 
point out (2006, p. 9), many well known formulations associated with feminism (such as “sisterhood is 
powerful”, “consciousness raising”, or “the personal is political”) date back to this second wave. In 
contrast with the earlier wave, which was characteristically “white” and focused on legal rights, the 
second wave markedly embraced the voices of women of colour and third-world women, and had a 
distinct focus on “culture”. It questioned and challenged the dominant gendered “codes” with the help of 
which societies perceived and organised their own social reality (Melucci, 1996). It was during this wave 
too, when academic feminism began to flourish, that the issue of domestic violence emerged. iii) The third 
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possible to describe historically and locally changing constructions of domestic violence 
(including the frequent de-gendering of the concept) as a product of struggles between 
differing discourses for hegemony over the meaning of domestic violence.  
 The concept of domestic violence that I am using here is indebted to post-
structuralism and more precisely to Michel Foucault. Post-structuralism inherited from 
structuralism (and from the Saussurian linguistic model that structuralism relied upon) their 
insights into the linguistic nature of reality, into the relation – understood as contingent – 
between signifier and signified, and into language as a system where the meaning of 
discreet elements is always dependent on their relative position within broader linguistic 
units such as the sentence (Saussure, 1916/1960). This epistemological model has been 
modified at two crucial points by post-structuralism (see Hall, 1997, pp. 15-63). Firstly, 
post-structuralism ceased to assume that there is a one monolithic signifying system that 
structures our experience, and instead assumed that several systems are in operation at the 
same time, changing historically and locally, but also potentially clashing or overlapping 
with each other. Secondly, and relatedly, post-structuralism no longer understood subjects 
as mere functions of a signifying system and fully determined by it, but instead saw them 
as determined by several signifying systems at the same time. This implies a space of 
negotiation and agency for subjects. In this space there is always a (limited) set of subject 
positions available, and human subjects can negotiate these or even strategically use one 
subject position against another (see Hall, 1997, esp. pp. 35, 42). Foucault called these 
signifying systems discourses. 
 Within this conception of language, Foucault’s notion of discourse is a technology 
of power that produces knowledge through the historically and locally specific uses of 
language (statements) within specific contexts of use (1969/1972, 1975/1977). Discourse 
is, in this sense, a prerequisite of meaning-production. It is discourse that produces and 
defines the objects of our knowledge, by regulating what is thinkable, say-able, and in 
general meaningful (that is, what ways of talking are thinkable with regard to certain 
                                                                                                                                                    
wave, beginning in the 1990s (see also above), is often understood as closely connected with the playful, 
the construction of women as “assertive social agents”, and with an increased focus on domestic violence, 
on body-related social practices, and on the media see Kroløkke and Sørensen (2006, pp. 15-21); on self-
assertive consumerism and “faux feminism”, see Gill (2007), McRobbie (2009); on the rise of an anti-
feminist backlash, see Faludi (1991); for a brief account of all three “waves” of feminism, see Kroløkke 
and Sørensen (2006). 
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topics). It also restricts and excludes other potential forms of knowledge and ways of 
talking as unthinkable and/or devoid of meaning. Discourse, in this sense, is a technology 
of meaning-making that runs through social practices and institutions at a given time and in 
a given space, regulating the objects, subjects and practices of our knowledge (1969/1972, 
1975/1977). As a consequence, according to Foucault, the unity of a discourse is not based 
on an object or topic in common. This unity is rather assured by the space in which various 
objects emerge and are continuously transformed in accordance with certain formative 
rules, that is discursive regularities that govern ways and modes of object construction 
(Foucault, 1969/1972, pp. 32-33.). 
 Such rules of discourse, however, concern not only meaning-making, but, for 
Foucault, they are also about power as an immanent, constitutive and ineliminable 
“element” of the social, a multiplicity of force relations, a constantly changing application 
of tactics and strategies that organises social relationships and interactions. Every act of 
meaning-making is also a claim to power and a claim to truth (“truth effects”), and these 
claims are also in operation in the inevitably different ways in which subjects are addressed 
and positioned by discourse (see Foucault, 1976/1978, pp. 92-102; 1977/1980, pp. 131-
133). Discourse, knowledge and power are therefore inevitably intertwined. The 
Foucauldian claim that “it is in discourse that [strategies of] power and [techniques of] 
knowledge are joined together” (1976/1978, p. 100) also implies that discourses can be 
neither “true” or “false” nor “accepted” or “excluded” as a whole, and neither can they be 
completely fixed. It is rather on the level of the multiplicity of discursive elements –  that is 
in the way these are constantly re-distributed, restructured and re-utilised –  that these 
strategies and techniques come into play (1976/1978, pp. 98-100). This approach to 
discourse is elaborated further in Laclau and Mouffe's theory, where they combine the 
work of Foucault with that of Derrida (and to some extent Lacan) in order to re-formulate 
the old Gramscian concept of hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, pp. 93-148). They locate 
hegemony in the field of articulatory practices, that is practices that establish a relation 
among discursive elements so that their identity is modified as a result of these articulatory 
practices (p. 105). Hegemony, in their interpretation, is a temporary fixing of the meaning 
of discursive elements and, therefore, no hegemonic practice can emerge if a discursive 
field is free of rival meaning-making claims / forces (that is if meanings are fixed), or if 
36 
there is no instability in the “frontiers” that separate these forces (p. 136). 
 According to the post-structuralist legacy of Foucault (and of Laclau and Mouffe), 
domestic violence is discursive not only because a new discourse appeared at a certain 
point in history – in the present case, during the second wave of feminism at the beginning 
of the 1970s in the UK and the US, which made domestic violence one of its central 
objects and started to speak about it – but first of all because of the how of this speaking. 
Domestic violence, which previously had been treated either as a “private” family matter, 
or medicalised as “perverse” (that is categorised as sexual abuse), and even more often had 
merely gone unnoticed and unnamed, emerged as a meaningful unit in accordance with 
certain formative rules in second-wave feminism. Specifically, these determine that it 
qualifies as violence, and moreover as a gendered type of violence that is embedded in 
broader social structures of gender inequality (on gendered-ness and violence as the two 
crucial aspects of domestic violence that early second-wave feminist discourses sought to 
make explicit, see Boyle, 2005, p. xiii). These rules would not have been possible without 
the opening up of a new space for discursive formation (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 32), where 
surfaces that previously had not been in interaction – those of the family, gender equality 
and violence – could come into contact with each other. In retrospect it is possible to argue 
that domestic violence, as it emerged in second-wave feminism, did not fit with the 
received grand narratives of violence, according to which violence would gradually 
diminish in modern states, become criminalised, and would be mainly found on the edges 
of society where the deviant, the poor and other socially under-privileged groups would be 
its main users (see Walby 2012, pp. 96-97). In contrast to this received interpretation, 
domestic violence was described as part of everyday experience, prevalent in mainstream 
society, and moreover in one of the central institutions of the modern state, the family.  
 Consequently, the act of naming domestic violence as such was not a mere 
renaming of one slice of the social matrix, but an offer (and an invitation) to radically 
restructure our experience of the social, to see links between the family, gender equality 
and violence, and thereby to place each of these in a new light. Such an offer clashes with 
other discourses that structure relations between given surfaces completely differently 
(irrespective of whether these discourses already have any object comparable to domestic 
violence), and it opens up the space for hegemonic articulations and practices. 
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Understanding domestic violence in the context of discursive space, where, due to the 
simultaneous operation of several discourses, a constant re-distribution and re-structuring 
of discursive elements is inevitably taking place, is a useful explanatory framework for 
discussing the fluidity of definitions of domestic violence and the fact that domestic 
violence is highly debated today in the Western world, including in Hungary. I discuss both 
these phenomena more thoroughly in the following pages. 
 
 
2.3 Domestic violence as a discursive battlefield: Feminist constructions and their 
counter-constructions 
 
Domestic violence does not have a clear-cut definition. There is a relatively broad range of 
terms in use, which refer to roughly the same phenomenon, but with significant differences 
in their meaning (for example, “intimate partner violence”, “wife abuse”, “family 
violence”, “intimate terrorism” or “men's violence to known women”). This proliferation of 
terms is partly due to the nature of knowledge in the social sciences, where it  inevitably 
goes through re-contextualisations and paradigm shifts which result in the revision of 
terminology (for example, the coinage of the term “men's violence to known women” in 
third-wave feminism would not have been possible without an earlier shift and broadening 
of focus from “wives” and “battering” to include non-married female partners and non-
physical forms of violence). It may also be due to a feminist critical concern that finding a 
definition that will work for all situations and at all times is difficult, and that therefore the 
concept needs some strategic openness, flexibility and constant re-shaping. But, on the 
other hand, this proliferation is also a product of the fact that many rival meaning-making 
claims are made in connection with domestic violence in a multiplicity of discourses, 
including non-feminist and non-academic ones, and these discourses have no common 
ground for formative rules of object-construction. In fact, decisions about which term to 
use – and consequently how to construct the object that a given term refers to – is always 
the product of actual configurations of power between various discourses that are in 
operation in the construction of domestic violence at a given time and in a given space – 
and these discourses differ most over the issue of gender (on the importance of naming, see 
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Krizsán & Popa, 2014; Lamb, 1991; Lamb & Keon, 1995; Verloo, 2007). Indeed, ever 
since domestic violence emerged as a discursive object in the early 1970s and became a 
subject of public discussion, it has been constantly exposed to attempts at hegemonic 
intervention by discourses that question the feminist frames of domestic violence, and most 
importantly its status as violence and its gendered nature.  
 Overall, discourses that operate in the construction of the meaning of domestic 
violence in specific contexts – and which altogether make up the order of discourse on 
domestic violence (see Foucault, 1971/1981) – can be very diverse.16 Of these, feminist 
discourses, despite their differing definitions of domestic violence, all construct it as 
gendered and as a type of violence (moreover, a type of violence that should be understood 
in the context of patriarchal social arrangements), thereby providing a high degree of 
consistency in the formative rules that guide their object construction. It is the questioning 
of either of these formative rules that qualifies other discourses, operating in roughly the 
same discursive space, as resistant or opposing forces to the feminist discourse. These 
opposing discourses – subsumed under the umbrella term of “patriarchal resistance” by 
Nancy Berns (2001, p. 262) – do not necessarily have a commonly shared and distinct set 
of rules of their own (that is, they do not form a unitary discourse), but are brought together 
through their resistance/opposition to the feminist constructions of domestic violence and 
their formative rules.17  
                                                 
16 Although the term “domestic violence”, which I am using here does not invite attention to the gendered 
nature of the violence it denotes, my choice of this term and not another is based on several facts:  1. 
“domestic violence” is used by both feminist and non-feminist discourses and is therefore more able to 
shed light on how the social meaning of this type of violence is always shaped by a multiplicity of 
discourses; 2. English-language academic publications written from a feminist perspective on domestic 
violence in Hungary have similarly chosen this term as the English equivalent of the Hungarian családon 
belüli erőszak (“violence in the family”); 3. as Jeff Hearn has noted, this is the term most often used 
throughout the world (1998, p. 28).  
17 I should, first of all, mention the so-called “family violence approach”, which, ever since domestic 
violence emerged as a concept in the 1970s, has continued to serve as the main gender-neutral framework 
for approaching the issue. Social scientists working within this framework – most notably Richard Gelles, 
Murray Straus and Suzanne Steinmetz, to name the most widely cited authors – tend to locate the roots of 
the problem in the particular family and its pathological coping behaviours, thereby identifying the issue 
as a family-level problem, to some extent further enabled by society's leniency towards violence in 
general. Therefore, these authors ignore precisely that component of the issue – (gendered) power 
inequalities – to which feminist approaches, including the present thesis, assign central relevance, by 
identifying this as the structural condition for the abuse (for a brief overview and comparison of these two 
approaches – i.e. the family violence approach, and the feminist approach – including their differences in 
naming violence, identifying its root causes, suggested interventions and even controversy over 
measurement tools, see Kurz, 1989). 
  On the other hand, even beyond these two opposing social scientific discourses, “patriarchal 
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 In line with feminist understandings, I take domestic violence as gendered and as a 
form of interpersonal, symbolic and structural violence. Domestic violence is symbolic in 
the sense that it both exploits and reproduces the “naturalisation” function of hegemonic 
discourses, that is their ability to legitimate and naturalise the status quo. Specifically, 
domestic violence is one of the many everyday social practices – although a relatively 
visible one by now – that (in historically and locally changing ways) reproduce and 
naturalise gender inequality, normative gender roles and heterosexual male supremacy 
(Hearn, 2012, p. 162), so that these appear to be a kind of “second nature” (Bourdieu, 
1998/2001; Butler, 1990). Although they too are originally discursive in nature, we do not 
perceive them as discursive because they are historically well-rooted and objectified in 
various forms of social institutions, habits and traditions – such as the patriarchal family – 
which altogether make them appear “natural”, “common-sensical” and “reasonable” 
(Bourdieu 1979/1984, 1998/2001). To put it more clearly, in the case of domestic violence 
there is a complex network of hidden assumptions about the “normal” and “natural” way of 
things in society (such as, for example, what “real” families, men and women should look 
like) that ultimately enable domestic violence to pass as an accepted and (until recently, 
mostly) unnoticed form of exercising patriarchal/masculine control over known women 
(Carter 1995). Domestic violence reproduces patriarchal social arrangements and also 
diverts attention from both victims' suffering and the fact that what we perceive as not 
being violence (that is, as a “legitimate” form of exercising control over fellow human 
beings) is already filtered by tacit assumptions about, as Hearn formulated it, “who is 
                                                                                                                                                    
resistance” to feminist constructions of domestic violence have also been repeatedly noted by feminist 
literature on less explicit and more subtle discursive levels since the early 2000s. Resistance of this kind 
has been documented across a range of countries and public discourses, such as the media, public policies, 
psychiatric and judicial discourses, and even volunteer services helping battered women (see e.g. Berns, 
2001 from the US; Nixon & Tutty, 2009 from Canada; Easteal, Holland & Judd 2015, from Australia; 
Thapar-Björkert & Morgan, 2010 from the UK; Krizsán & Popa, 2014 from Eastern Europe; Hearn, Strid, 
Husu & Verloo, 2016 from the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, to name just a few). These studies have 
pointed out the subtle and repeated de-gendering of domestic violence in these counter-constructions, but 
have also revealed various other recurrent strategies by which the status of domestic violence as violence 
can be questioned and/or blurred. These include the obfuscation of perpetrators' responsibility or the 
concealment of their violence (Phillips & Henderson, 1999; Coates & Wade, 2007), the diversion of 
attention from perpetrators' responsibility to that of victims (Berns 2001; Thapar-Björkert & Morgan, 
2010; Easteal et al., 2015) and the concealing of victims’ resistance or blaming and pathologising of 
victims (Coates & Wade, 2007; Thapar-Björkert & Morgan, 2010), to name just some typical examples. 
The absence from discourse of men as perpetrators, combined with the visibility of women as victims, can 
also be considered as typical (Phillips & Henderson, 1999). I discuss the media-related findings later in 
more detail. 
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allowed to do what to whom” (1998, p. 15). 
 Furthermore, domestic violence is also structural in the sense that, despite 
occurring between individuals, it is rooted in well-established structures of domination and 
inequalities of power at a broader social level (Galtung, 1969). First of all, there is that of 
historically far-reaching heterosexual male supremacy (hooks, 1984), but this also 
intersects with a complex range of other power inequalities like those based on race, 
ethnicity, class, religion or even age (Crenshaw, 1994; Gill & Mason-Bish, 2013). In 
general, what counts as violence – that is, why certain types of violence get noticed and 
condemned, while others pass unnoticed and/or accepted – is strongly linked to broader 
social structures of domination, and therefore violence is also a form of social inequality 
(Hearn, 1998, p. 15). Moreover, whether a certain type of violence is acknowledged as 
violence in a given society largely shapes the possible courses of action that victims can 
follow when seeking help and support or in attempting to resist. It may also impact the 
ways in which perpetrators, including perpetrators of domestic violence, abuse (Stark, 
2007, pp. 172-196). Therefore, forms of domestic violence are typically historically, locally 
and culturally varied and generally context-specific (Hearn, 1998, pp. 31-32).  
 Nonetheless,  as feminist literature has repeatedly pointed out, of the many existing 
social inequalities that may show up in intimate relationships, it is most commonly gender 
inequality that perpetrators of domestic violence take advantage of, given that these 
relationships are typically built on practices that are guided by gender norms. Domestic 
violence is enabled by existing gendered social inequalities, and is also an instance of their 
enactment (Stark, 2007). It is one of the many ways in which male superordinate power – 
which was once taken as representing the “natural” way of things, but over recent decades 
has been powerfully questioned in many societies – can be established and re-established 
in private relationships at the expense of women's agency, and women's social gains in 
general (see e.g. Hearn et al. 2016, p. 553; Stark, 2007). In other words, domestic violence 
is an abuse of power that both capitalises on existing gendered power inequalities in 
societies and also seeks to cement – or even to increase – these in the context of private 
relationships in order to maximise perpetrators’ personal gains from these relationships. 
Since domestic violence primarily targets women, it also qualifies as a type of gender-
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based violence.18 
 Over recent decades, in feminist literature, domestic violence has been increasingly 
grasped in terms of a calculated, instrumental, ongoing and cumulative abuse of power and 
control in relationships (see e.g. Hearn, 1998; Johnson, 1995; Stark, 2007). This contrasts 
with early feminist understandings, which, by focusing on battering, unwittingly 
contributed to an understanding of the issue in line with the general connotations of the 
term “violence”, that is as episodes of use of physical force (see. e.g. Dobash & Dobash, 
1979; Martin, 1976).19 As Stark points out, domestic violence can best be understood as a 
type of political crime, and more specifically as an offence to liberty. It attacks and 
severely restricts the victim's agency by depriving victims of rights and resources that are 
“critical to personhood and citizenship”, and its consequences for victims are similar to 
experiences of entrapment, kidnapping or imprisonment (2007, pp. 5, 15, 204). Control 
tactics and oppressive strategies can vary greatly and range from seemingly minor verbal 
attacks and public put-downs (often resulting in the victim's isolation from friends, family 
or workmates), through claims to full control over the victim's daily life (such as their daily 
schedule, budget, social life or personal care), to explicit threats and intimidation, where 
battering is only one (not necessarily present) element of the entire spectrum of abuse. 
                                                 
18 Gender-based violence, similarly to domestic violence, has been mostly “discovered” by second-wave 
feminism and its content is still constantly being re-shaped (for a discussion of alternative terms for 
gender-based violence, such as “gender violence”, “gendered violence”, “violence against women”, “anti-
women violence”, “male violence against women” or “sexist violence”, see Kurz, 1997; Meyers, 1997, 
pp. 6-8). The term gender-based violence, which is now widely used by both international human rights 
organisations and EU institutions, has replaced the previously more accepted “violence against women” 
(for a detailed discussion of how gender-based violence came to be considered among the violations of 
human rights at international level, see Engle, 2006), and the two terms are still often used 
interchangeably to denote types of violence where victims are targeted because of their gender – or, in 
other words, because they belong (or are thought to belong) to a certain social group specified on the basis 
of their gender – with the vast majority of victims being underprivileged on the basis of gender, that is 
women and non-heterosexuals. Following from this definition, gender-based violence is often understood 
to bear many similarities with hate crimes (for a discussion of “gender-biased violence”, “gender-bias 
hate crime” and their embeddedness in the US discourse on hate crime, see Angelari 1994; McPhail, 
2003; for a detailed discussion of the conceptual difference between gender-based violence and hate 
crimes, and their UK legislative framework, see Gill & Mason-Bish, 2013). Currently, gender-based 
violence is an umbrella term that encompasses quite a variety of types of violence, often overlapping, and 
ranging from physical violence (such as femicide or wife battering) through sexual or economic types to 
ostensibly “lighter” kinds of violence that mainly operate on an emotional level (but later may evolve into 
more severe types of violence) such as stalking or online harassment.  
19 For a general survey of perspectives on and theorisations of domestic violence and its cognate terms in the 
1970s and 1980s, see Kurz, 1989; on the textual boom on domestic violence and its cognate terms from 
the 1990s onwards, plus the main directions of this literature, see Bell & Naugle, 2008; Johnson & 
Ferraro, 2000; Kurz, 1997.  
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These tactics and strategies, however, as Spark reminds us, are typically built on practices 
that are guided by gender norms in relationships, and that operate through “gender-specific 
infringements of adult autonomy that have no counterpart in public life and are currently 
invisible to the law” (p. 15). Since this complex network of interconnections between 
violence and gender, as Spark has noted, goes mostly unnoticed and undiscussed in the 
public sphere (which is, we should add, one more enabling factor for domestic violence), 
feminist discourses aim at crossing the private-public divide, and uncovering domestic 
violence for the public.  
 So far I have discussed domestic violence as discursively constructed, that is as 
inevitably relying on semiotic systems such as language and image in order to become 
meaningful and identifiable in the social world. I have argued that domestic violence, ever 
since it was first conceptualised by second-wave feminism in the UK and the US, has been 
repeatedly and inevitably exposed to attempts at redefinition through hegemonic 
interventions. Following Berns (2001), I have subsumed discourses resistant or opposed to 
the feminist constructions of domestic violence under the umbrella term  “patriarchal 
resistance”, and pointed out that domestic violence is typically shaped by several 
discourses simultaneously, depending on its locally and historically specific contexts. I 
have also argued that domestic violence is a prevalent form of gendered interpersonal, 
structural and symbolic violence, enabled by existing gender inequalities (and discourses 
that present the former as natural), and that, moreover, it is typically relegated to the 
domain of private matters, which is an additional enabling factor for violence and also a 
reason for the issue to remain unnoticed and/or undiscussed in the public sphere. I have 
therefore concluded that, in order to reach a change in the social perception of the issue, 
domestic violence needs to be brought to public attention. The next section is dedicated to 
elaborating the issue of public attention, by pointing out the crucial role that the media 
(especially the mainstream media) inevitably play in this process in modern societies. 
 
 
2.4 Why do the (mainstream) media matter? Achieving publicity and symbolic power 
through mediation 
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In this section I discuss, following Arendt's legacy, the importance of publicity (i.e. public 
attention) to domestic violence. Moreover, given that publicity in modern societies is 
typically obtained through the mediated public sphere – that is the mass media and, since 
the spread of internet platforms in the mid-2000s, interactive and networked media – I also 
discuss domestic violence in the context of mediation, a concept denoting the broader 
social impact of the media in general (Couldry & Hepp, 2013; Livingstone, 2009) and their 
symbolic power to construct our perception of the social world (Couldry, 2003). I further 
discuss why the mainstream media, where the greatest amount of publicity can be 
achieved, are crucial to feminist constructions of domestic violence. The typical ways in 
which the mainstream media and news journalism shape and frame discourses on domestic 
violence specifically will also be discussed in greater detail in the next section.  
 Domestic violence, since it is a type of violence that has long been unnamed, 
ignored and relegated to the domain of private matters, first of all requires publicity (i.e. 
public attention) in order to achieve a change in the social perception of the issue. 
Ultimately, bringing domestic violence to public attention is a fundamental condition not 
only of raising social awareness around the issue, but also of enabling citizens to develop 
any moral, political or emotional engagement or attitude towards the issue of domestic 
violence. Any normative questions regarding whether domestic violence is represented in 
the “right” way to a broader public (that is, in accordance with feminist insights) or 
investigations into the social implications of these representations presuppose that domestic 
violence has already achieved publicity. 
 In modern societies, publicity is typically obtained through the mediated public 
sphere. Although the concept of the public sphere in media studies is typically traced back 
to the Habermasian understanding of the concept (1962/1989), which has become highly 
popular in media studies since the early 2000s (see Lunt & Livingstone 2013), here I am 
reaching back to one of its older definitions by Hannah Arendt (1958).20 Specifically, 
Arendt – in contrast to the Habermasian understanding, which prioritises the ideas of 
                                                 
20 Habermas originally understood the public sphere in terms of an abstract and unitary space where public 
opinion is formed through citizens' widespread and egalitarian participation in rational discussion and 
debate about matters of public concern, This concept has been extensively criticised on various grounds, 
including its false assumptions of a unitary public sphere, of citizens' egalitarian and widespread access, 
and of rational discussion being the key feature of this sphere (for critiques see e.g. Fraser, 1990; 
Benhabib, 1992).   
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participation and social consensus on the common good – focuses more on competition for 
social recognition and the fundamental exposure of the “public sphere” to publicity (that is, 
to public attention). It therefore fits better the perspective of the present study, since it 
reflects the challenges typically facing attempts to bring feminist issues to public attention 
and give them access to the public agenda. However, as Benhabib has pointed out (1992, 
pp. 74-81), Arendt's original concept is difficult to apply to modern societies in its entirety 
and therefore needs some re-elaboration. 
  Arendt uses a twofold, self-contradictory model. On the one hand, she understands 
the sphere of publicity as an agonistic space where greatness is achieved and displayed 
through being seen and/or heard by unspecified others, that is spectators, and submitted to 
their judgement (a model Benhabib equated to the modern experience of politics). On the 
other hand she understands it as an associational sphere (modelled after the experience of 
the Greek polis and strongly contradicting the nature of the public sphere in modern 
societies), where citizens act in concert, coordinating their actions through speech and 
persuasion.21  The Arendtian model, however, has recently been further developed and 
refined by Adut (2012), who reaches back only to the agonistic part of the Arendtian 
concept and enriches it with a recognition of the multiplicity of public arenas and the 
distinction between publicity (i.e. public attention) and publicness (i.e. the mere being in a 
public space). He basically defines the public sphere as a general term denoting all (virtual 
or real) spaces that are fundamentally subject to spectatorship, which is  understood in 
terms of the asymmetry “between the few who receive attention and the numerous who 
give it” (2012, p. 241). In Adut's approach, the public sphere is a dynamic sphere 
consisting of many public arenas and spaces receiving public attention to varying degrees, 
and where players are basically competing with each other for (scarcely available) public 
attention, which they may in turn use for either  political ends (such as, for example, the 
social recognition of an issue or a movement, or the defamation of an adversary by a 
scandal) or non-political ends (for example, fame for celebrities). 
 Following on from Arendt and Adut, it is in the mediated public sphere that 
publicity for domestic violence can be sought and eventually achieved, and thereby social 
                                                 
21 For an alternative understanding of the applicability of the Arendtian concept to modern politics see 
Silverstone, 2007, pp. 29-34. 
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awareness raised around the issue (the achievement of publicity is not automatic, since 
publicness – that is the mere state of being in the public sphere – does not in itself 
automatically secure publicity. Moreover, publicity can significantly differ in its extent, see 
Adut, 2012, p. 244). Therefore,  since publicity is disproportionately distributed in the 
mediated public sphere, certain segments of this sphere are more important than others in 
terms of their publicity-generating value. In this respect, publicity is also a prerequisite for 
the symbolic power of the media. Symbolic power is here the particular power of the media 
to construct, and not only reflect, our perception of the social world (Couldry, 2003, p. 5), a 
phenomenon widely theorised today in the context of mediation, that is the broader social 
impact of the media in general through their omnipresent and multidirectional influence on 
our everyday lives (Couldry & Hepp 2013; Livingstone 2009). Since publicness does not in 
itself automatically generate publicity, and since symbolic power cannot be reached 
without it, social reality is more powerfully produced in those segments of the mediated 
public sphere where a large amount of publicity is available. 
 On the other hand, this capacity of the media to endow certain – strictly selected 
and regulated – discourses with strong symbolic power, and thereby to make them the 
“taken-for-granted, natural-looking frameworks” for understanding the social (Couldry, 
2003, p.1), can be re-formulated as the power of the media to endow certain discourses 
with a hegemonic position (and, thereby to activate their naturalising function), while 
excluding, marginalising or silencing other discourses. In this respect, the more central 
segments of the mediated public sphere, where the largest amount of publicity is 
concentrated – usually referred to as the mainstream media – typically strictly regulate and 
filter the discourses, perspectives and voices to which they grant access. Specifically, 
elements of counter-discourses that go against already established and therefore more 
powerful ways in which social reality is perceived, and that thereby give an oppositional 
interpretation of social reality – for example, feminist constructions of domestic violence – 
typically face discursive resistance.22 Although the feminist movement has made 
                                                 
22 Feminist discourses, with regard to their oppositional character in the face of more established 
understandings of the social world, are similar to “new social movements” (Melucci, 1996, pp. 8-9, 97-
106). In Melucci's understanding, new social movements are “new” because they characteristically differ 
from their predecessors, that is social movements that emerged before the second half of the 20 th century 
in Western countries. New social movements have a specific focus on culture: they typically challenge 
and aim to upset the dominant “codes” of societies that structure the ways in which they perceive and 
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considerable progress in this area since second-wave feminism emerged in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, feminist and women's issues – including domestic violence – still often face 
difficulties in this area in terms of discursive resistance and access to the main channels of 
publicity (on the so-called ”feminisation” of the mass media in Anglo-American countries 
since the 1990s and its complex and often conflicting relationship with feminism, see Gill, 
2007; McRobbie, 2009; on the mainstream–alternative media spectrum, see Rauch, 2016). 
 Hence, what ultimately becomes part of the mainstream media agenda and the way 
it is discursively constructed is both a result of discursive struggles and a reflection of 
existing social inequalities. It is, nonetheless, precisely the disproportionate distribution of 
publicity in the mediated public sphere, as discussed earlier, that largely explains why the 
mainstream media – despite their general tendency to resist oppositional interpretations of 
social reality – are indispensable for emerging social movements like feminism (see della 
Porta, 2013). The mainstream media form the segment of the mediated public sphere 
where, in strong connection with the large amount of publicity concentrated there, social 
reality is most powerfully “produced”. Accordingly, the mainstream media are of essential 
importance to the issue of domestic violence and to achieving a change in the social 
perception of violence. Therefore, in the present study I focus on the portrayal of domestic 
violence in the mainstream media – and more specifically in the mainstream news media, 
because it was through the news that the issue of domestic violence originally entered the 
Hungarian media, and also because it is still primarily through their consumption of this 
media genre that people make sense of the world around them (an aspect I discuss in more 
detail in the next chapter).     
 In this section I have discussed the role of the media in shaping and circulating the 
social meanings of domestic violence in modern societies through the symbolic power they 
possess to construct, not only to reflect, our perception of the social world, and also 
through their institutional power to give publicity to – that is to draw public attention to – 
certain issues, and thereby to endow these with (varying degrees of) public relevance. 
Drawing on the legacy of the Arendtian concept of the public sphere as a space of 
appearance, I have argued that it is in the mainstream media that the social meanings of 
                                                                                                                                                    
organise their own social reality (1996, p. 8-9), a definition that also well describes second- and third-
wave feminism. Melucci defines movements as “hidden networks of groups, meeting points, and circuits 
of solidarity which differ profoundly from the image of the politically organized actor” (p. 115).  
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domestic violence are most powerfully produced, in strong connection with the large 
amount of publicity (i.e. public attention) concentrated there. Moreover, I have restricted 
my analytical focus to (mainstream) news, since this genre played a central role in Hungary 
in bringing domestic violence to citizens' attention. In the next section I briefly summarise 
the findings of feminist literature with regard to the most typical ways in which domestic 
violence is shaped and framed by the media, especially by news discourse. In this sense, 
the next section is also strongly connected to the issue of media, publicity and symbolic 
power. On the other hand, at the end of the next section, and while not  questioning the 
merits of this feminist literature, I also identify some theoretical gaps that prevent this 
literature from thinking of the media as potential facilitators of social change. The task of 
filling these gaps falls into my very last section, where, with the help of theories of 
mediated suffering and mediated emotions, I further develop my analytical framework so 
that in the end it become attentive both to gender bias in texts and to the agency of these 
same texts in emotionally, morally or politically engaging publics with the actors involved 
in domestic violence.  
 
 
2.5 Domestic violence in the mainstream (news) media: Existing literature and its 
limitations 
 
Since the 1970s, Anglo-American feminist media criticism has produced a large body of 
literature focusing on the mainstream media, with special attention paid to the news genre. 
It has repeatedly diagnosed and documented a masculine-biased culture in newsrooms, 
where news selection, hierarchisation and production are routinely carried out according to 
the value preferences and norms of heterosexual white men, as well as a persistent 
tendency of the mainstream media to employ and activate negative stereotypes of women 
(see e.g. Carter, Branston & Allan, 1998; Carter & Steiner, 2004; Carter & Weaver, 2003; 
Ceulemans & Fauconnier, 1979; Chambers, Steiner & Fleming, 2004; Gallagher, 1979, 
1981; North, 2014; Ross & Byerly, 2006; Ross & Carter, 2011; Tuchman, Kaplan & Benet, 
1978). Feminist studies of the media portrayal of domestic violence – a separate research 
line within the above field, flourishing especially since the 1990s and still Anglo-Saxon-
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dominated – have similarly found persistent gender bias in media texts, and repeatedly 
pointed out that these reinforce gender inequality and a culture of violence (see e.g. Berns 
1999, 2001, 2004; Boyle 2005, pp. 84-93; Braber, 2015; Bullock, 2007; Carll, 2003; Carter, 
1998; Gillespie, Richards, Givens & Smith, 2013, Meyers, 1994, 1997; Nettleton, 2011; 
Sunindyo, 2004; Zeynep, 2006). The main findings of this research line, as I elaborate 
below, show how in the mainstream news discourse domestic violence is repeatedly subject 
to patriarchal discursive resistance. Portrayals tend to downplay male violence and its 
pervasiveness in societies, and instead to shift responsibility either onto victims or onto 
social groups whose violence is traditionally both less accepted and at the same time more 
marked. This links back to the work of Hearn, referenced earlier, according to which social 
perceptions of what counts as violence are strongly linked to broader social structures of 
domination (1998, p. 15).  
 More specifically, the findings of feminist literature can be summarised as follows. 
The media tend to portray domestic violence as rare and/or marginal, and to hide its deep 
embeddedness in mainstream society (see e.g. Meyers 1997, pp. 66-67). In-depth 
explorations of its social context are generally rare, while the high prevalence of the issue 
in societies tends to be ignored, and instead potential causes and solutions are either sought 
on an individual level (that is, on the victim's or the couple's side) or  “outsourced” to 
socially marginalised groups (see e.g. Berns, 2004; Boyle, 2005, pp. 85-86; Meyers, 1997, 
pp. 29-34). Similarly, the media disregard the scale that connects “normal” people to 
perpetrators and – in order to keep domestic violence at a distance from mainstream society 
– to portray perpetrators and/or victims as profoundly different (e.g. victims as weak and 
helpless, and perpetrators as “insane monsters”). Accordingly, domestic violence also tends 
to be portrayed as exceptional, and is often presented in a sensationalist style (e.g. Meyers, 
1994, p. 48; Carter, 1998). The more prevalent types of domestic violence typically remain 
only sporadically represented, while other less frequent types, for example cases ending in 
murder, receive a disproportionate amount of attention (e.g. Boyle, 2005, pp. 84-85, 91; 
Carter, 1998). The media tend to differentiate between female victims on the basis of their 
social standing (e.g. ethnicity, race, class or marital status) as well as of their conformity to 
patriarchal ideals of femininity, with low-status and/or less conforming victims receiving 
less empathy (e.g. Boyle, 2005, p. 92; Meyers, 1997, pp. 52-71;). In general, there is a 
49 
strong tendency to shift responsibility from perpetrators to victims, by minimising 
perpetrators' responsibility and agency (e.g. claiming that they acted under the influence of 
alcohol or out of jealousy or dissatisfaction with how victims were fulfilling their feminine 
role – such as taking care of housework or children) (e.g. Boyle, 2005; Lamb & Keon, 
1995; Meyers, 1997; Nettleton, 2011). Victims are often not treated with respect, and thus 
often fall prey to secondary victimisation in the media. 
 The above findings are generally very convincing in pointing out how patriarchal 
resistance typically plays out in media texts in the case of domestic violence, and how this 
contributes to reproducing gendered social inequalities and a culture of violence. However, 
there are still some questions that this literature never or only occasionally addresses. 
These are in general related to the link between media texts, publics and social action. That 
is, although domestic violence is mostly represented in accordance with patriarchal norms 
in the mainstream news media across countries, Western history shows that from time to 
time domestic violence has been capable of generating massive public outcry, engaging 
broader publics with the issue, and in some cases even led to public action against violence 
(as happened in Hungary in 2002 and 2013), while other cases have divided a whole nation 
(e.g. the O J Simpson case). This agency of media texts, that is the ways in which they are 
capable of engaging publics with issues, inflating emotions, establishing (or breaking) 
social solidarities, building (or denying) a sense of belonging, and ultimately, through 
engaged publics, even of leading to social and political action, is, I suggest, under-theorised 
in existing feminist literature on the media portrayal of domestic violence. Therefore, in 
order to capture this agency of media texts, in the following pages I re-conceptualise the 
news media’s portrayal of domestic violence in the context of theories of mediated 
suffering.  
 
 
2.6 Engaging the public: The news media as agents of social change 
 
The news media portrayal of domestic violence can be grasped theoretically as mediated 
suffering, that is suffering that is subjected to the politics of pity, a term originally coined 
by Boltanski (1999, pp. 11-12; see also Chouliaraki, 2006). The politics of pity refers to 
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that activity of the media with which they try to establish a kind of “sense of proximity” 
between the spectator and the distant sufferer in order to engage the spectator morally and 
emotionally in the suffering on the screen. “Pity” is a technical term here and does not 
necessarily imply that the actual emotion that is activated indeed has to be pity. Rather, it 
generally refers to the mediated nature of moral and emotional engagement on the 
spectator's part. Consequently, this kind of engagement (if achieved at all) is always and 
inevitably constructed: it is not a “natural” human reaction to suffering, but a historically 
and locally specific way of relating the spectator to the sufferer, which is regulated and 
controlled by the media discourse.  
 Theorising domestic violence as mediated suffering makes it possible to investigate 
the concrete ways and modes in which pity is activated: the ways in which mediation 
constructs the sufferer and the suffering, produces paradigmatic forms of emotion, ethical 
sensibilities and/or norms of acceptable public conduct with regard to on-screen suffering, 
or even paradigmatic forms of action against suffering. Moreover, narratives about 
domestic violence, instead of portraying exclusively the victims,23 usually bring sufferers 
together with perpetrators and (if there are any) with benefactors, with notable differences 
in the activated affective regimes around these actors (this is the case even if the media 
portrayal of domestic violence, as discussed earlier, is often subject to shifts of 
responsibility from perpetrator to victim, and accordingly also shifts in the emotions 
associated with victimhood). Mediated moral and emotional engagement with perpetrators 
and with benefactors is in this respect also of importance, since it is part of the mediated 
regulation of affective regimes, ethical sensibilities and/or the activation of moral norms in 
the face of domestic violence. Ultimately, the ways in which the media discursively 
                                                 
23 When I use the term “victim”, I am employing the terminology of theories of mediated suffering to refer 
to people who are exposed to violence (or who have been exposed to it at an earlier stage of their lives). 
At the same time, I am aware that this term is highly controversial and loaded with additional – and 
usually negative – meanings in a range of Anglo-American public discourses, both feminist and non-
feminist, that discuss violence. Accordingly, since the 1990s this term has been increasingly replaced by 
“survivor”, in order to invoke a more desirable subjectivity. As has been noted in previous literature, 
“victim” is usually associated with passivity, lack of agency and silence, whereas “survivor” can 
encompass a more heroic, active, empowered mode of living with a (past) experience of violence and is 
often even strongly associated with the act of “speaking up” and/or reaching out to others with similar 
experiences (see Alcoff & Gray, 1993; Naples, 2003; Orgad, 2009). As the replacement of “victim” with 
“survivor” would imply a break with the established terminology of theories of mediated suffering, 
moreover, since this specific dichotomy between the two terms is – as of 2018 – mostly unheard of in 
Hungary, I have kept the term “victim”.  
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construct distant sufferers, perpetrators (and occasionally benefactors) and engage (or 
disengage) spectators with them is also a form of mediated (global or local) citizenship. 
This kind of discursively constructed engagement typically appeals to shared (moral, social 
and/or cultural) values and imagined communities, and thereby establishes (or breaks 
down) any sense of belonging to larger communities of people, while at the same time 
excluding others as outsiders.  
 The idea that the media are capable of constructing emotionally engaged publics, 
and that emotional engagement would also be of central importance to political and civic 
agency is relatively new in both media and political studies. As Dahlgren has pointed out, 
the political and civic engagement of the media has traditionally been understood as devoid 
of any affective or passionate component, i.e. as a merely cognitive and rational type of 
attachment to public issues (2009, p. 83). In contrast to these traditional understandings – 
which in general postulate that emotions would be the antonyms of reason and rationality, 
and would necessarily have a distorting or corrupting role in the public sphere (see Hall, 
2005) – emotions have been subject to significant re-evaluation in a number of disciplines, 
including media studies, and emotions, political sense-making and citizenship are now 
increasingly conceptualised as closely interconnected (Dahlgren, 2009, pp. 80-101). For 
example, today it is widely acknowledged that shared emotions play a crucial part in 
forming collective identities (such as nations) and are capable of forming or breaking social 
solidarities (see e.g. Ahmed, 2004; Anderson, 1991), or that they are necessary to any 
collective action (Flam & King, 2005; Goodwin, Jasper & Polletta, 2001; Melucci, 1996). 
Similarly, over the last decade steadily increasing attention has been paid to the 
interconnections of the moral and emotional components of mediation, especially because 
of  the spread of media research on humanitarian discourse and its power to engage 
“people's potential to care” (Chouliaraki, 2006, 2008a, 2010, 2015). 
 While this “emancipation” of emotions in contemporary critical thinking is 
generally connected to the advent of the “Affective Turn” in social and cultural sciences in 
the 2000s (for an overview of this, see Geyser, 2012), in media studies it has also been 
provoked by an earlier development, that of the emotionalisation of the mass media in 
Western societies that took place roughly around the early 1990s. The emotionalisation of 
the mass media brought such phenomena as infotainment, tabloidisation and therapy 
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culture, which together have made emotional expression more central to Western mediated 
public spheres (see Pantti, 2011; Pantti & van Zoonen, 2006). The Affective Turn offered a 
rich vocabulary for thinking about emotions (and cognate concepts such as affects, feelings 
or sentiments) that media scholars could pick up and even enrich further. Accordingly, 
today the mediated public sphere is increasingly thought of as also being an “emotional 
public sphere” (Lunt & Stenner, 2005), that is a place where emotions are selected, 
constructed, managed and displayed publicly and often intertwined with political issues 
(see e.g. Rottenberg, 2018), as well as a space of “affective economies”, i.e. where 
emotions are empowered and accumulated through the circulation of texts (Ahmed, 2004, 
pp. 45-46; Kuntsman, 2012; Papacharissi, 2015). Even news journalism, a media genre 
traditionally seen as based on objectivity as a key professional value (see e.g. Tuchman, 
1972; Gans, 1984), is nowadays increasingly also captured in affective terms, e.g. by 
emphasising its potential to “bear witness” to tragic events (Rentschler, 2009, p. 159; 
Chouliaraki, 2010, p. 305), to “socialise” the public in the proper expression of emotion 
with regard to certain events, and thereby to establish emotional citizenship (Pantti, 2011; 
Pantti & van Zoonen, 2006), or by grasping the “affective labour” of news journalism 
(Rentschler, 2009; on affective labour in general, see Hochschild, 1983).  
 To date, the power of the news media to engage publics morally and/or emotionally 
with spectacles of human suffering, and thereby to set norms of public conduct/feeling and 
establish social solidarities, has rarely been explored in cases of domestic violence (for 
some notable exceptions, see e.g. Bierria, 2010; Kuhl, 1997; Silberstein, 2003). Instead, 
media scholars have mostly studied natural disasters such as tsunamis, earthquakes or 
famines (see e.g. Brown & Minty, 2008; Pantti & Tikka, 2014), man-made disasters such as 
rail crashes, cinema fires, or mass fatalities in football stadiums (see e.g. Pantti, 2011; 
Walter, 1991), violent deaths of politicians or other public figures (see e.g. Pantti & van 
Zoonen, 2006; Sumiala-Seppänen & Stocchetti, 2005, 2007), or reporting from war zones. 
The under-representation of domestic violence cases in these studies can be partly 
explained by the fact that domestic violence, with the exception of some high-profile cases, 
rarely makes the headlines (Boyle, 2005; Carter et al., 1998; Meyers, 1995, 1997) and 
therefore is rarely followed by a massive public reaction that would be thought worth 
exploring. Nonetheless, over recent decades, Western news journalism has witnessed some 
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domestic violence cases that provoked considerable public attention, inflamed emotions in 
broader society, triggered intensive public discussion, and some even brought citizens onto 
the streets. These cases, by achieving considerable and prolonged publicity, and 
consequently also considerable symbolic power in the social construction of domestic 
violence, typically offered a semiotically rich symbolic public space where meaning-
making claims and appeals to moral norms and moral communities could be made, and 
where acceptable forms of public conduct and public emotional expression could be 
explored, negotiated and established in the face of domestic violence. 
 
In the following chapters I analyse three cases of domestic violence in Hungary between 
2002 and 2013, which, similarly to the above-mentioned cases, achieved outstandingly 
high media coverage and provoked massive public reaction. Since I am interested in media 
platforms and genres that have the most symbolic power to “produce” reality for 
spectators, I focus on mainstream television news journalism. It is to this segment of the 
mediated public sphere that  traditionally a large amount of public attention is directed. As 
I explain in the next chapter, I have carried out an in-depth textual analysis of media texts 
with the help of Faircloughian Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), a particular version of 
CDA that matches my specific interest in discursive changes in media texts and the ways in 
which these feed into long-term shifts in orders of discourse. I have analysed what these 
media texts “did” in the Hungarian mediated public sphere: that is, how they discursively 
constructed and activated social meanings, forms of emotion, moral norms and/or social 
solidarities with regard to domestic violence. Faircloughian CDA combined with a case 
study research design has also allowed me to locate these performative actions of media 
texts within the ever-changing media ecology of the Hungarian public sphere, and to 
explore in depth the social and media-related contexts of my selected domestic violence 
cases.
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3. Methodology: Critical Discourse Analysis, Historically Comparative Case Studies 
and Television News 
 
 
In order to capture the role that the news media played in constructing domestic violence 
for the broader Hungarian public between 2002 and 2013, I analyse the portrayal of three 
data-rich domestic violence cases through media texts selected from the mainstream 
Hungarian broadcast news media (television), and investigate these with the help of critical 
discourse analysis (CDA). This chapter is dedicated to a justification of the choice of CDA 
(Fairclough) as a method, and of the case study as a research design and also as the 
underpinning for why historical analysis and television journalism still matter despite 
today's general tendency in media studies to focus on the present and the latest 
technological innovations. This chapter also aims to clarify the rationale behind my choice 
of cases, and how these, as televised news stories, interacted with the ever-changing media 
ecology that the genre of television news faced between 2002 and 2013 in Hungary.  
 Since I am interested in discourses and discursive changes in media texts, and what 
these media texts “do” in a mediated public sphere with regard to the issue of domestic 
violence, I have chosen a method attentive to discourse and to long-term discursive shifts 
in texts – CDA – and employ this on a media genre that people typically turn to in order to 
make sense of what is happening in the world and what is of social importance (Gans, 
2003, pp. 1, 21; Reese, 2016) – that is, news and current affairs programmes. Moreover, 
my method is attentive to that segment of the mediated public sphere where traditionally a 
large amount of public attention is directed, and which consequently has the most symbolic 
power to “produce” reality for spectators – that is, mainstream television journalism. The 
following sections are intended to give deeper insights into the reasons why these 
methodological choices were made, and in general how these choices fit with my research 
questions. I discuss firstly Faircloughian CDA, secondly historical approaches and their 
continuing value in media studies, thirdly television and televised current affairs and their 
place in the new media era, and finally, at the end of this chapter, case-study research and 
the selection of my cases. 
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3.1 Critical discourse analysis: Investigating discursive change through in-depth 
textual analysis  
 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is an umbrella term denoting a particular group of 
textual analyses that employ a critical, socially engaged and hermeneutic approach to texts, 
with special attention paid to the relations between language (meaning-making) and power. 
CDA became institutionalised at the beginning of the 1990s, and its roots are traditionally 
traced back to critical linguistics (CL), which developed in England a couple of decades 
earlier, that is in the 1970s and 1980s (Wodak, 2001). While CDA is far from being 
homogeneous, all of its versions are characteristically focused on what Wodak describes as 
“[critically] analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, 
discrimination, power and control as manifested in language” (p. 2). The critical nature of 
CDA lies precisely in this act of uncovering how power inequalities are articulated, 
reproduced (or, occasionally, questioned) through texts, and how texts contribute to the 
maintenance of oppressive power structures at the broader social level (Meyer, 2001, p. 
15). CDA also typically assumes discourses to be historical, and makes ample reference to 
their context (Meyer, 2001, p. 15). This emphasis on historicity renders CDA a kind of 
natural match for longitudinal, historical approaches as well as for context-attentive 
methods such as, most notably, case studies (on the natural alliance between historical 
analysis and CDA, see also Fairclough, 1992a, p. 9). 
 While some strands of CDA have openly emancipatory social goals and therefore, 
as Lazar has pointed out “are part of an emancipatory critical social science which [...] is 
openly committed to the achievement of a just social order through a critique of discourse” 
(2007, p.145), all strands, whether overtly emancipatory or not, pose questions about 
hierarchy and domination, asking which social position benefits and which is marginalised 
or excluded in the process of meaning-making (Fairclough, 2001, p. 125). In contrast to 
many other approaches that typically try to reach an allegedly neutral and detached position 
of the researcher, CDA is “always explicit about its own position and commitment” 
(Meyer, 2001, p. 17; see also Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 31). This focus of CDA 
on subtle and not so subtle power inequalities that sustain (or challenge) asymmetrical 
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power arrangements through language makes CDA an ideal methodological match for 
feminism, as Lazar has argued (2005, 2007). Given that patriarchy – similarly to many of 
the systemic power inequalities that CDA investigates and unfolds through the analysis of 
language – is hegemonic (that is, it mostly appears as consensual and not as a form 
domination at all, and both men and women are, to a certain extent, complicit in its 
maintenance) and sustained by tacit and taken-for-granted gendered assumptions that 
inevitably also show up in discourses, patriarchal social arrangements can be well 
investigated through CDA. By unfolding these arrangements, as they show up in different 
contexts through language, feminist CDA can shed light on interrelationships of gender and 
power in discourse, and thereby contribute to reaching  a “feminist humanist vision”, 
where the category of gender is not always inevitably subject to systematic privilege/lack 
of privilege, advantage/disadvantage, inclusion/exclusion in social life and its meaning-
making practices (2007, p. 145).  
 Of the various versions of CDA, I use that developed by Norman Fairclough (1989, 
1992a, 1992b, 1995, 2001), firstly because Faircloughian CDA focuses specifically on 
discursive change, which is also a topic of major interest in the present study, and secondly 
because this version of CDA makes extensive use of a specifically Foucauldian theory of 
discourse combined with a concept of hegemony, which are both discussed in detail in the 
previous chapter and of crucial importance to my theoretical framework. My choice of 
Fairclough has also been influenced to some extent by the fact that his version of CDA 
acknowledges feminist works and feminist perspective in general (see Lazar, 2007, p. 143). 
Without anticipating too much of what I explain later at greater length, it is primarily the 
double focus of Faircloughian CDA on individual texts and on their complex role in 
articulating power struggles between discourses (and the subsequent contribution of the 
same texts to long-term shifts in orders of discourse) that makes this type of CDA 
particularly suitable for the present study. Faircloughian CDA makes it possible to apply 
the Foucauldian concept of discourse and that of hegemony to concrete texts and to 
investigate discursive change in these. Moreover – on the basis of some well-selected 
media texts and their comparison, as I discuss below – it also makes it possible to draw 
conclusions about long-term shifts in the social meaning of domestic violence in the 
Hungarian mediated public sphere between 2002 and 2013.  
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 Furthermore, in Fairclough, discourses are never “only” semiotic, but always have a 
social dimension, or, to put it more clearly, discourse is only one element – the semiotic 
element – of (historically and locally specific) social practices (Fairclough & Chouliaraki, 
1999, p. 38). Social practice is a central concept in Faircloughian CDA, and – similarly to 
texts, as we see below – it takes an intermediary position between pre-existing abstract 
structures or permanences (as constraints) and actions (as spaces of agency) (1999, pp. 19-
36). In Fairclough, social life is made up of social practices, that is of habitual ways of 
acting that are “tied to particular times and places, in which people apply resources 
(material or symbolic) to act together in the world” (p. 21). Social practices, therefore, are 
“forms of production of social life” (p. 22), and it is the semiotic-reflexive element of these 
social practices that Fairclough and Chouliaraki call discourse (p. 38). As Chouliaraki 
succinctly puts it, in Fairclough – following Foucault – discourse is “a productive 
technology of social practice that subjects people to forms of power while, at the same 
time, providing them with spaces of agency and possibilities for action” (2008b, p. 675). In 
Fairclough, discourses fulfill social functions, of which two are of particular importance: 
the fact that discourses, as already been pointed out, re-present the world to us 
(representational function) and the fact that they also – as so far not been particularly 
highlighted – relate and orient us towards others in this world (interpersonal function) 
(Chouliaraki 2008b, pp. 688-691). Discourses, through their interpersonal function, have 
the power to offer paradigmatic forms of “relating and acting upon oneself and others”, and 
“to cultivate certain types of identity and agency”, which, as Chouliaraki points out (2008b, 
p. 691), resonates with what Foucault called governmentality – a contemporary form of 
power that affects and shapes people's conduct through their sense of self-governance 
(Foucault 2004/2007, 2004/2008). This insight into the social functions that discourses 
fulfill allows me to address discourses as articulating and regulating not only meanings, but 
emotions and moral values, too, which are also a topic of major interest in the present 
study. This interrelated-ness of meaning-making, feeling and normative claims about 
taking action in the very process of the articulation of a discourse has been particularly 
highlighted by Chouliaraki (2006, 2008a), who, in the context of mediated suffering, 
conceptualised the media discourse as, among others things, articulating proposals for 
moral and emotional engagement with distant sufferers. All in all, this dialectical 
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embeddedness of discourse in the social world, where the (historically and locally specific) 
social thereby functions as a “condition of possibility” for meaning-making (Chouliaraki 
2008, p. 674), is what ultimately enables CDA researchers to treat systematic semiotic 
choices in texts as subtle indicators of the ways in which social life “out there” is produced, 
including the subtle ways in which gendered power arrangements are sustained in the 
social world.  
 More specifically, Fairclough, in line with the broader characteristics of CDA 
discussed earlier, defines CDA as a “form of critical social science” that has a distinct 
theoretical perspective on language and a particular interest in the textual dimension of 
power relations (2001, p. 215). Faircloughian CDA characteristically combines the 
Foucauldian concept of discourse with a “'text-and-interaction' sense [of discourse] in 
linguistically-oriented discourse analysis”, the latter inherited from critical linguistics (CL), 
and exploits this combination for an in-depth semiotic analysis of concrete texts (1992a, p. 
4). More specifically, in contrast to the Foucauldian theory of discourse, which primarily 
investigates discursive processes at the macro-social level, Faircloughian CDA focuses on 
individual texts – or, in Fairclough's words, “discursive events” – and the ways in which 
texts, through articulating discourses, contribute to “longer-term constitution of 'orders of 
discourse'”, and thereby to social and cultural change (1992a, p. 9). On the other hand, in 
contrast to previous linguistically-oriented discourse analysis, which, as Fairclough states, 
has often overemphasised the role of texts in reproducing existing power relations and their 
respective structures of meaning-making (1992a, p. 1) , Faircloughian CDA, relying on the 
concept of hegemony, takes power relations as dynamically changing and reaching an 
equilibrium only temporarily. With the help of this step, Fairclough reaches a more 
complex and dynamic understanding of the relations between power and text than previous 
linguistically-oriented approaches did (for the importance of a dynamic concept of power 
and of hegemonic struggle in CDA, see Fairclough, 2001, p. 214).  
 The key insight of Faircloughian CDA is that texts are inevitably shaped by a 
dialectical tension between pre-established structure(s) (that is orders of discourse, genres 
or other textual conventions) that operate as constraints, and action (that is the particular 
act of articulation of the above structures by the given text), which always carries the 
possibility of productive digression from the structures already given (2001, p. 214). Given 
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that discourses both feed into and are  re-articulated by texts, it is essentially texts that 
produce and reproduce discourses on a constant basis, by articulating already existing 
discourses (and thereby reproducing and further strengthening them), or by combining 
them in new ways (and thereby contesting and modifying existing discourses), or even by 
generating new discourses with the re-articulation or re-structuring of available discursive 
elements (1992a, p. 97). Briefly, in Fairclough all texts are inter-discursive and inter-textual 
(inevitably relying on previous texts, discourses, genres or other textual conventions), but 
at the same time they also have the potential to subtly digress from these existing 
conventions/structures through the particular ways in which they re-articulate and/or 
combine their textual and discursive predecessors (2001, pp. 214, 270; for a detailed 
discussion of intertextuality and interdiscursivity in CDA see 1992b). Ultimately, as 
Fairclough states, each text “may re-produce or transform pre-established structures” 
(2001, p. 212). At the same time, it is exactly these particular articulations of discourse by 
texts, and the eventual accumulation of these articulations over time, that contribute to 
longer-term shifts in the actual order of discourse. 
 This insight into the role of texts in articulating discourse (or digressions from 
discourse), and the long-term implications of these articulations for shifts in orders of 
discourse, assign a double focus to Faircloughian CDA: it always “oscillates” between a 
focus on shifts in the orders of discourse and a “focus on the productive semiotic work that 
goes on in particular texts and interactions” (2001, pp. 214-215). In other words, texts are 
always analysed with one eye on their broader discursive context, which is reached through 
a combination of interdiscursive and linguistic-semiotic analysis – a type of analysis that I 
too employ in the next chapters (p. 216).24 On the other hand, Faircloughian CDA, given 
its strong focus on particular texts, does not directly address the issue of longitudinal 
historical analysis and its importance in tracing how discursive change unfolds over time, 
although Fairclough acknowledges that CDA is inevitably “a method for historical 
analysis” (1992a, p. 9). Therefore, in order to better grasp long-term shifts and changes in 
                                                 
24 The importance of the interdiscursive aspect cannot be overemphasised here, since the discursive 
composition of a given text, and more specifically the heterogeneity of this composition, is already 
indicative of whether a discursive change is taking place. The most telling sign, as Fairclough states, is the 
presence of contradictory or inconsistent elements in texts, which endow them with a “patchwork” 
appearance that soon vanishes and is gradually replaced by “seamlessness” as the ongoing discursive 
change begins to catch and solidify, and the new, emergent discourse subsequently becomes “natural”, 
“commonsensical”, or, in other words, naturalised (1992a, p. 97). 
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the social meaning of domestic violence in the Hungarian media between 2002 and 2013, I 
combine Fairclough with a longitudinal historical approach, more specifically, a diachronic 
comparative study, organised according to a case-study research design. I apply 
Faircloughian CDA to a small number of purposefully sampled domestic violence cases, 
each selected from various points during the 2002–2013 period, and  formulate conclusions 
on the basis of their comparison.  
 In light of the above, the object of my study is the mediated discourse(s) on 
domestic violence in Hungary between 2002 and 2013, as it/they emerged and changed 
over time through historically and locally specific technologies and genres of mediation. 
That is, although I analyse specific media texts with the help of CDA, the primary focus of 
my study remains the discourse(s) that these texts articulate, combine or re-arrange, where 
discourse is understood as a regime of systematic semiotic choices in media texts 
(evidenced by patterns of co-appearance and combination), through which domestic 
violence can become meaningful to Hungarians, and can structure and shape their 
orientation to themselves and to others in their world. Given that in Hungary the issue of 
domestic violence originally emerged in the public sphere through the genre of crime news 
and current affairs programmes – and this media genre still plays an important part in 
shaping the issue for a broader Hungarian public – and that, of the various news media 
outlets, it has been – as I discuss below – the medium of television that has had the most 
symbolic power to “produce” the “reality” of domestic violence for Hungarians, I focus on 
how domestic violence has been mediated through the genre of televised current affairs. 
Moreover, by using a case-study research design combined with the CDA approach – that 
is, two context-attentive perspectives combined – I am also able to reflect on the shifting 
media ecology of the media texts in question, a context that changed rapidly in the 2000s 
and the early 2010s in Hungary (and in the rest of the world), and to some extent re-
structured the place of television and televised current affairs programmes in spectators’ 
lives, as well as the ways in which they made sense of the world. 
 Since historical, longitudinal approaches are losing ground in today's media 
scholarship and the same holds true for studies of television, in the following two sections I 
discuss why long-term studies and scholarly attention to television are important, 
especially for the issue of domestic violence in the media. Following these two sections, I 
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discuss case studies as a research design and the selection of my cases. 
 
 
3.2 The continuing value of historical and long-term approaches 
 
Historical and long-term approaches are rather sporadic in today's media studies, which 
generally prefer synchronic methodologies to diachronic ones. Over recent decades media 
scholars have repeatedly pointed out that historical approaches, and longitudinal 
approaches in general, have been marginalised within media studies. Nicholas Garnham, 
for example, sees media studies as “enraptured by the new and the ephemeral” (2000, p. 
24), while Alice Mattoni and Emiliano Treré argue that media studies have been 
predominantly focusing on the new media platforms that the new technologies brought 
(2014, p. 255). Michael Pickering has similarly diagnosed an overarching pattern of 
“present-centredness” in the field, with an increased focus on “newness and nowness” and 
“a continual skewing of attention towards the latest issues and developments in 
communications”, resulting in a kind of “technological determinism” that today mostly 
manifests as an increased attention to new media (2015, pp. 9-11.).  
 This lack of attention to historical and longitudinal approaches is much less 
prominent in the feminist literature on the media portrayal of domestic violence, 
considering that key feminist literature on the topic – from the 1990s, when scholarly 
interest in the subject significantly increased – has produced longitudinal studies as well as 
short-term investigations (for the former see e.g. Berns, 1999, 2001, 2004; Ryan, Anastario 
& Dacunha 2006). These long-term studies, however, have rarely focused on change, 
despite the fact that domestic violence, similarly to most public issues, typically evolves 
over longer time spans within the public arena, and although the portrayal of domestic 
violence goes through different changes and stages. Berns’s two landmark studies, 
referenced earlier, are a good example of this increased focus on discursive continuities: 
although they analyse the print media portrayal of the issue in the US over an impressively 
long period of three decades (1999, 2001), they conclude with the identification of patterns 
in media portrayals – the “patriarchal-resistance perspective” and the “individual frame of 
responsibility” – that have remained largely intact over time (1999, p. 86; 2001, p. 274). 
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 Within such a scholarly environment, longer-term investigations focusing on 
change articulated through traditional media platforms and genres – such as this one – may 
look oddly out of line with today's methodological preferences. However, what these 
dominant preferences fail to grasp is exactly what sits at the heart of my research: the 
subtle ways in which the “new” gradually emerges from what is already established – in 
other words, a grasping of the slower processes of discursive and social change that may 
lead to the present. 
 Interestingly, this aspect of change over time was more prominent in earlier, 
second-wave feminist media scholarship on domestic violence, and in cognate research 
fields. The most illustrative example from early feminist literature appears to be Tierney's 
article from 1982, in which the author applies the theory of issue-attention cycles to 
describe the ups and downs in coverage of the battered women's movement in the 
mainstream news media in the 1970s in the US. Research in cognate fields (both in second- 
and third-wave feminist scholarship), such as the work of Barbara J. Nelson (1984) and 
Jenny Kitzinger (2004), similarly focused on change over time. They map the ways – 
respectively – in which child abuse and child sexual abuse, both lacking previous media 
discussion, developed into issues of public concern in the national media of the US and the 
UK respectively. These studies demonstrate the value of a focus on historical change in 
gender and media scholarship, since they trace how taboo topics broke through the 
threshold of newsworthiness and publicity over time. However, this aspect, as I have 
already pointed out, is not at the forefront of today's research agenda on the media 
portrayal of domestic violence, and even less present in its landmark texts (e.g. Boyle, 
2005, pp. 84-93; Braber, 2015; Bullock, 2007; Carll, 2003; Gillespie, Richards, Givens & 
Smith, 2013, Meyers, 1994, 1997; Nettleton, 2011; Sunindyo, 2004; Zeynep, 2006). 
 This relative neglect in the current literature of a focus on change over longer time 
spans may partly be explained – as well as by the general preference of today's media 
studies for the synchronic methodologies discussed earlier – by the location in time and 
space that these scholarly works occupy in relation to the issue they investigate. Namely, 
when in the 1990s an increased academic attention started to be paid to the media portrayal 
of domestic violence by feminist scholars, first of all in Anglo-Saxon countries, domestic 
violence had already been part of the public arena in these countries for a relatively long 
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time. Tierney, Nelson and Kitzinger, however – similarly to the present study – considered 
issues that at the time of their investigations were relatively new on the national media 
agenda, and therefore, understandably, paid special attention to the ways in which these 
issues craved a space on the public agenda. This aspect of issue-formation and -
development is marginalised in today's transnational feminist media discourses on 
domestic violence despite the fact that this scenario (that is, domestic violence freshly 
gathering ground in national public spheres and on public agendas) is probably much more 
common worldwide than is suggested by the typical reliance on the Anglo-American 
experience of current landmark texts by feminist criticism of the media portrayal of 
domestic violence. This is because domestic violence started to receive significant 
visibility outside Anglo-American countries only from the early 1990s, when the issue was 
included on the international human rights agenda (for more on this inclusion, see Engle, 
2006). 
 Therefore, when in the following chapters I take a case-based, historical approach 
to examining how the issue of domestic violence changed discursively in the Hungarian 
mediated public sphere over time, I necessarily need to question some key assumptions of 
previous literature. Firstly, the assumption that tacitly normalises Anglo-American 
experiences from the 1990s onwards, which tends to overlook the fact that domestic 
violence follows different trajectories of change in different national public spheres. 
Secondly, the frequent assumption that the media primarily function as an institution of 
social and patriarchal control with regard to the issue of domestic violence (as discussed in 
Chapter 2). Instead, drawing on Chouliaraki (2006, 2008a), I focus on the potential of the 
media to serve as a moral agent of change in regard to domestic violence, through 
articulating proposals for moral and emotional engagement with the victims of violence. 
This implies that, in line with the dialectics of discourse perspective, I take media discourse 
as indeed subject to certain power structures (most importantly, patriarchy), but at the same 
time also in possession of historically and locally specific, regulated forms of agency, 
through which power structures can be challenged. I approach coverage of domestic 
violence in the media as shaped by an interplay of discursive continuities and 
discontinuities, as formed by the ever-changing power relations between (mediated) 
discourses, and as a space where continuity is mainly assured through repetition, while 
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discontinuity may emerge through major break points, such as fundamental re-distributions 
of discursive elements over time.  
 As mentioned, I sample media texts from that segment of the Hungarian mediated 
public sphere that traditionally receives the largest amount of public attention – that is the 
television news genre. As the primacy of the medium of television over online and 
interactive journalism is somehow less self-evident since the advent of the new media era, 
in the next section I dedicate some space to the place of television and television news in 
the new media era, and also give a brief overview of the main broadcasters and the 
broadcast ecology in Hungary between 2002 and 2013.   
 
 
3.3 Television and televised current affairs and their place in the new media era 
 
Similarly to historical approaches, studies of television and television news are currently 
somehow pushed to the margins of media scholarship. This decrease in scholarly interest 
over recent decades is usually justified by the claim that television viewership, with the rise 
of the multimedia era, has been in continuous decline since the 1990s (Cushion, 2015, p. 
504; see also 2012, pp. 169-195).25 However, as a number of media scholars (see e.g. 
Briggs, 2009, p. 1; Cushion, 2015; Miller, 2010, pp. 11-19) have pointed out, television is 
still the most influential medium in most countries around the globe, and accordingly 
television news “remains the most viewed, valued and trusted source of information” 
(Cushion, 2012, p. 1), even if today it is increasingly produced and consumed in a 
“converged” way, intersecting with other media (Briggs, 2009, p. 152).26 Based on this still 
ongoing primacy over online and interactive journalism, I therefore focus on television 
news and televised current affairs programmes in order to investigate changes in the 
discursive construction of domestic violence in the Hungarian mediated public sphere 
                                                 
25 In Cushion's opinion, another aspect that may contribute to today's general scholarly preference for online 
and interactive media at the expense of television is that doing research on online news “is much less 
time-consuming than researching broadcast coverage”, and obtaining the latter can also be complicated 
and more expensive, at least compared with content freely and comfortably available online (2012, p. 
184).  
26 See also Smith (2009) on television – and not the internet – as the primary source of information for 
voters even during the 2008 US presidential elections, an event usually cited as a leading example of the 
increased role of the internet over traditional news media.  
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between 2002 and 2013. By focusing on this genre, I can reach that segment of the 
mediated public sphere where the social reality of domestic violence was most powerfully 
“produced”, that is where the symbolic power of media institutions over the issue was the 
strongest. 
 To be sure, television news, once a more or less self-evident category and primarily 
referring to fixed-time news bulletins and hard-news-oriented current affairs programmes, 
has since the 1990s become an increasingly hybrid genre across the world, and nowadays 
includes a wide range of subgenres, such as infotainment TV magazines, afternoon chat 
shows, political talk shows and celebrity news (Cushion, 2012, pp. 7, 15). In Hungary, this 
hybridisation of the television news genre had already started by 2002, the beginning of the 
period under observation, and, as in other parts of the world, resulted in a proliferation of 
broadcast news programmes and texts. Therefore, although in the next chapters I primarily 
focus on fixed-time evening news bulletins, I occasionally also consider other forms of 
television news, if these are especially relevant to the outcome of the news media portrayal 
of the case under study. In-depth interviews with the perpetrator or the victim, for example, 
were typically broadcast in these novel types of infotainment programmes, and news 
bulletins from time to time relied heavily on excerpts from these, as we see in the next 
chapters. 
 The Hungarian media ecology around television and television news also went 
through considerable changes between 2002 and 2013. First, during the early 2000s, 
Hungarian television news experienced the expansion of commercial broadcasting into the 
genre (an aspect that I discuss in more detail in the next paragraphs), with new types of 
news delivery appearing, spreading and gaining strength. A few years later, over the decade 
of the 2000s, with the rise of a multimedia era and the increased spread of online and 
interactive journalism in the country, television news, too, increasingly started to be 
produced and consumed in a converged way, that is by intersecting with other media 
platforms, genres and media material. This, combined with the spread of “media 
multitasking” habits among media users, resulted in the fact that, over those twelve years 
between 2002 and 2013, television news shifted from being a mono-platform type of news 
discourse into a multi-platform one with convergent circulations of news material (Briggs, 
2009). My three empirical cases – discussed later in more detail – well exemplify this shift. 
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Domestic violence, once clearly restricted to crime news and the current affairs/social 
issues section of traditional news media outlets (both printed and broadcast), gradually 
expanded into the local, highly commercialised televised celebrity culture, and finally even 
started to converge with online media platforms, as a news story. In brief, over time the 
media ecology changed around television so that news stories, once primarily circulated 
through printed and broadcast mass media, by the early 2010s were surrounded by a multi-
platform media milieu. 
 Since a detailed overview of the history of television in Hungary between 2002 and 
2013 is beyond the scope of this study, here I just briefly note that, by 2002, an 
entertainment-driven, multi-channel and multimedia environment was a fact of life for 
broadcasters in Hungary as in any other part of the Western world (for a brief overview of 
the media history of the country between 1989 and 2010, see Paál, 2013).27 The period 
between 2002 and 2013 is a relatively stable era in the history of Hungarian television, 
although some changes in the broader media ecology shook this stability (as discussed in 
the previous paragraph), with three major national broadcasters leading viewship statistics 
throughout the whole period: commercial broadcasters TV2, RTL Klub and – significantly 
lagging behind these – the main channel MTV (re-named M1 in 2005) of the national 
public service broadcaster (for statistics see AGB Nielsen, 2018). The stability of this era is 
mostly due to the fact that this period fell between two major changes in the more 
immediate context of the Hungarian broadcasting ecology. The first change was the 1997 
Media Law, which introduced a double system of public-service broadcasting and 
commercial broadcasting into the country – a development that made possible the launch of 
the two privately owned national commercial broadcasters TV2 and RTL Klub in the same 
year, thereby breaking the monopoly of the state in national terrestrial broadcasting (and 
national television news delivery). The second change, in 2014-2015, included the sale of 
TV2 (previously owned by a German media group, ProSiebenSat1) to investors with strong 
                                                 
27 Generally speaking, although, as media scholars have repeatedly pointed out, the development of the 
institution of television followed a very similar path on both sides of the continent, even before the fall of 
the Iron Curtain – with the majority of countries introducing regular television broadcasting in the 1950s, 
the popularity of television reaching its peak in the 1970s, and processes of deregulation and 
decentralisation starting to take place in the 1980s on both sides of the continent – in international 
literature “European television” is still mostly identified with Western European television, and television 
cultures – including cultures of news discourse – from the Eastern part of the continent tend to be only 
minimally addressed (see e.g. Imre, 2013; Mihejl, 2013).  
67 
ties to the current political government and a major transformation of the Hungarian public 
service broadcaster on 15 March 2015, which – by turning TV2 from politically 
independent to strongly government-friendly, and transforming M1 into a pro-
governmental national 24-hours news TV channel – considerably increased state control 
over television news in the country (see Freedom House, 2015, 2016).28  
 Between 2002 and 2013 the major Hungarian television news outlets were, as I 
have already noted, the two privately owned national commercial broadcasters TV2 and 
RTL Klub, and the public service broadcaster MTV/M1 – the three media outlets that I use 
as the main sources of my data in the following chapters. TV2 and RTL Klub from the start 
represented an entertainment-driven and profit-oriented type of television, but due to their 
licence agreements both also delivered public service programming, including regular, 
fixed-time news bulletins and current affairs programmes (Terestyéni, 1999). These two 
broadcasters also introduced new, infotainment-oriented types of news programmes – 
characteristic in Western television since the 1990s – to the broader Hungarian 
public.These included current affairs infotainment magazines Fókusz, Házon kívül (RTL 
Klub), Mokka and Napló (TV2), political infotainment talk show Heti Hetes (RTL Klub) 
and celebrity talk shows Esti Showder (RTL Klub) and Frizbi (TV2). In contrast to these, 
MTV/M1, as a public service broadcaster, represented a more hard-news-oriented agenda 
and a more traditional style of news reporting and, similarly to many other Eastern 
European public service channels, was in general politically influenced by the current 
governments (see Bajomi-Lázár & Monori, 2007 for variations in time). Although the more 
tabloid-style news agenda of the two commercial broadcasters – together with many of the 
other new developments in Western news reporting on these channels, such as the increase 
in live news – also had some impact on the reporting style of MTV/M1, research from 2007 
still revealed a significant difference between commercial and public-service broadcasters 
in the country. The evening news bulletins of TV2 and RTL Klub, compared with that of 
MTV/M1, characteristically contained a higher percentage of soft news, and represented a 
more tabloid-oriented agenda (Bajomi-Lázár & Monori, 2007; Terestyéni, 2007). 
                                                 
28 This latter development formed part of an (as of 2018 still ongoing) broader process of transformation of 
the Hungarian media landscape, starting with the highly controversial 2011 Media Law, which 
significantly increased state control over the media in Hungary (for more on this see Freedom House, 
2012; Urbán, 2016). 
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 Therefore, in the following chapters it is the above-mentioned broadcasters and 
current affairs programmes that are the focus of my research, where I investigate the ways 
in which they mediated the issue of domestic violence to the broader Hungarian public in a 
fast-changing media milieu, and served as the focal points of processes of remediation of 
news stories across available media platforms and genres. The following section aims to 
give insights into the criteria by which I selected, out of the abundance of media texts 
available and dealing with the issue in the given period, the three cases most relevant to the 
topic of the present research. 
 
 
3.4 Cases, the case study and case selection 
 
Even if the concept of a case is fairly elastic, there is a relatively strong academic 
consensus on the fact that cases are real-life units of human activity that can be studied and 
understood only through detailed examination and in their context (Gillham, 2000, p. 1). 
The concept of a case study, however, although today widely used in qualitative studies, is 
often vaguely defined (for discussions see Hyett, Kenny & Dickson-Smith, 2014; Thomas, 
2011; Tight, 2010). Moreover, the case study’s hermeneutic character tends currently to be 
undervalued when compared with  other, more “rigorous”, approaches (Yin, 2003, p. xiii). 
Indeed, the case study has undergone a strong devaluation in the social sciences since the 
1950s, when, with the dominance of positivism, quantitative techniques were regarded as 
more “rigorous” and reliable. Its popularity, however, seems to be once again on the rise 
(Tight, 2010, p. 333). Bent Flyvbjerg, for example, has recently described cases as central 
research categories for social science research, on the basis of their affinity with the 
particular, the practical and the highly context-dependent. He even re-formulates the value 
of the case study in terms of positivist scientific ideals of reliability, validity and 
generalisability (2001). However, as Hyett, Kenny and Dickson-Smith point out, 
misunderstandings around the case study result from the variation in definitions of and 
approaches to case-study research, which often prevent scientists from developing a 
common understanding of the “practice and rigour” of the case study (2014, p. 1). They 
have identified the two most popular of these approaches as the “post-positivist” 
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(Eisenhardt, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Yin, 2003) and the “social-constructivist” (Merriam, 
2009; Stake, 1995). Since the present study is based on post-structuralist – that is, social-
constructivist – insights, it stays closest to the latter rather than the former.  
 The post-positivist approach assumes a singular notion of reality and aims to arrive 
at factual truths via the use of triangulation, a careful selection of multiple methods and, in 
general, the use of a rigorous case-study protocol (Hyett et al. 2014, p. 2). In contrast, the 
social-constructivist approach – based on a notion of reality as shaped by meaning-making 
systems – is characterised by a certain creativity or “analytical eclecticism” (Thomas, 2011, 
p. 512) combined with an adherence to the adequate selection, definition (i.e. boundaries 
and contexts) and presentation of the case(s), and the proper selection and handling of data 
sources (Stake, 1995, p. 131). This approach allows a high degree of flexibility in choosing 
study designs and analytical categories as long as: i) they serve the study of the case(s); and 
ii) a reflexive awareness is developed of the situation in which the researcher-object 
relationship is embedded (Stake, 1995, pp. xi-xii). In Stake's understanding, the case study 
basically intends to grasp the complexity and richness of the case(s) under observation, 
through detailed, in-depth data collection and analysis (1995) – something that the present 
study also does, by providing an in-depth exploration of meaning-constructions, with the 
help of CDA applied to case studies. Based on Stake's categorisation, my cases qualify as 
intrinsic case studies, that is their primary interest is the case itself and its particularities, in 
contrast to instrumental case studies where cases are explored for the sake of building a 
theory, or generalising across cases (1995).  
 In Stake’s approach, as in any other approach to case studies, the most important 
criterion for selecting cases is their relevance for the research objective; they need to be 
selected to give the maximum amount of information about the research objective (see also 
Mills, Durepos & Wiebe, 2010, p. 61). Whereas, in principle, the discursive composition 
and shifts in the news media portrayal of domestic violence in Hungary between 2002 and 
2013 could be observed in any case of domestic violence randomly picked from the time 
period under investigation, some arguments can be made in favour of the claim that high 
publicity cases are more suitable for such a study in terms of their relevance. Domestic 
violence cases are in general strictly filtered in media discourse, and – as previous feminist 
literature has pointed out – it is typically non-ordinary cases that receive extensive media 
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coverage, at the expense of more frequent forms of domestic violence (see e.g. Benedict 
1992, p. 8; Dobash & Dobash 1992, p. 6; Meyers, 1994, p. 48). For my purposes, these 
non-ordinary, “exceptional” cases have something that ordinary cases do not have: a large 
amount of symbolic power, that is power to define the social meaning of domestic violence 
more effectively than other cases do. It is this feature that makes them more suitable for the 
present study than less publicised cases (for symbolic power, see Chapter 2). Moreover, 
these cases often also generate additional public reactions, such as discussions or political 
actions, which produce even more texts. In other words, these cases also usually have a 
higher level of data-richness. 
 The cases presented below were, therefore, selected on the basis of these criteria – 
high publicity, symbolic significance and data richness. Moreover, in order to assure that 
they were cases of domestic violence in line with my definition in the previous chapter, I 
operationalised any instance of interpersonal violence where the perpetrator had 
systematically tried to gain control and dominance over victim(s) within a romantic or 
family relationship – and which Hungarian media outlets named as such. With such an 
operationalisation, violence not only between married couples, but also between common-
law partners, ex-partners, unwanted suitors and their targets qualified as domestic violence, 
as also did violence between family members (including adult–child relationships). 
Including child abuse, too, in the operationalisation of the term (and thereby making some 
concession towards the family-violence approach to domestic violence) was necessary in 
order to take account of the shifting meanings of domestic violence in the Hungarian 
mediated public sphere, where Hungarian media outlets – especially initially – applied this 
term to cases, which other media outlets referred to as child abuse. In fact, the term, as I 
discuss in detail in Chapter 4, entered the Hungarian media agenda through a complex case 
of domestic violence, where a male perpetrator had been systematically abusing his entire 
family, but the case was shaped into a news story with a nearly exclusive focus on his 
teenage step-daughter as the victim.  
 As briefly indicated earlier, my cases also represent different stages in the changing 
place of television and television news in the Hungarian media ecology between 2002 and 
2013. This media environment, similarly already noted, went through considerable changes 
during this period: first, commercial broadcasting expanded into the genre, and later the 
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increased spread of online and interactive journalism resulted in television news, too, 
increasingly starting to be produced and consumed in a converged way. The three cases 
introduced below well exemplify this shift, with domestic violence, once restricted to the 
crime news and current affairs/social issues sections of traditional news media outlets, 
gradually expanding into local televised celebrity culture – the latter enabled by 
commerical broadcasting – and finally penetrating and converging with digital interactive 
media as a televised news story. 
 Based on the above, I selected three cases spanning the 2002–2013 decade. All 
these cases enjoyed prolonged newsworthiness in the Hungarian news media, achieved a 
high level of publicity, and produced a large amount of media texts, which altogether 
assigns them a high relevance to my research objectives. The importance of these cases can 
be further exemplified by the fact that Hungarian media outlets still today repeatedly 
follow up on the characters in these news stories, and thereby ongoing media coverage 
sustains a public, collective memory of these cases among Hungarians. 
 
3.4.1 The Kitti Simek Case (2002) 
 
The case of 14-year-old Kitti Simek, who, after suffering a decade of abuse from her 
stepfather, shot the man dead, has a special importance in my narrative, since it was 
through this news story that the issue of domestic violence entered the Hungarian mediated 
public sphere, was named as such, and came to be represented as a special type of violence. 
Although other cases of domestic violence had already been represented by the Hungarian 
news media, the Simek case was the decisive one in that this new act of naming indicated 
the emergence of a new discourse. The special importance of the Simek story, however, lies 
not only in this act of naming, but in the combination of this act with the enormous 
publicity that the story received. It was this combination that ultimately enabled the case to 
raise awareness of domestic violence in the country, since back in 2002 Hungarian society 
was mostly ignorant of domestic violence issues. In this sense, as well as by giving a 
snapshot of the historical moment when domestic violence entered the Hungarian media, 
this case also serves to explore how local public discourses on domestic violence are 
formed, how existing discursive elements are re-distributed and restructured in order to 
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articulate new meanings, and how the subject positions related to violence (that is, the 
positions of victim, perpetrator and benefactor) and the core elements of violence (such as 
motivation and subtypes of violence) go through various narrative selection mechanisms in 
order to assign coherence to the story. I also explore the ways in which existing media 
technologies (in this case, print and broadcast media, tabloid and serious journalism) were 
utilised in order to circulate across Hungarian society these new meanings, including the 
paradigmatic forms of moral and emotional engagement with the victim and the perpetrator 
that these media portrayals offered.  
 
3.4.2 The Roland Damu Case (2010) 
 
Roland Damu, an actor and media celebrity known for his role in a TV2 daily soap opera, 
battered and raped his ex-girlfriend in November 2010, and became the first high-profile 
perpetrator of domestic violence sentenced to prison in Hungary. Moreover, the story was 
steadily followed, with extensive media attention in the course of the eighteen months that 
passed between the crime and the legal sentencing by a second court. As one of the 
commentators on the case pointed out (Spronz & Puss, 2011), Damu's status as a public 
figure played an important role in his fall, since the media had already been – sporadically 
but repeatedly – reporting on his violent actions since 2004 (including, for example, an 
outburst of  rage at colleagues on a celebrity cooking show), and these actions could be 
relatively easily recalled when the domestic violence incident took place. The footage of 
the cooking show, for example, was re-watched by “hundreds of thousands” on YouTube, 
as an online news magazine reported after Damu's first-court guilty verdict (Farkas, 2011). 
Because the case was treated as soft news until the sentence was pronounced by the first 
court, and because Damu was a TV2 celebrity figure, the story spilled over a good deal into 
infotainment programmes, where Damu regularly appeared and where his ex-girlfriend, 
too, agreed twice to be interviewed. This case, therefore, offers the possibility of exploring 
the role of local celebrity culture and of the tabloidisation of commercial media in 
attracting public attention to a case that would normally not break the newsworthiness 
threshold of media outlets. 
 
73 
3.4.3 The József Balogh Case (2013) 
 
My third and final case is the story of József Balogh, an MP of the conservative-nationalist 
party FIDESZ, who battered his cohabiting girlfriend in April 2013 to the point where she 
was in need of hospitalisation. The story hit the news at a specific moment when public 
attention to the issue of domestic violence was temporarily receiving a major boost in the 
country, due to the scandalous comments that another MP of Balogh's party had made a 
couple of months earlier in a parliamentary discussion of an important policy instrument 
against domestic violence (a bill). This comment provoked public outcry, and also marked 
Balogh's party as sexist in the eyes of many Hungarians. Although Balogh was far from 
being the first national politician to be caught committing battery, he was the first whose 
story received considerable media attention. Moreover, he became an object of public 
ridicule after he blatantly lied about his girlfriend’s injuries in front of the cameras (he 
blamed their family dog for the woman's injuries), thereby drawing more attention to his 
case. In this respect, the story marks a specific historical moment when the issue of 
domestic violence, having already gathered strong public support for its criminalisation, 
became further instrumentalised in national political scandals. The second important aspect 
is that Balogh's lies intensified public emotions around the issue of domestic violence in 
the country, especially in the networked media, with the sharing of internet memes that 
mocked the politician. This prominent role that social media played in magnifying and 
shaping public emotions about the story introduces a new level of complexity into the 
broadcast coverage of the Balogh case, highlighting the role of a convergent, hybrid media 
ecology in socialising citizens into specific forms of emotional engagement with domestic 
violence. 
 
Following this general overview of my cases, the next three chapters investigate each case 
in more detail through a number of selected, paradigmatic media texts, with the help of 
CDA. Audiovisual materials produced by the three major Hungarian broadcasters are freely 
and publicly available in the National Audiovisual Archive (NAVA), a digital archive 
originally launched in 2006 that I have used for data collection. Data from this archive, 
however, is not fully accessible for the whole 2002–2013 period, as the so-called “NAVA 
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Law”, obliging Hungarian broadcasters to render copies of their audiovisual materials 
publicly available, entered into force only in 2004, and consequently is not applicable to 
pre-2004 material (for a brief overview of the history of NAVA, see Kiss, 2017, p. 155-
170). However, some material from public service channels produced shortly before 2004 – 
including the news media texts closely linked to my one and only pre-2004 case, that of 
Kitti Simek (see Chapter 4) – can be accessed through NAVA. In the one and only case of 
missing commercial broadcasters, I substituted for broadcast news the print news from one 
tabloid (Blikk) and one broadsheet (Népszabadság), both with the highest circulation 
numbers in the country back then. This allowed me to present a snapshot of a media milieu 
where domestic violence news stories were circulated through traditional news media 
outlets including both television news (which steadily remained the focal point for bringing 
domestic violence to public attention) and print news media,. Archived copies of 
Népszabadság are available today in most public libraries in Hungary, while those of Blikk 
were accessed at the National Széchényi Library in Budapest.  
 
 
3.5 The next three chapters 
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 investigate these three aforementioned cases, each through selected 
extracts from three major news media outlets, with the help of a CDA framework. The 
analytical categories employed are:  i) domestic violence and its “actors”, that is victims 
and perpetrators, which I explore through naming, but also through characterisation, 
context and actors' agency (and the allocation of motives, if this occurred); ii) the media 
proposals for emotional and moral engagement with these actors in  domestic violence 
(that is, the specific forms of emotion and moral norms that the media discursively 
articulated in the face of these actors and/or the issue of domestic violence, including 
attention to actors’ on-screen violations of certain social norms that regulate public conduct 
and emotional expression); and iii)  the proposals by the media for interventions on 
domestic violence (if there were any), through the identification of who should act on 
which kind of problem, and the implications of these proposals for the construction of 
domestic violence in the national public sphere. 
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 Through this analytical framework, I follow the mediated discourse(s) on domestic 
violence in Hungary between 2002 and 2013, as these have emerged, changed over time 
and been articulated through the genre of televised current affairs in a historically and 
locally specific (and rapidly changing) media environment, the latter strongly shaped by 
the emergence of new forms of news delivery and reporting, and through novel media 
platforms, with which television and televison news were in dynamic interaction. The 
primary focus of my study, as I explained earlier, is the discourse(s) that media texts 
articulated, combined or re-arranged. I explore how domestic violence, through systematic 
semiotic choices in media texts, was able to become meaningful to Hungarians, to structure 
and shape their orientation to themselves and to others in their world. The next chapter is 
specifically dedicated to the Simek case from 2002, through which the issue of domestic 
violence entered the Hungarian mediated public sphere, was named as such, and came to 
be represented as a special type of violence, thereby indicating the emergence of a new 
public discourse. 
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4. From Homicide to Abuse and from Perpetrator to Victim: The Simek Case and the 
Birth of Domestic Violence in the Hungarian News Media 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I present an analysis of the so-called Simek case from Hungary in 2002, 
which was, I am suggesting, the first case of domestic violence to receive considerable 
media attention, and accordingly contributed to increasing public attention to the issue 
nationwide.29 This chapter explores how this case came to symbolise a shift in the 
discursive paradigms of domestic violence, and specifically how domestic violence entered 
the mediated public sphere in Hungary through the case, obtained a name, and came to be 
represented and understood as violence. By giving a name and a lot of publicity to a 
hitherto unnamed and invisible type of violence, and by constructing it as an issue charged 
with a range of emotional and moral meanings, the news media’s portrayal of the Simek 
case played an active role in laying the foundations for domestic violence becoming an 
issue of public concern and an object of social intervention in the country. Indeed, the 
Simek case was followed by a period when domestic violence became “a daily media 
event, an element of the political scene” (Hüse & Konyáriné Ménesi, 2008, p. 55), but 
further high-profile cases – discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 – did not emerge until the early 
2010s. The Simek case still plays a significant role in the collective memory of 
Hungarians, as a readily available instance of domestic violence in parliamentary speeches 
(see e.g. Lukács, 2015), academic accounts of the history of Hungarian feminist activism 
(Fabian, 2009, 2014; Vanya, 2006a) and also in the media, which continue to follow the 
                                                 
29 Despite the prominent role the Simek case played in introducing domestic violence into public discourse 
in Hungary, currently there is only one academic article partly dedicated to this case (Barabás, Gyurkó & 
Virág, 2006). Although this article explicitly addresses the media representation of the Simek case, it only 
analyses how the work of the police and various institutions of justice has been communicated, and does 
not touch on the issue of domestic violence as such. The Simek case is similarly missing from the only 
piece of academic writing dedicated to the media portrayal of “women as victims” in the country (Balogh, 
Kassa & Sinkó, 2011). This slim volume does not address any cases prior to 2007, and consequently fails 
to reflect on the ways in which domestic violence originally entered the Hungarian public sphere. 
Accordingly, the most useful summary currently available, at least regarding the first weeks of media 
coverage, is a journalistic article published in a political-cultural Hungarian weekly, Magyar Narancs 
(Gavra, 2002). 
77 
lives of the Simek family (see, for instance, Czellár, 2016; Temesvári, 2016).   
 By giving nationwide publicity to domestic violence, the Simek case not only 
served as an eye-opener for Hungarian society, which in 2002 was largely ignorant of 
domestic violence issues, but also made visible many of the limitations of and inherent 
tensions in Hungarian media practices that had not yet been tested on domestic violence 
cases. Media outlets repeatedly violated certain ethical norms of media portrayal that they 
had previously not been forced to consider, and these violations led to some far-reaching 
consequences that affected not only the media portrayal and the afterlife of the case, but 
also its researchability today.30 Specifically, in the weeks after 3 September 2002, when 
news first broke about the case, Hungarian spectators could follow the Simek story day by 
day as a kind of true-life soap opera, with twists and turns rife with dramatic details of a 
private nature about the 14-year-old girl Kitti Simek, who – after a decade of emotional, 
physical and sexual abuse she (and her family) had suffered from her stepfather – took a 
gun and shot him in the early hours of the 31 August 2002. Kitti, with her mother's consent, 
regularly appeared on TV screens and in newspaper headlines with her full name and face 
revealed, participated in a popular political talk show, willingly gave interviews about the 
abuse, recalling how she shot the man, and talking about her feelings. In short, a great 
many private details (including the under-age perpetrator-victim's full identity) were 
publicised, which, while giving unprecedented insight into the nature of violence in 
families, at the same time also violated her right to privacy and rendered her vulnerable to 
the negative consequences of media exposure. 
 In retrospect, it is evident that this violation of norms was strongly connected to the 
general social, historical and media-related context of the case. The Hungarian media could 
not adequately resolve the dilemma of how to reconcile the right of a victim of domestic 
violence to  privacy, on the one hand, with the right of domestic violence to publicity (as an 
                                                 
30 The researchability of the Simek case is limited to some extent today, as media outlets, even if not bound 
by existing Hungarian laws, are typically reluctant to share their original footages of the Simek story with 
researchers, often with the justification of protecting the victim's right to privacy. Accordingly, original 
newscast footage made by commercial broadcasting channels, including RTL Klub and TV2, the two 
major national commercial broadcasters in the country, which back in 2002 played a crucial role in 
covering the Simek case, is currently not available for research purposes. Also, footage made by MTV1, 
the largest public service TV channel in Hungary, are available today only in a corrupted form, that is with 
both the graphic overlay (caption) in the lower third of the original screen and the introductory words of 
the news anchors removed. Thereby persons appearing on the screen are often difficult to identify. Printed 
media, however, is fully accessible in public libraries. 
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issue that had long been kept hidden), on the other hand, especially in a situation where the 
victim – unaware of the potentially negative consequences of media exposure – willingly 
cooperated with the media (for a discussion of domestic violence as a privacy issue see 
McLaughlin, 1998). The emergence of domestic violence in the Hungarian public sphere, 
as catalysed by this case, quickly blurred the seemingly well-established line between the 
private and the public. But new boundaries (and corresponding media practices) were still 
to be established, especially in a media environment that had only just moved towards 
infotainment, as the first national commercial broadcasting channels were launched in 
1997. What is more, the Simek case, with its strong focus on the hitherto “hidden” violent 
aspects of intimate life and personal accounts of these, also marked a shift in Hungary 
towards confessional and personalising tendencies in the media. This shift, first observed in 
Anglo-American countries in the 1990s, placed intimate life at the heart of media 
representations, and thereby created societies saturated with mediated intimacy – that is, 
media representations of intimate relationships (Barker, Gill & Harvey, 2018, pp. 24-26).  
 Ironically, this shift towards mediated intimacy – in the Western media traditionally 
linked to the emergence of media genres focusing on intimate life, such as reality TV 
shows and dating shows, and emotionalised, dramatic modes of presentation of personal 
stories and confessions (see Pantti, 2011; Pantti & van Zoonen, 2011) – coincided almost to 
the day in Hungary with the breaking news of the Simek story. While news of the latter 
broke on 3 September 2002, the first episode of Való Világ (Real Life), the localised 
version of the Big Brother reality TV show and as such the first media genre in the country 
dedicated to the intimate life of real citizens, was aired on 11 September 2002 by 
commercial broadcaster RTL Klub. The two “shows” therefore initially ran in parallel in the 
Hungarian media. This coincidence in time is also important because it brings attention to 
the fact that in 2002 Hungarian media outlets – although they had already felt “the call of 
the time”, i.e. a shift towards personalisation and the mediation of intimate life – were not 
yet experienced with the implications of exposing citizens’ private lives to the public. As a 
result, in 2002 Hungarian media outlets often did not exert enough self-restraint in sharing 
“newsworthy” data about the intimate life of members of the Simek family with the public, 
and the case soon fell prey to sensationalist media portrayals, with spectaculation often 
sidelining substantial public discussion of domestic violence. However, even if the general 
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media portrayal of the Simek case did not meet normative expectations regarding how to 
cover domestic violence cases, the mere fact that a hitherto taboo case was now named as 
domestic violence in the Hungarian public sphere was still a significant step forward.31  
 The outstandingly high media visibility that the Simek case achieved – something 
that would have been impossible for an “ordinary” case of domestic violence – was also 
strongly connected to the fact that the story involved a very untypical type of perpetrator of 
homicide (that is, an under-age female) – a perpetrator profile that traditionally enjoys high 
newsworthiness in the Western media.32 The Simek case indeed belongs to a very rare type 
of domestic violence case, that of adolescent parricide.33 As a result, domestic violence – a 
term originally coined by feminists to refer primarily to wife abuse (see e.g. Morvai, 1998) 
or abuse of wives and children (Tóth, 1999a) – entered the Hungarian news discourse by 
yielding an alternative name and an alternative focus to a rare type of crime (adolescent 
parricide) that the news media would have covered anyway, on the basis of existing media 
practices, in their crime news section, due to its high newsworthiness. This shift in names 
and perspectives, as I discuss below, was greatly helped by the fact that the Hungarian 
news media, spurred by the search for  explanations, focused on the element of abuse that 
the under-age perpetrator had suffered from her parent – a direction of media focus that is 
relatively common in the case of adolescent parricides – and consequently reallocated the 
status of perpetrator and victim between the girl and her stepfather. 
 To be sure, the Hungarian news media already, before the Simek case, covered 
cases that qualify as domestic violence. However, what the Simek case brought was a 
                                                 
31 For similar reasoning, see Kitzinger, 2004. In connection with the emergence of child sexual abuse in the 
British media in the 1980s, she argues that in a case of taboo topics the mere fact that the media covers 
them is more important than the way in which they are covered. 
32  On the disproportionately high attention that under-age and/or female perpetrators of homicide typically 
receive in the media in Western societies, see Heine 2013, p. 4; on the “ordinary”, that is most frequent, 
type of domestic violence – i.e. women falling victim to spousal abuse – typically not receiving much 
media attention, see e.g. Berns, 2004; Boyle, 2005, pp. 84-93; Meyers, 1997; in Hungary see Hüse & 
Konyáriné, 2008. 
33  On adolescent parricide, see Heine, 2013. Adolescent parricides are mostly committed by severely 
abused teenagers (i.e. between 13 and 18 years of age), who – lacking the necessary means of self-
protection (e.g. they cannot just leave their abusive homes) as well as, due to their age, a well-developed 
mental ability to consider alternative solutions – try to escape the abuse by killing the abusive parent or 
step-parent (Heine, 2013, pp. 7-8). Probably the most well-known case of adolescent parricide, at least in 
the Anglo-American world, is that of Ritchie (16) and Deborah (17) Jahnke from the US, who, after being 
severely abused by their father (then 38) for years, killed him in 1982. A much more recent and highly 
publicised case, where a (young adult) child, after decades of abuse, turned against a parent and instigated 
her murder –  in the strict sense of the term not a case of adolescent parricide, but bearing strong 
similarities to one – was that of Dee Dee (48) and Gypsy Rose Blanchard (24) from the US in 2015. 
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change in terminology, in perspective, and consequently a change in discourse. The 
assumption that the year 2002 indeed brought a qualitative change in this field – in other 
words that domestic violence, previously only sporadically mentioned in Hungarian media 
texts, established itself firmly in the Hungarian media agenda from around that year – is 
further confirmed by the quantitative data provided by Magyar Távirati Iroda (MTI), the 
Hungarian news agency (see Magyar Távirati Iroda n.d.). These data indicate an 
outstandingly large rise in mentions of the term domestic violence (családon belüli erőszak) 
in 2002. According to MTI, the number of mentions of the term in Hungarian media texts 
was roughly 20 times higher in 2002 than in the previous year, and the increase continued, 
although at a more moderate pace, in subsequent years (see Magyar Távirati Iroda n.d.).34 
Naturally, these data do not tell us anything about the ways in which domestic violence was 
discursively constructed for the public back then – it is these ways that form the object of 
the present study. 
 In this chapter I explore the ways in which domestic violence was discursively 
constructed by the Hungarian news media in the coverage of the Simek case, with special 
attention to: i) its implications regarding typical victims, perpetrators and their gender, 
through analytical categories of lexical choice, but also characterisation and context; ii) the 
types of emotional and moral engagement that the media proposed as acceptable with 
regard to these actors in domestic violence; and iii) the media proposals for legitimate 
interventions on domestic violence, and the implications of these for the construction of 
domestic violence in the national public sphere. 
 
 
4.2 Data, data selection and methods 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, I use critical discourse analysis (Fairclough) to analyse the ways 
                                                 
34 The statistical data available at MTI also demonstrate that it was indeed domestic violence, and not a rival 
term available to denote cases of violence within four walls, that entered and established itself on the 
Hungarian media agenda around 2002. Specifically, the two other cognate terms that had also been in use 
to some extent before 2002, if typically limited to professional discourse – child abuse 
(gyerekbántalmazás) and violence against women (nők elleni erőszak), the latter bearing strong feminist 
connotations in Hungary as elsewhere – did not experience such a large increase in mentions as did the 
term domestic violence around 2002 and in fact over the whole period from 1989 to 2013 (see Magyar 
Távirati Iroda n.d.). 
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in which  the Simek case was covered by three major Hungarian news media outlets: the 
evening news programme on MTV1 (the main public broadcasting TV channel in the 
country), Népszabadság (the largest political daily back in 2002, an independent left-wing 
newspaper), and Blikk (the largest tabloid paper, with a slightly lower circulation than 
Népszabadság). Of this pool of texts, which includes approximately 60 pieces of news, I 
give special attention to the peak coverage period from the 3 September, when the first 
news broke, until late September, when the story started to go cold  (after this  the story 
was typically covered only during the different stages of the murder trial, that is in April, 
June and September 2003, and in January of 2004 and 2005, although in the tabloids the 
story enjoyed newsworthiness only until around November 2002).35  This couple of weeks 
had a decisive impact on the general news media portrayal of the case. I selected four texts 
(two full news stories and two excerpts) for deeper analysis, on the basis of their ability to 
illustrate the discursive constructions that I identify below as the most widespread, and 
therefore typical, in the news media coverage of the case. Accordingly, the next section is 
dedicated to an analysis of the “actors” in domestic violence – that is the victims and the 
perpetrators – and their gender, which I explore through naming, and also through 
characterisation and allocation of motives. After this, I analyse the types of emotional and 
moral engagement that the media proposed as acceptable for the above actors. The final 
section explores the proposals made by the media for interventions on domestic violence, 
and the implications of these for the construction of domestic violence in the national 
public sphere.  
 
 
4.3 The birth of domestic violence in the news media: Naming the crime, and 
constructing perpetrators, victims and their gender  
 
The main feature of news reporting on the Simek case was the shift from homicide to the 
element of abuse, and the consequent construction of Kitti as the main victim – this despite 
                                                 
35 Kitti first was first given a suspended sentence (September 2003), but later sentenced to 26 months in 
prison (January 2004), which she avoided serving only when granted parole by the President of Hungary 
in January 2005. In 2002 in Hungary the age of criminal responsibility was 14, which Kitti had reached 
only a couple of weeks before the murder. 
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the fact that the story was more complex since Kitti was both a victim (of abuse) and a 
perpetrator (of homicide). In this section, by focusing on discursive practices around the 
actors in the news story, I investigate the selection mechanisms by which the media outlets 
filtered out or backgrounded certain subjects, actions and events while at the same time 
highlighting others, in order to give meaning to the story from the perspective of abuse. 
Therefore, the focal points of this section are the actors in domestic violence and the ways 
in which they were constructed through the choices made with regard to naming, 
characterisation and allocation of motives, and (where applicable) the nature of the 
suffering endured. I also explore the terms that media outlets employed in order to define 
and categorise the crime. In the second part of this section I investigate the ways in which 
the category of gender was connected by the media to violence, thereby giving additional 
meaning to the story from the perspective of abuse.  
 
4.3.1 From homicide to abuse: Constructing perpetrators and victims  
 
The fact that the Hungarian news media from the start treated Kitti as the main victim is 
well mirrored in the terms that media outlets used to tell the story and categorise the crime. 
The term “parricide” is never mentioned in any of the media texts that I studied – rather, 
media outlets referred to the story as a case of domestic violence (“családon belüli 
erőszak”, Népszabadság), child abuse and child sexual abuse (“gyerekbántalmazás”, 
“szexuális gyerekbántalmazás”, MTV1), or physical and emotional terror (“testi és lelki 
terror”, Blikk), and all repeatedly referred to Kitti's suffering as abuse or sexual abuse (on 
the importance of naming, see Lamb, 1991; Lamb & Keon, 1995). Interestingly, despite the 
strong focus on the element of abuse and the repeated use of the term domestic violence, 
none of the media outlets interviewed experts on domestic violence. Expert status was 
assigned only to a priest, a psychologist, the director of an NGO “helping victims”, and 
two experts on child abuse. This, together with the fluidity of terms used to categorise the 
crime, indicates that, in the Hungary of 2002, domestic violence, and still less its subtypes, 
were far from settled in a solid discourse through which their “reality” could be easily and 
seamlessly articulated. 
 The earliest media texts, released on 3-4 September 2002, which had a profound 
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impact on the overall media portrayal of the case, constructed Kitti's and her stepfather's 
personalities and motivations so that sympathy right from the start was with Kitti, while the 
stepfather acquired a monster-like personality. Media texts reported that Kitti “has put an 
end to a decade-long dread” (MTV1, 3 September 2002), “shot him in desperation” 
(Népszabadság, 4 September 2002), “could not endure the beating any more” (Blikk, 4 
September 2002), and even when her perpetrator status was mentioned, the worst 
description was “homicidal little girl” (MTV1, 3 September 2002). The stepfather, 
meanwhile, was described as someone who “hit his wife, stepdaughter and 3-year-old 
daughter with a board, electric wire, and a whip”, “professed extreme right-wing ideas, and 
collected Nazi books” (MTV1, 3 September 2002), was “racist and an arms and weapons 
maniac”, “unemployed”, and who “in the spirit of Nazism, kept his whole family in severe 
physical and emotional terror” (Blikk, 4 September 2002), or “treated his family 
mercilessly” (Népszabadság, 4 September 2002). During this initial period media texts 
typically reported the abuse in much more detail than the murder itself (the murder 
received significant attention only later, as investigations progressed). Accordingly, abuse 
became strongly highlighted as Kitti's motivation for the murder (as later confirmed by the 
police investigation), and strongly linked to and explained by the stepfather's aggressive 
personality, epitomised by his frequently mentioned Nazi ideas (what is factually known is 
that the man indeed possessed Nazi books and an SS uniform).  
 By giving special significance to the stepfather's Nazi ideas, media outlets (with the 
exception of Népszabadság, we should add, which mentioned only the man's “anti-Roma” 
sentiments and “extreme right-wing” ideas) presented him as unquestionably an outsider, 
thereby removing both the abuse and its perpetrator from mainstream society. This type of 
media portrayal is by no means case-specific. The phenomenon of depicting perpetrators as 
monster-like or insane is well-known and widely criticised in the existing literature on 
domestic violence because it downplays the high prevalence of domestic violence in 
societies and encourages explanations at individual level instead of reflecting on the ways 
in which violence is enabled and legitimised in society (see e.g. Meyers, 1997; Berns, 
2004; Zeynep, 2006, pp. 305-7). In the Simek case, the combination of this raging-monster 
image of the stepfather's personality constructed by the media, along with the uncommon 
nature of the murder that Kitti committed, made the whole case particularly vulnerable to 
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portrayals focusing on the extraordinariness and exceptionality of the case, even before 
sensationalist portrayals began to dominate coverage from the second week after the news 
first broke.  
 The following multi-modal news item, broadcast as early as 3 September on the 
prime-time news bulletin of MTV1, well illustrates how sympathetic identification with 
Kitti, as described earlier, was discursively created through a tactical use of language and 
image in the news, as a result of which Kitti's identity was shifted away from the status of 
perpetrator towards that of  victim:  
 
Homicidal little girl 
[We see a village house from the outside, then the entrance from the courtyard] The 
14-year-old girl has put an end to a decade-long dread. Over this period her 
stepfather had been beating her and the entire family on a daily basis. [We see Kitti 
in close-up, petting a dog] On several occasions he had hit his wife, stepdaughter 
and three-year-old daughter with a board, an electric wire or a whip. He had 
threatened them even with a gun. [Kitti's mother speaks to camera] “Whether I had 
it in my mouth? Well, yes, it happened... loaded with a bullet, at full-cock.” [The 
camera shows Nazi books] The stepfather professed extreme right-wing ideas, and 
collected Nazi books] [We see Kitti coming out of a room] He often shut the family 
into the house, and did not let them meet others [New picture: Kitti and her mother 
are shown in close-up, the mother kisses Kitti's hand] He had even sexually 
molested the 14-year-old Kitti. This was something that the girl could not endure 
any longer. On Saturday at around 1.30 a.m. the head of the family fell asleep. It 
was then that the girl pulled out her stepfather's gun and shot him in the temple. 
[We see Kitti talking on camera, but not directly to camera] “...and then I felt very 
relieved, too, because I will be able to forget more quickly that I've killed him 
than... than these ten years. Because whenever I go to the beach or elsewhere, like I 
try on clothes, I try on lingerie in a shop, and look at myself, I will always have that 
on my back. And [at this point she looks into the camera] I will never be able to 
forget it in my life.” [New picture: two men in suits are sitting at a table in an 
office] The girl has confessed and pleaded guilty. [New picture: more people sitting 
around an office table] The police continue the investigation, and are helped by 
experts. [A man in a suit is talking to camera, without caption; it can only be 
assumed that he is a spokesperson for the police] “A forensic medical investigation 
is needed, even because of the sexual harrassment. The technical assault and the 
sexual abuse [the man grimaces] that her father had carried out has caused severe 
emotional pain to her, so we need a psychiatrist, too, and a firearms expert”. [New 
picture: village street] The police have reported that the girl has already reached the 
age of criminal responsibility, as she turned 14 on the 6 August. [New picture: we 
see two village women talking to Kitti's mother on a village street. Kitti is squatting 
alone, at some distance from them, and is petting a dog]. But she can remain at 
liberty for the course of the investigation. 
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As indicated earlier, the above multi-modal news item illustrates how the focus shifted 
from homicide to the element of abuse, and, accordingly, how the roles of perpetrator and 
victim (and the emotions associated with these) were distributed between Kitti and her 
stepfather. This is well observable already at the very beginning of the news item: although 
the title (“homicidal little girl”) puts the focus on homicide and the fact that is has been 
committed by an unusual perpetrator,  the next sentence immediately excuses Kitti from the 
crime by stating that “the girl has put an end to a decade-long dread”.  
 The rest of the footage similarly diverts attention from the homicide to the abuse 
that preceded it. This is achieved through various discursive tactics. It happens firstly 
through assigning central importance to the stepfather's abuse, both in the family history 
and in the narrative of the day of the murder. Specifically, nearly half of the footage is 
dedicated to a detailed description of the violence that the family, primarily Kitti, had 
suffered, while the act of homicide is given only one sentence (“It was then that the girl 
pulled out her stepfather's gun and shot him in the temple”). Secondly, it happens through 
directly quoting Kitti about the abuse. She mostly talks about her own suffering and its 
irrevocability, including the mark that abuse has made on her body (this bodily mark, 
however, is not further demonstrated by visuals). Thirdly, it happens through the use of an 
expert quote to validate Kitti's emotional pain. The police spokesperson claims that “the 
technical assault and the sexual abuse that her father had carried out has caused her severe 
emotional pain”. All these contribute to the image of Kitti's victimisation, despite the fact 
that she was, at the same time, also a murderer. The footage makes use of visual elements, 
too, in order to bring the teenage girl emotionally closer to spectators, raise their sympathy 
towards her, and thereby contribute to portraying her in terms of sympathetic identification. 
Besides the fact that Kitti looks on screen like a normal teenager – what is more, one with a 
pretty, innocent face – she is often shown by the camera petting a dog, a potential 
indication of her capacity for bonding and love, which feeds further into the assumption 
already built that she, in contrast to her stepfather, is not an aggressive, anti-social 
personality.  
 
4.3.2 Connecting gender, sex and abuse: Male violence, sexual abuse or child (sexual) 
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abuse?  
 
The above news story also yields insights into the ambiguous ways in which the Hungarian 
news media established a connection between the abuse and the gender of people affected 
by it. In general, media outlets often struggled with the gendered aspects of the story, 
namely, that the perpetrator of the abuse was male, and his victims – given that the man 
abused the whole family, not only Kitti – were all female, but the nature of the abuse went 
beyond being merely sexual. The most common strategy for coping with the above 
dilemma was, as I discuss below, that of paying extra attention to the sexual elements of 
the abuse, and at the same time marginalising the mother – whose victim position in the 
face of the male perpetrator was made far less evident than that of the under-age Kitti – and 
thereby the topic of male violence against adult women.  
 The above-cited footage is illustrative of this process, as it gives special emphasis to 
sexual abuse, which, combined with the spotlight on Kitti's age and gender, converts the 
gendered nature of violence that both the girl and her family suffered from the man into 
sexual violence against under-age victims, i.e. child sexual abuse. It is telling that the 
footage, despite being relatively brief (its full transcript does not exceed one page), 
mentions Kitti's exact age three times and she is never described in gender-neutral terms 
(e.g. as a “child” or a “teenager”), but always by terms indicating both her gender and her 
age (“girl” or “little girl”). Also, the text assigns special significance to the sexual elements 
of the abuse that Kitti suffered. Firstly, it presents sexual abuse as both the culmination of 
all previous abuse she suffered and the trigger for the murder (“He had even sexually 
molested the 14-year-old Kitti. This was something that the girl could not endure any 
more”), despite the fact that this status of sexual abuse in the story had not been confirmed 
either by police investigations or by members of the Simek family (in fact, as later 
investigations and media reports revealed, sexual abuse had started years before Kitti shot 
him). Secondly, sexual abuse is the one and only form of abuse mentioned in the footage 
that is accompanied by a strong and negative on-screen emotional reaction (that is when 
the spokesperson for the police has a grimace full of disgust and embarrassment at the 
mention of it). This gives a special significance to sexual abuse, which serves as an 
indication to spectators of what would be the socially “approved” emotional reaction to 
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sexual abuse in general (on the power of the news media to habituate spectators to 
“appropropriate” emotional responses, see Pantti & Nervi, 2006).36  
 During the rest of the media coverage, MTV1 attributed even further significance to 
the sexual element, and started to explicitly label the case as a story of child sexual abuse. 
Népszabadság and Blikk, however, followed slightly different routes. Népszabadság, while 
it similarly highlighted sexual abuse in the beginning, consistently referred to the story as a 
case of domestic violence, which it understood as inflicted primarily on women and 
children, and thereby foregrounded the gendered nature of the violence. Blikk, however, 
mostly emphasised the “terror” that Kitti had endured rather than consistently refering to 
abuse, but on two occasions it shared sensitive details about her sexual molestation (Blikk, 
5 September and 30 November 2002). In short, while media outlets assigned varying 
degrees of importance to the element of sexual abuse, all of them highlighted the issue, 
thereby giving an over-sexualised tone to the media coverage of the case at the expense of 
highlighting the non-sexual elements and the generally gendered nature of domestic 
violence. 
 As I have already indicated, besides the types of violence, the media also selected 
the victims of violence that they deemed worthy of attention, and this also contributed to 
diverting attention from the gendered nature of the crime. The most significant victim 
missing from the texts – or even if present  her victim status was downplayed and vague – 
was Kitti's mother. Despite the fact that she, similarly to Kitti, endured a decade of abuse, 
her suffering was rarely mentioned and was markedly overshadowed by Kitti’s. In all the 
media texts I studied, there are only two in which the mother's suffering is explicitly 
addressed: the first is the text quoted above, where we are given the mother's brief first-
person account of a tiny (although quite shocking) part of the violence she endured, and the 
other is a report from the Simek family’s village, published by Népszabadság on 10 
September 2002, where the newspaper mentions that the stepfather had also humiliated the 
mother several times in front of village inhabitants. In all the other texts, the mother's 
suffering is touched upon only by a reference to the man abusing his “family” – a very 
general term that fails to address her as an individual. Although the fact that the mother's 
                                                 
36 It should be noted that by turning the story into a case of child sexual abuse MTV1 was focusing on 
exactly the form of child abuse – sexual abuse – of which Hungarian society already in 2002 strongly 
disapproved (on the widespread disapproval of child sexual abuse in Hungarian society, see Gavra, 2002).  
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suffering was downplayed and mostly hidden in the media coverage of the case did protect 
the mother, in a sense, from the media invading her privacy, it also resulted in an erasure of 
adult female victims – the most typical victims of domestic violence – from the media 
coverage of the case. 
 In summary, the Hungarian news media arrived at the topic of domestic violence 
and abuse through a case of homicide committed by an under-age perpetrator, a child, that 
is someone who was both more vulnerable and less evidently responsible than an adult. 
What is more, she had previously fallen victim to, among others, a type of violence – 
sexual abuse – that Hungarian public opinion already unambiguously disapproved of back 
in 2002, in contrast to other forms of domestic violence that the girl had also suffered. The 
media portrayal of the case unequivocally placed the victim of abuse – and not the victim 
of the homicide – in the position with which spectators could most sympathetise. The 
strong focus on the abuse and its child victim diverted attention from the mother, despite 
the fact the she too was a typical victim of domestic violence, as well as demonising the 
abusive stepfather. Both of these factors pushed the general media portrayal of the case in 
the direction of emphasising even more the extraordinariness and individuality of the story, 
rather than focusing on its embeddedness in broader social contexts, including the 
inequality of the sexes and the high prevalence in societies of abuse in domestic settings. 
 
 
4.4 Changes in proposed types of emotional and moral engagement: The implications 
of media exposure for the construction of the under-age perpetrator's victimhood  
 
As indicated earlier, the most questionable aspect of the Simek case was the fact that 
several media outlets – including MTV1 and, repeatedly, Blikk – exposed 14-year-old Kitti 
before the public. This media portrayal had a profound impact; her moral integrity was 
soon questioned and this is the phenomenon on which I focus in this section. Specifically, I 
explore the ways in which her quasi-celebrity status – a role that the news media assigned 
to her by repeatedly exposing her private life to the public and thereby raising her to 
temporary fame – clashed with the complexity of her perpetrator-victim status.37 In the 
                                                 
37 On the strong connection between celebrity status and media attention directed to the details of an 
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previous section I discussed how the news media initially tended to ignore this complexity 
in order to present Kitti as an ordinary teenager who had fallen victim to abuse and was 
therefore undoubtedly worthy of compassion and sympathy. In this section I explore how 
the media handled this complexity as Kitti's social status changed when she appeared to 
make active use of the accumulated symbolic capital she had acquired through positive and 
extensive media attention. I first give an overview of how Kitti's media exposure occurred, 
with a special focus on her consent to what now looks like a violation of her privacy and a 
disregard for international norms of ethical media portrayal of children. Secondly, I give an 
overview of how the discursive construction of her “good victim” status by the media (and 
the emotions associated with this status) gradually changed as she remained in the spotlight 
for an extended period. I identify two characteristic discourses:  the narrative of heroism 
and the narrative of blame, both created as a response to her quasi-celebrity status. I also 
discuss a particular appearance by Kitti on a fashionable television talk show, and the ways 
in which her public conduct and her management of emotions in front of the cameras (and 
the social expectations concerning these latter two) reinforced a negative change in the 
social perception of her victimhood. 
 While media outlets were not violating any Hungarian law by having Kitti appear in 
person on the news, since they had obtained the girl's and her mother's consent,38 the 
disclosure of Kitti's full identity had originally happened without the consent of the Simek 
family,39 and it was this that served as the main motivation for Kitti and her mother 
agreeing to be interviewed, so as to better control information flows on their case.40 While 
nowadays it is widely accepted that reporting on child victims of abuse requires 
extraordinary caution, especially regarding the child's right to privacy, in 2002 a large part 
                                                                                                                                                    
individual’s private life rather than their public role, see Rojek, 2001, p. 10; Turner, 2004, p. 8. On female 
celebrities and the gendered realm of celebrity culture see Williamson, 2013. 
38 As later investigations led by the Hungarian Ombudsman for Data Protection confirmed. On the 
conclusion of the investigation, see Adatvédelmi Biztos Hivatala [Bureau of the Hungarian Ombudsman 
for Data Protection], 2002. 
39 Media outlets originally relied on the pieces of information that the police, mostly in accordance with 
existing police guidelines and practices, made public about the crime on the evening of 2 September, that 
is Kitti's age and place of residence, to which Mai Nap, a tabloid, added Kitti's first name the next 
morning. This addition, although completely in accordance with the existing Hungarian media practice of 
naming suspects in crime news, proved to be crucial, as Kitti had a relatively uncommon first name and 
lived in a little village of not more than 300 inhabitants so could easily be identified by locals and by 
journalists. In retrospect, the one and only unusual step in the whole process was that in the case of an 
under-age perpetrator it was uncommon for the police to reveal their place of residence (see Gavra, 2002). 
40 For Kitti's account of why she started to cooperate with the media, see Morvai & Simek, 2005, p. 50. 
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of the Hungarian news media lacked this insight.41 In retrospect it appears that Hungarian 
media outlets were just not prepared for managing the complexity of an underage 
perpetrator-victim and did not handle the situation with the required responsibility and self-
restraint.42  
 Among the media outlets under study, it was Blikk that – similarly to other tabloids 
as well as commercial TV networks – shared sensitive data about Kitti on a daily basis, and 
turned the case into a real-life soap opera. The Simek story featured in their headlines each 
day between 4 and 14 September 2002, a period during which Kitti, like a celebrity, 
willingly gave many interviews to the paper and her face appeared in their pages almost 
daily. Although the focus of these tabloid articles, as I discuss in the previous section, was 
mostly on the abuse that Kitti had passively endured, Blikk also repeatedly presented Kitti 
as an active agent who, although with some delay, ultimately took control of her own life 
by shooting a gun, and therefore as worthy of celebration. Accordingly, the tabloid 
presented the murder as an act of bravery and heroism (e.g. “Kitti is celebrated as a hero in 
her village”, “villagers are all talking about Kitti's brave act”, Blikk, 5 September 2002). In 
the same spirit, they also repeatedly presented  Kitti, and even directly quoted her, as not 
feeling guilt or remorse: “Kitti does not feel guilty for killing her stepfather” (4 September 
2002); “I would shoot the gun again” (directly quoting Kitti, 7 September). In brief, Blikk, 
besides actively contributing to the sympathetic identification that characterised Kitti's 
initial media portrayal, also employed a narrative of heroism to underpin the unusually 
intensive – and, at least initially, positive – attention it dedicated to Kitti, whose only action 
that elevated her above other, “ordinary” teenagers (and brought her public fame) was the 
fact that she had murdered a step-parent. In other words, if sympathetic identification was 
tailored to the story of the ordinary teenager who has been a victim of abuse, then the 
narrative of heroism that Blikk employed served to tell a story about an extraordinary 
teenager who had saved herself from abuse, and was therefore particularly worthy of public 
attention. 
                                                 
41 On the impact of media exposure on abused children, see Jones, Finkelhor & Beckwith, 2010; on ethical 
media coverage of traumatised victims, see Coté & Simpson, 2000. 
42 Ironically, UNICEF guidelines on how to portray children in the media, including the guidance that the 
identity and face (or “any distinguishing feature or information”) of children who have fallen victim to 
abuse or have committed a crime should never be revealed, became available in Hungarian only a couple 
of months before the Simek case (see Herczog, Neményi & Rácz, 2002; for the updated version of the 
original UNICEF guidelines in English, see Guide for Media Practitioners, 2008). 
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 However, the intensive and voyeuristic public attention that Blikk actively enabled 
towards Kitti right from the start by exposing her private life to the public on a daily basis, 
ultimately made the case vulnerable to sensationalist modes of portrayal, especially as the 
tabloid made repeated efforts to keep the story “hot” for an extended period, that is until 
November. In order to maintain public attention for such a prolonged period, Blikk shifted 
towards a narrative of blame and accusation, which was a radically different approach than 
what could be observed in the initial coverage of the story, and which constructed 
compassion and sympathy as adequate emotional and moral reactions to the events. Blikk 
interviewed more and more acquaintances of the Simek family, digging deeper and deeper 
into Kitti's past, and in the course of this presented Kitti as less and less innocent. The 
tabloid, among others, questioned whether the abuse had really happened, reporting that 
according to the stepfather's friends the man “was not attracted to young girls sexually, on 
the contrary” – a statement that Blikk described as “contradicting” Kitti's allegation (17 
September 2002). They also reported that Kitti had been caught shoplifting the previous 
year (28 September 2002), and informed readers that according to the stepfather's mother, 
the man was “nice, gentle” and ”exploited” by his family (8 September 2002). The tabloid 
also interviewed a number of “experts” (a bishop, a child psychologist, the head of an 
NGO specialising in “helping victims”, and a child welfare expert) about the case. All of 
these took a stand against Kitti and her mother, with the head of the NGO and the child 
psychologist explicitly blaming them for not having tried harder to seek help from the 
authorities (8 September 2002). Blikk, through this use of the narrative of blame, was able 
powerfully to keep Kitti's private life exposed to the public for a prolonged period, and 
thereby to exploit spectators' voyeuristic interest in her “extraordinary” personality and 
exploits.  
 While the two other media outlets, MTV1 and Népszabadság, did not participate in 
this soap opera-like portrayal that Blikk employed, Népszabadság – the only media outlet 
in my sample that never interviewed Kitti and that tried to refrain from exposing her to 
public attention – switched to a less victim-friendly portrayal once it had become evident 
that Kitti, through her willingness to appear in public and confess the details of her private 
life, had established herself as a recurrent face in the media – or, in the newspaper's words, 
a “celebrity” (10 September 2002, p. 7). Népszabadság introduced their break with the 
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initial discourse of sympathetic identification with a reference to society's growing 
disapproval of Kitti's intensive media appearances. It reported that the police thought “the 
media have made a martyr of the little girl” (9 September 2002), and that they now 
detected a strong resentment among locals of Kitti regularly appearing in the media as a 
kind of “celebrity”, “made a martyr”, and“popularised by the media as a role model to 
follow” (10 September 2002). In the latter article, Népszabadság also quoted approvingly  
psychologists according to whom:  
 
...exposing Kitti to media publicity all the time is so unreasonable. Since this 
otherwise kind, unpretentious, smiling thing who is in need of understanding and 
help testifies with each of her words that there are some basic rules that she has not 
internalised. And this is a harmful message. Even if the deforming impact that the 
ten-year-long suffering has made on her conscience is a valid excuse for what she 
has done. (p. 7) 
 
As the passage above shows, Népszabadság located the problem in the “harmful message” 
that the media could convey by popularising someone of questionable morals. Thereby 
they reproduced exactly – although with more delicacy – the narrative of blame employed 
by Blikk. Whereas Népszabadság noted the “deforming impact” that the abuse may have 
had on the underage victim-perpetrator's emotional state, the potentially negative 
consequences that media exposure could have on an abused child escaped their attention, 
and instead they simply claimed that media publicity was “unreasonable”.  
 Generally, the idea that there may have been a connection between the abuse Kitti 
had suffered from her stepfather and her baffling conduct in the media – e.g. her claims, 
quoted earlier, that she “would shoot the gun again” or that she did not feel guilty – was 
never mentioned, still less discussed in any of the media texts in my sample. This lack of 
public reflection on the potentially negative effects that media exposure may have on a 
traumatised child becomes even more evident in the following excerpt from Blikk, which 
reports on an appearance by Kitti on a popular morning political talk show, Nap-kelte, on 
the national commercial TV channel ATV (Blikk, 8 September 2002). After informing their 
readers that Kitti arrived at the studio accompanied by her mother and solicitor, and that 
afterwards spectators could see her talking at length about the murder, notes that the 
teenager girl did not display the emotions that society would expect from somebody who 
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has just murdered a parent: 
 
Kitti arrived at the studio wearing capri pants, now fashionable among teens, a 
white blouse and a pretty headscarf, she smiled happily, and had an amiable word 
for everybody. Nobody would think that this child had shot someone at close range 
not long ago. She does not behave at all like a murderer, but rather like an ordinary 
smiling teenage girl. […] She is even talking about the bloody dawn as if she were 
recalling the story of a film from yesterday evening. It's creepy. Probably there is no 
one who could tell what she has in her mind. Not even  her mother. (p. 9) 
 
Blikk describes Kitti's affable behaviour and emotional distance-keeping from the murder 
as shockingly inappropriate to the situation (“creepy”), in other words as a violation of 
feeling rules – that is, rules that regulate socially approved ways of expressing and 
managing emotions in a given situation (see Hochschild, 1983, p. 64).43 In the tabloid’s 
description, the girl's looks and conduct (“fashionable”, “pretty”, “amiable”,“smiling”), 
although originally described in positive terms, once combined with her marked 
emotionlessness while speaking about the murder (“as if she were recalling the story of a 
film from yesterday evening”) become disturbing and alarming signs of her alleged inner 
emotional state. Kitti's public conduct, already stigmatised as “creepy”, is further 
highlighted by the tabloid's addition that “no one”, not even the person closest to Kitti (that 
is, her mother) can know how Kitti feels about the crime she has committed – a hint 
explicitly questioning the girl's moral integrity. It is also worth noting that the tabloid's 
intensive focus on the lack of socially acceptable emotions was not complemented by a 
reflection on the broader context of the situation. That is, Blikk, like Népszabadság, failed 
to bring attention to the potential links between such behaviour and trauma, or even with 
the consequences of a child’s public exposure in the media. The fact that Kitti had been 
exposed to media attention and expected to show “normal” conduct while in a traumatised 
condition was in general lost in the coverage of the case.  
 In summary, Kitti's intensive media appearances resulted in the focus shifting from 
the chronicle of abuse to her personality and moral integrity, and in new proposals by the 
media regarding acceptable emotional and moral public engagement with this story. 
                                                 
43 On coverage of emotions in the news media, especially emotions reported as “appropriate” or not, and the 
power of the news media to construct and regulate “good” emotional citizenship, see also Pantti & Nervi, 
2006. 
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Sympathy and compassion, once central emotions associated with Kitti's portrayal by the 
news media, gradually gave way to a narrative of heroism, and more importantly of blame 
and stigmatisation, the latter questioning the girl's moral integrity as well as condemning 
her media appearances and her public conduct. Similarly, while in the beginning the news 
media, by emphasising the abuse, were quick to offer excuses and explanations for the 
crime she had committed, such explanations were not offered for her media appearances, or 
in particular for her visible emotionlessness in front of the cameras when asked about the 
murder. Kitti, by not showing easily visible signs of remorse, failed to manage her 
emotions in public in a way that society would approve of, and this contributed further to 
her condemnation by the media and ultimately also to the questioning of her “good victim” 
status.  
 
 
4.5 Patterns of social intervention in the texts: Habituating spectators to forms of 
(in)action 
 
The media coverage of the Simek case, as we have seen, offered a relatively broad range of 
emotional and moral engagements that spectators could activate towards Kitti, including 
compassion and sympathy, which, especially initially, were emotions of central importance. 
These, at least in theory, could have provoked a widespread feeling that action needed to be 
taken against suffering and domestic violence. However, the perception of a need is not in 
itself enough to constitute spectators as public actors on domestic violence. For this to 
happen, domestic violence needs to be presented as a social phenomenon that spectators 
have the agency to act on, and concrete links to action also need to be provided, where such 
needs can be channelled (on the constitution of the spectator as a public actor see 
Chouliaraki 2008a, p. 832).  In this section I consider the spectrum of options that media 
texts offered to spectators as paradigmatic forms of social action (or inaction) in the face of 
domestic violence. I then explore the ways in which domestic violence, once 
acknowledged as a social issue on which action should be taken, was pushed further in the 
direction of gender-neutrality. 
 In general, the media portrayal of the Simek case created media publics as passive 
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citizens in the face of domestic violence. One of the characteristic ways in which this was 
achieved (a technique mostly employed by Blikk, but sporadically also by MTV1) was that 
of presenting domestic violence without any social context. There was a lack of attention to 
potential causes and means of prevention, instead locating this type of violence at an 
individual level (on creating domestic violence as an individual problem, see Berns 1999, 
2001, 2004). The MTV1 news item quoted earlier well illustrates this technique of 
individualising violence (“Homicidal little girl”, 3 September 2002). It portrays abuse as 
resulting exclusively from the stepfather's aggressive personality, and remains silent about 
the institutions that could take responsibility for prevention and intervention. Violence is 
thus presented in this news item as something in which society intervenes only after it has 
already happened. The only form of intervention mentioned is investigation by the police, 
with the assistance of experts: “The police continue the investigation, and are helped by 
experts. [...] A forensic medical investigation is needed […] we need a psychiatrist, too, 
and a firearms expert” (“Homicidal little girl”, 3 September 2002). This type of portrayal, 
by failing to bring public attention to potential causes and means of prevention, practically 
reproduces in spectators the helplessness of the victim (and if spectators refuse 
identification with the victim in order to avoid this position of helplessness, then a 
voyeuristic stance is at their disposal, through which suffering can be observed with a 
thrill, while keeping their distance – once again implying spectators' passivity).  
 This kind of portrayal was counterbalanced to some extent by an alternative option 
offered by the media texts to spectators as an adequate form of action against domestic 
violence. This alternative, present in all the media outlets in my sample, focused on the 
inadequacy of state institutions – typically the police, the village notary, and various 
childcare and medical services – and their unwillingness to intervene.44 Népszabadság and 
occasionally also MTV1 combined this portrayal with relevant information about the 
prevalence of domestic violence/child sexual abuse in societies. The media outlet that did 
the most to present domestic violence as an issue worthy of social intervention was 
Népszabadság, which dedicated separate articles to domestic violence, including relevant 
                                                 
44 The unwillingness of relevant state institutions to intervene in cases of domestic violence was (and still is) 
a major problem in Hungary. On this issue, see the negative reports that Hungary repeatedly received 
during the 2000s and 2010s on the effectiveness of domestic violence prevention in the country: Council 
of Europe, 2006; Amnesty International, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2013. 
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information about the latency and frequency of the issue in societies, and the claim that 
typically the victims were women and children. The newspaper also repeatedly interviewed 
state officials about discrepancies in the existing system and planned changes, and thereby 
created domestic violence as a social issue on which action should be taken.45 However, as 
I illustrate below, although these articles, at least in theory, could have provoked a 
perception of need for reform of state institutions, they mostly also failed to provide any 
concrete links to social actors that could act on such a need. On those rare occasions when 
such links were given, Népszabadság employed an ambiguous strategy with regard to non-
state social actors taking action against domestic violence, and this ultimately, once again, 
constructed spectators as passive citizens.  
 The article below, published in Népszabadság on 21September 2002, well 
illustrates the latter strategy. The article briefly covers a petition launched by feminist 
activists on the 20 September, in which activists called on people in top state positions to 
implement more effective state-level measures against domestic violence and also called on 
citizens to add their signatures in order to put greater pressure on the state.46 Without 
anticipating in detail what I discuss in a later section, I note here that Népszabadság’s 
interpretation evolved, with the newspaper turning an initial call for action into more of a 
report on action, portraying social intervention against domestic violence as already 
happening and not in need of civil support. The newspaper article reads as follows (italics 
are mine and indicate excerpts from the original text of the petition):  
 
Against domestic violence. 
Public personalities and social organisations demand measures 
In Hungary there is at least one child every month and one woman every week 
whose life is taken by “the head of the family”. Therefore several public 
personalities and social organisations are calling on Parliament, the Government, 
the President of the Supreme Court, the Public Prosecutor and the Chief of State 
Police to pass a bill conforming to international norms on domestic violence and 
take measures in order to prevent domestic violence this very year. The call was 
                                                 
45 This increased focus in the newspaper on the general issue of domestic violence, however, went hand in 
hand with the Simek story losing its exemplary status as a case of domestic violence: after the 14 
September 2002, Népszabadság stopped referencing the Simek story in social issues articles and restricted 
coverage to its crime news section. 
46 For the original text of the petition, today widely considered to be the start of a series of bottom-up 
movements against domestic violence in the country, see Morvai, 2004, pp. 144-145; on the afterlife of 
the petition from the perspective of feminist media activism, see Vanya, 2006a. 
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published yesterday, when the recently murdered little boy's funeral [that of the 12-
year-old Tomi Balogh] took place. According to the announcement, so far no steps 
have been taken against domestic violence, therefore now they call on everybody to 
join their initiative. The document was given sad actuality by the news on Friday 
reporting that a man from Hajdúhadháza, after a family dispute, had stabbed his 
eight-year-old son in the chest.  
According to the call it does not conform to reality that state institutions would be 
forced to remain passive in the face of domestic violence, since over the last twenty 
years the UN, the Council of Europe and the European Union have elaborated in 
detail legislative models and models of action through which the safety of 
defenceless family members can be increased considerably. On the basis of these 
norms in nearly all countries of Europe domestic violence and criminal harassment 
qualify as criminal acts, and it is not victims who are removed from their families, 
but perpetrators who are restrained from their family members. 
As we have already reported earlier, in the opinion of Katalin Lévai, the Head of the 
Department of Health in the Ministry of Labour, it is essential to revise existing 
criminal laws related to domestic violence and rape. An anti-discrimination bill can 
be passed in Parliament this year, and a position of Child Protection Ombudsman 
created at the beginning of next year. (p. 9)   
 
The most salient feature of the above article is the fact that, although it reports on a petition 
launched by members of civil society , it downplays their agency as an effective form of 
taking action against domestic violence. First of all, the article is silent about the fact that 
the text it references was in fact a petition – that is, primarily intended to mobilise citizens 
– and not only an announcement addressing state officials. In the same spirit, 
Népszabadság also omits the names and identities of the people who launched it, or any 
links to persons, organisations or places where the petition could be signed by spectator-
citizens, who could thus take action against domestic violence. It thereby erases all 
concrete links to public acts of civil agency. Instead, the feminist activists who launched 
the petition are referenced only in very general terms, as “public personalities” and “social 
organisations”, and the addressees of the petition are described as “everybody”. With these 
omissions and vague generalisations, the article can hardly have been read as reporting on a 
proposal for civil action.  
 On the other hand, the newspaper fully identified and named other social actors 
taking action on domestic violence. In the very last paragraph of the article a state official 
is named and her position minutely described. As a result, despite the fact that the 
newspaper introduces both the activists’ and the state official’s claims with phrases that are 
used for paraphrasing opinions without taking a stand on them (“according to” and ”in the 
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opinion of”), the state official's statements – because expressed by someone whose position 
is fully identified, with consequent implied authority and general expertise on social issues 
– achieves more weight and credit than the unidentified activists’ claim, even though the 
latter is also accurately recapped in the text. With these textual strategies, Népszabadság 
practically constructed the state as being the only competent social actor on domestic 
violence, at the expense of other valid forms of public action and most importantly that of 
citizens. 
 The other salient feature of the text is the fact that – along with acknowledging 
domestic violence as a serious social issue on which public action should be taken – it 
pushes domestic violence further in the direction of gender-neutrality, through 1) an 
increased attention to children as victims, 2) the concealment of wife abuse, and 3) 
downplaying male violence. Whereas the original petition identified both women and 
children as typical victims (see Morvai, 2004), Népszabadság dedicates disproportionately 
high attention to children at the expense of women. Specifically, apart from the first 
sentence of the article, where women as well as children are identified as typical victims, 
the only hints the article gives that gender is an important factor in this type of violence is 
the mention of rape and an anti-discrimination bill at the end of the text –  hints insufficient 
in themselves to raise attention to the gendered nature of domestic violence, given that the 
gender factor has not been highlighted at all in other parts of the article. The descriptions of 
the two cases of child abuse that the article uses as illustrations of domestic violence – that 
is, the case of the “recently murdered little boy”, a reference to the 12-year-old Tomi 
Balogh, which was also mentioned in the original text of the petition, and the newspaper’s 
own addition of the death of the eight-year-old boy from Hajdúhadháza, resulting from a 
“family dispute” – similarly evidences the omission of the gender aspect. Specifically, both 
cases, despite being selected, at least in principle, to illustrate domestic violence against 
women and children, are constructed as cases of child abuse. The description of these cases 
in the article conceals wife abuse and downplays male violence. Male violence against 
children is portrayed as resulting from a “family dispute” in Hajdúhadháza, whereas the 
article remains silent about the by then well-known fact that wife abuse was also an 
important context of Tomi Balogh's murder by his father.47 Additionally, the article also 
                                                 
47 On the more detailed context of Tomi Balogh's murder by his father, including the facts that it followed 
99 
remains silent about the fact that  the petition was being launched by feminists, that is 
citizens promoting gender equality. In brief, the newspaper clearly selects victims and 
types of violence from among the available cases in order to present domestic violence as a 
social problem on which action should certainly be taken, while capitalising on the social 
perception of children as the cultural emblems of innocence in order to present “good” 
victims in defence of whom society is probably most willing to take action. This is a victim 
profile to which adult women – and still less a teenager who has become a perpetrator of 
homicide – are less able to conform.  
 In summary, the media portrayal of the case mostly contructed spectators as a 
passive audience of domestic violence, and assigned the role of public actor exclusively to 
the state, thereby downplaying acts of civil agency already occurring in the country. 
Ironically, the acknowledgement of domestic violence as a severe social problem on which 
action should be taken went hand in hand with the Simek story gradually losing its 
symbolic power to represent domestic violence in media texts, while the perception of 
domestic violence moved further in the direction of gender-neutrality and children became 
the centre of attention as the most typical victims. By the time domestic violence was being 
portrayed, at least in some media outlets, as a severe social problem on which action 
should be taken, the Simek story had become so controversial, because of  Kitti's previous 
media exposure, that both Népszabadság (the only media outlet in the sample that 
consistently portrayed domestic violence as an issue that should be tackled) and the 
petition launched by feminist activists omitted the Simek case, and thereby revoked its 
symbolic power to represent domestic violence to the broader public. 
 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I have analysed the Simek domestic abuse case through selected extracts 
from three major news media outlets across a period of peak coverage in September 2002. 
Using a CDA framework that employed the analytical categories of naming, as well as of 
                                                                                                                                                    
years of abuse by the head of the family, and that after the murder the man left a letter to his wife in which 
he explained to her that he had killed their boy with the intention of causing her emotional pain, see 
Morvai, 2004.  
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characterisation, allocation of motives and context, I have explored the ways in which 
domestic violence was constructed in terms of the identity of the event and its actors – that 
is, the switches from perpetrator to victim, from homicide to abuse, and from sexual abuse 
to domestic violence, the proposed emotional engagement of news publics with these 
actors, and the proposals for social intervention in the violence committed. I argue that the 
Simek story drew the attention of the media because of its traditionally high 
newsworthiness (as a case of homicide with a female, under-age perpetrator), but the case 
soon began to be narrated as a case of abuse, where abuse was further specified by various 
names, including that of domestic violence. However, with the news focusing on Kitti, a 
child, as the main victim of domestic abuse and marginalising the suffering of other family 
members, the term domestic violence entered  the Hungarian public arena with the focus 
already shifted away from women, and with domestic violence already de-gendered to 
some extent, despite the fact that originally it was coined by Hungarian feminist activists. 
Thereby this case created domestic violence mostly in terms of a gender-neutral 
victimhood. 
 The identity of the event, as constructed by the media, was fundamentally shaped 
by the fact that these news media repeatedly failed to place the case in broader social 
contexts, rather showing a strong tendency to present violence as resulting from an issue on 
the individual level. Therefore, while the media portrayal of the Simek case was suitable 
for raising public attention to the existence of domestic violence, it did not do the same for 
the nature of domestic violence. Since the Simek case was mostly portrayed as unique and 
extraordinary, the chance to present domestic violence as having a high prevalence in 
societies, including Hungarian society, and as forming part of the everyday life of many 
citizens, was missed. The relevant discussion of domestic violence was further hindered by 
the fact that media outlets repeatedly violated the victim's privacy, exposed her to the 
public, and thereby made the story highly vulnerable to a voyeuristic consumption that did 
not favour socially engaged approaches to the victim's suffering or to the general issue of 
domestic violence.  
 Furthermore, despite the fact that a feminist, bottom-up movement was launched in 
the country against domestic violence within less than three weeks after the first news 
broke about the Simek case, the news media down-played the importance of civil agency in 
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relation to domestic violence, erased explicit proposals for public civil action, and instead 
gave a monopoly to the state in taking action against this type of violence. The Hungarian 
news media remained practically silent about existing channels into which spectators (if 
they were) emotionally and morally engaged with the suffering of the victim, could have 
channelled their need for action, and instead constructed them as an audience devoid of 
civil agency in the face of violence.  
 Despite all the negative sides of the media portrayal listed above, the Simek case 
did play an important part in raising public awareness of the existence of domestic violence 
in Hungary.  It was the very first case in the country that both achieved very high media 
visibility and was identified and named as a case of domestic violence (or cognate terms), a 
type of violence that had been previously unnamed and kept hidden from publicity. Many 
characteristics of the media portrayal of the case (the focus on its extraordinariness, the 
sensationalist portrayals, the extended exposure of the victim's private life to the public) 
impeded, at least provisionally, relevant public discussion. However,  the very same 
features contributed significantly to the high visibility that domestic violence achieved in 
the Hungarian news media, which overall led to a breaking of the silence around the issue 
in Hungarian public discourse. 
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5. TV personality Roland Damu's fall from grace: Televised fame, the emergence of 
televisual celebrity culture in Hungary and the place within it of domestic violence, 
2010-12 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores a case of domestic violence from 2010-2012, in which Hungarian 
soap actor and TV personality Roland Damu was involved as a perpetrator, and through 
which a very central and prevalent form of domestic violence emerged into the limelight in 
Hungary: male violence against female intimate partners. The main issue at stake in this 
case was the possibility of re-defining domestic violence – which previously was mostly 
understood in gender-neutral terms, as we have seen in Chapter 4 – with the inclusion of 
the aspect of gender. As I demonstrate in this chapter, gender emerges as an important 
dimension of the reporting of domestic violence, particularly of naming the crime, the 
identity of typical perpetrators and victims, and also the ways in which this type of 
violence was perceived in terms of the dialectic between victimhood and agency. Also, 
because this case involved as perpetrator a well-known public personality whose fame had 
arisen from a local televisual celebrity culture that became established in the country only a 
couple of years earlier, this case also offers us the possibility of exploring the specificities 
of domestic violence as mediated predominantly through this celebrity-news-oriented 
segment of the Hungarian news media. 
 As police investigations later revealed, on 17 November 2010 Roland Damu, 
shortly after the end of his nearly two-year-long abusive relationship with his ex-fiancée 
Tímea Palácsik, shut her into a flat, where he battered and raped her. The woman reported 
the case to the police, and Damu, after two court appearances on 12 September 2011 and 
20 March 2012, was finally sentenced to four and a half years in prison. The news of the 
crime broke very early on the following day, and the story was followed intensively by the 
Hungarian news media, especially its tabloid segment, throughout the eighteen months 
from the first news until the final verdict. This, as some media outlets later pointed out, 
made the whole case “a drama unfolding in the public eye” (“Damu Rolandot miért”, 2011) 
103 
and, more importantly, the “first case of domestic violence” in the country that was “nearly 
the whole time out in the public domain” (RTL Klub, Házon kívül, 28 March 2012). Indeed, 
since 2002, when teenager Kitti Simek shot her abusive stepfather dead – the case explored 
in Chapter 4 – no other high-profile domestic violence cases had emerged in the Hungarian 
mediated public sphere, and the Simek case, because it was mostly portrayed as a case of 
child abuse, had not brought attention to those discursively more central forms of domestic 
violence involving the gendered violence of (adult) male perpetrators against (adult) female 
victims. In spite of its central role in the formation of domestic violence as a public issue in 
Hungary, the Damu case is currently very under-researched, with, as of late 2018, only one 
one brief, four-page-long scholarly article from 2011, when the case was not yet over, 
which – despite the fact that Damu was a TV personality and therefore strongly tied to the 
medium of television – focuses only on the tabloid press coverage of the case (Prischetzky, 
2011). 
 As already mentioned, until the media brought the Damu case to public attention, 
domestic violence was not much discussed in the Hungarian public sphere, with the notable 
exception of the aforementioned Simek case; and neither were other forms of gendered 
violence, except for a high-profile case of rape, the “Zsanett” case from 2007 (for a 
discussion of the latter, see Kormos, 2011).48 To be sure, cases of these forms of violence 
were regularly reported by the news media, but typically did not inspire extensive media 
coverage or discussion. Awareness-raising campaigns or investigative reports into these 
types of violence were similarly missing or scarce.49 However, by the beginning of the 
2010s a significant need for public discussion of domestic violence had accumulated in 
Hungarian society, for which the Damu case may have served as a catalyst. This is evident 
from the fact that shortly after the Damu case a strikingly high number of personal 
narratives on this subject attracted publicity, including a cluster of autobiographical novels 
written by survivors of child abuse (Anoni, 2013; Czapáry, 2013) or male spouse abuse 
(Demcsák, 2014; Péterfy-Novák, 2014). There was also a series of comings-out in the 
media, with local female celebrities and public figures sharing with the public their own 
                                                 
48 This rape case does not qualify as domestic violence, since the rape was perpetrated by strangers (more 
specifically, policemen). For further details, see Kormos, 2011. 
49 The first notable piece of investigative journalism on the subject appeared only in 2009, when Index.hu 
published a series of interviews with victims of domestic violence (understood as both child abuse and 
spouse abuse) (“Fődíjas lett”, 2009).  
104 
stories about how they had survived male spouse abuse (for example, TV2 anchorwoman 
Zsuzsa Demcsák on the TV2 programme Frizbi, 14 October 2012; flautist Eszter Horgas in 
Fókusz on RTL Klub 4, November 2015). Interestingly, the first of these comings-out in the 
media, that of actress Athina Papadimitriu about her abusive marriage, preceded the Damu 
case by only a couple weeks (Frizbi on TV2, 22 October 2010), but the media attention this 
received was rather small, and by no means comparable to that attracted by the Damu story.  
 Damu's status as a soap actor and TV personality, characteristically tied to the 
emergence of commercial broadcasting in Hungary, did shape the media coverage of the 
case considerably on many levels. Langer defines a television personality as an individual 
who is “constituted more or less exclusively for and by television” (1981, p. 351), and 
Damu indeed first emerged into national fame through his role as the main “bad boy” 
character in TV2's daily evening soap, Jóban-rosszban (In Good and Bad Times), launched 
in 2005. However, many aspects of his televisual fame point to a new type of television 
personality – as originally brought to scholarly attention by Bennett and Holmes (Bennett, 
2008; Bennett & Holmes, 2010) – that appeared in the country only with the advent of 
commercial broadcasting. Specifically, Damu achieved televisual fame through a constant 
building of his media image, in which his private life and fictional role repeatedly and 
characteristically merged into the “seamless public persona” (Bennett, 2008, p. 35) of a 
charming bad boy. This building of Damu’s image would not have been possible without a 
televisual celebrity culture having taken root in the country by the 2000s, or unless the 
broadcaster, too, had strongly enabled this image-building. TV2 regularly gave additional 
circulation to Damu's image in a series of factual programmes, such as their celebrity news 
and celebrity reality shows – genres unheard of in Hungary before the advent of 
commercial broadcasting, which allowed Damu to perform himself. As a consequence, he 
had soon firmly established himself as one of TV2's “faces”, and his image had also 
acquired non-televisual media circulation, first in the tabloid press.50 By the time the news 
broke on 18 November 2010, Damu was a nationally well-known and popular personality, 
characteristically linked to TV2, and regularly attracting the attention of the tabloid media. 
 As a consequence of Damu's successful image-building in the media, the 
                                                 
50 On the subsidiary circulation of televisual images by other segments of the media, and their role in the 
establishment of television personalities, see Bennett, 2008, p. 35. 
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newsworthiness of the story about his battering and raping of his ex-fiancée, which in the 
case of an ordinary perpetrator would probably not have reached the attention threshold of 
the news media, was multiplied. As previous literature on the subject demonstrates, the 
most frequent and “ordinary” types of domestic violence, where, as in the Damu story, a 
women has fallen victim to spouse abuse, typically do not receive much media attention 
unless the case ends in tragedy or a high-profile person is involved (see e.g. Carter 1998; 
Dobash & Dobash 1992, p. 6; Meyers, 1994, 1997; on Hungary, see Hüse & Konyáriné, 
2008). Therefore, the Damu case is relevant because of its ability to bring attention to this 
“everyday face” of domestic violence in families that usually escapes media attention.  
 On the other hand, as some experts on gender have pointed out (Dankovics & Puss, 
2011), since Damu's image was strongly tied to “soft” media genres such as the soap opera, 
celebrity reality shows and celebrity news, the newsworthiness of the story and especially 
its domestic-violence-related social relevance mostly escaped the attention of more 
“serious” media outlets. The story was mostly followed by the tabloid segment of the 
Hungarian media only and especially by the infotainment-oriented news programmes of 
commercial broadcasters and by the tabloid press. This phenomenon of media attention 
getting diverted from the social relevance and embeddedness of domestic violence cases of 
celebrities due to the tabloidisation of the story and/or its development into a media 
spectacle is far from being case-specific, as previous literature on the subject has 
demonstrated (see e.g. Boyle, 2005, pp. 84-85, 91; Braber, 2015, p. 96). However, as 
existing literature evidences, even cases as imbued with sensational spectacles and 
exploitative voyeuristic approaches as the O. J. Simpson case in the US have the potential 
to raise attention to important aspects of domestic violence (McLaughlin, 1998). As we 
will see below, this was true of the Damu case and its gender aspect, which highlights the 
emergence of gender-based violence into public attention.  
 Another implication of Damu's previous image-building was his increased personal 
exposure – both passive and active – to the media. Given that for a while he had practically 
lived his life in the public eye, a long track record of his previous scandals and crimes had 
accumulated in the media, over which he lacked control, and which was relatively easily 
recalled and re-circulated in public once the news broke about him battering and raping his 
ex-girlfriend. These previous media documents were able to serve as a kind of additional 
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proof of his perpetrator status and generally aggressive tendencies.51 On the other hand, 
due to his strong and long-standing ties to the media industry and his televisual skills, 
Damu was also in a privileged position to control his present media image and re-fashion it 
in a more favourable direction that would fit better with his own version of the story. This 
act of remaking his image, as we see below, almost took over a large part of the media 
coverage of the story, and was mostly trying to construct him as a subject worthy of 
compassion and pity. As a result, the media coverage of the Damu case was in many 
respects centred around the perpetrator's media image and the forms of emotion it 
discursively constructed, resulting in an on-screen competition between the victim and the 
perpetrator regarding where pity and compassion should be placed. 
 Damu's close and intimate connection to local televised celebrity culture also makes 
this case highly relevant from the perspective of mediated intimacy (Barker, Gill & Harvey, 
2018, pp. 24-26). His on-screen persona was, on many levels, a product of media genres 
that placed intimate and private life – both “real-life” and fictional – at the heart of media 
representations (on celebrity status being closely tied to an increased focus of the media on 
these people's private life rather than their public role see Rojek, 2001, p. 10; Turner, 2004, 
p. 8.). Specifically, not only his frequent appearances in celebrity-related genres like 
celebrity news, celebrity talk shows and cooking shows – where he could “perform 
himself” – were of this kind. The soap opera in which he played a leading character – 
usually referred to as the “chief baddie” on the show – was similarly centred around the 
private lives of inhabitants of a fictitious Hungarian town, Csillagkút, which spectators 
could “peep into”. In this sense, when the news broke about his battering and raping of his 
ex-fiancée, which later developed into “a drama unfolding in the public eye” (“Damu 
Rolandot miért”, 2011), this information fitted nicely into the web of media representations 
around him that had already been established earlier.  
 
 
                                                 
51 To give an example, media outlets were happy to re-circulate the news that three years earlier he had hit 
one of his female colleagues after a party, or that at an early stage of his career he had once broken down 
the door of another female colleague (see “Soha nem tudta”, 2010). Some video footage on YouTube, to 
give another example, showing Damu in the middle of an outburst of rage during a celebrity cooking 
show, was watched by “hundreds of thousands” of users, as an online news magazine reported, after the 
first verdict against him was announced (Farkas, 2011). 
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5.2 Data, data selection and methods 
 
Although the Damu case was covered by the print and internet news media, too, in the 
following pages – in line with the broader argument of my thesis – I focus on the broadcast 
media coverage. Broadcast media, and especially commercial broadcasters, served as the 
focal point of media coverage throughout. It was to commercial broadcasters that other 
news platforms regularly referred, and from which they re-mediated important content. In 
other words, the commercial media and their characteristic entertainment-driven and 
celebrity-focused news genres had a particular importance in the unfolding of this case, 
given that Damu, as a television personality and a local celebrity, was strongly tied to this 
medium and these particular media genres. However, as I established in Chapter 3, I extend 
my study to the three most-viewed national broadcasters, in order to obtain a more detailed 
picture of how this case was covered in 2010-2012 in the most viewed – and therefore 
central – segment of the Hungarian mediated public sphere, that is the public-service 
broadcasting channel, M1, and two commercial broadcasters, TV2 (Damu's own channel) 
and RTL Klub (for viewership statistics see AGB Nielsen 2012). Data were collected with 
the help of NAVA, the National Audiovisual Archive in Hungary, and occasionally 
complemented with data from TV2's own archive (if data from NAVA seemed to be 
corrupted or lacking). In this way I collected 178 news stories that dealt with the Damu 
case between 18 November 2010 (when the news broke) and 30 April 2012 (by which time 
the story had gone cold).   
 The distribution of relevant media texts among these three broadcasters shows that 
the public service broadcaster (M1) almost completely refrained from covering the story, 
while commercial broadcasters monopolised its reporting. This confirms my previous 
argument that the story was heavily tabloidised, that is cast in the genre of entertainment-
oriented “soft news”. Specifically, of the three broadcasters, it was TV2 (Damu's channel) 
that produced the most news items, altogether 132 items.  Of these 29 were aired on the 
broadcaster's prime-time news bulletin (Tények), 35 on their off-peak news bulletins 
(Tények Reggel, Tények Este), but they regularly returned to the story also in their prime-
time current affairs magazine Aktív (27), their morning news magazine Mokka (34), and 
108 
their late-night celebrity talk show Frizbi (9). RTL Klub – considered to have the most 
tabloid agenda of the three broadcasters (see Bajomi-Lázár and Monori 2007; Terestyéni 
2007) – produced 49 items of news on the story, of which 18 were aired on their prime-
time news bulletin (Híradó) and nine on their off-peak news bulletins (Reggeli, Fél Kettő), 
but they repeatedly covered the story also in their prime-time soft-news-oriented current 
affairs magazine Fókusz (12), and their celebrity news magazine Reflektor (3), and once (1) 
also in Házon kívül, a current affairs magazine mostly dealing with political and social 
issues. M1, the public service broadcaster, covered the story only once in eighteen months, 
in a very brief piece of early morning news, after the second-court trial.52 Therefore, 
although I focus more here on prime-time news bulletins, I necessarily also include the 
more soft-news-oriented broadcasts. This is especially because some of the latter type of 
programmes – such as the Frizbi celebrity talk show, where both Damu and Tímea 
repeatedly appeared and gave in-depth interviews – had a special relevance in constructing 
the perpetrator's and the victim's personalities for the public eye.  
 Since I am interested in discursive change in representations of domestic violence, I 
have used critical discourse analysis (CDA) – as explained in Chapter 3 – in order to 
explore the ways in which domestic violence (and cognate types of violence) was 
discursively constructed by the Hungarian broadcast news media. I explore naming 
(classifying the event as rape, assault or domestic violence), agency (specifying roles of 
victim and perpetrator) and emotions (proposed affective and moral engagement with 
Damu and Tímea), and the implications of all these for the construction of domestic 
violence in the national public sphere. Moreover, given that relevant data is available in 
abundance and media attention was very intense for an extended period of time (September 
2012 – April 2013), rather than looking for “peak periods”, I seek to give a general 
overview of the dominant discourses, and select some texts for deeper analysis on the basis 
of their ability to illustrate the most typical of these discourses. My central arguments are 
that: i) the news coverage of the case underwent two terminological shifts that both pointed 
towards the construction of the story as an instance of gendered violence; ii) the media 
                                                 
52 Given that Prischetzky (2011) has referenced a piece of news from M1 that I did not find in the NAVA 
database, I double-checked the lack of data from public service broadcaster M1. As an employee of the 
Media Services and Support Trust Fund (MTVA) -- a state fund currently in charge of, among other 
things, managing the archives of M1) – confirmed to me in an email correspondence on the 9  April 2018, 
M1 had indeed covered the Damu story only once between November 2010 and April 2012. 
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constructed pity and compassion as the most adequate forms of emotional engagement, but 
failed to reassuringly clarify whether these should go to Damu or to Tímea; and iii) while 
agency and victimhood emerged as key issues for understanding the nature of domestic 
violence, this focus often led to the emergence of victim-blaming discourses. 
 
 
5.3 The politics of naming: Assault, rape or domestic violence? 
 
The act of naming a perpetrator's actions is never innocent, given that labels and names can 
have far-reaching implications regarding how we construct a crime of violence and its 
actors: which parts of a course of events are considered part of a criminal act at all; what 
level of agency we expect from the victims; or which social groups (if any) we consider 
more affected by a given crime. These also have far-reaching implications for whether a 
given crime is constructed as socially pervasive (and, therefore, requiring social 
intervention) or understood as an individual problem (on the importance of naming, see 
Lamb, 1991; Lamb & Keon, 1995).  
 Damu's violence was referred to by various names and labels in the media. The 
overwhelming majority of media texts referred his actions by the legal terms “sexual 
violence” (nemi erőszak), “severe assault” (súlyos testi sértés) or (especially after 12 
September 2011) “illegal restraint” (személyi szabadság megsértése). These terms were 
probably taken from police and court documents (given that back in 2010-2012 domestic 
violence was not a separate entry in the Hungarian Criminal Code) and inserted into the 
news discourse because of their particular suitability for meeting requirements of 
objectivity in reporting. The similarly frequent use of phrases like “he battered her, raped 
her and did not let her out of the flat”, usually combined with a clear indication of the day 
when the above acts happened (17 November 2010), can be understood as the 
approximations of the above legal terms in everyday speech (see e.g. RTL Klub, Híradó, 12 
September 2012).  
 While the above terms fairly conveyed to the broader public the state of affairs that 
had served as the legal basis for bringing a charge against Damu, they had some 
problematic implications from the point of view of domestic violence. Most importantly, 
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these terms – in accordance with the fact that at the time of the Damu case domestic 
violence was not recognised as a separate criminal act in the country – fragmented the 
process of domestic violence into separate, one-off acts of (mostly) physical force. Thereby 
they wiped out precisely those characteristics of domestic violence that relevant literature 
has since the mid-1990s stressed as fundamental to this type of violence: its nature as an 
ongoing and cumulative abuse of power and control in relationships (see e.g. Hearn, 1998; 
Johnson, 1995; Stark, 2007). 
 Specifically, what became obscured in this way was the element of coercive control, 
which is the most typical form domestic violence assumes in modern democracies (Stark, 
2007, pp. 193-4). Coercive control practically operates as a response to women's social 
gains in modern societies, including the formal equality between the sexes, serving as a 
kind of “counter-move” to undo these gains within the realm of the private. Through such 
typical tactics as isolation, intimidation, repeated put-downs and gradually depriving 
victims of their social, financial and other resources, perpetrators of coercive control exert 
a cumulative and systematic control over their victims, often invisible to the public, and 
target and erode exactly that agency, personhood and capacity for self-motivation in their 
victims that modern societies typically expect from and celebrate in their adult members 
(Stark, 2007, pp. 171-197). In the media coverage of the Damu case, this “invisible” side of 
domestic violence was brought to the attention of the public mostly only through Tímea's 
narrative, when she talked about the abuse that she had suffered from Damu on a daily 
basis during their relationship. Media outlets otherwise, when they simply relied on legal 
terms taken from legal documents, inadvertently obscured this process of accumulation and 
systemacity so crucial to domestic violence, and instead inadvertently constructed domestic 
violence in terms of one-off criminal acts. Moreover, the missing element of coercive 
control would also have been crucial to understanding why Tímea had not left her abusive 
relationship with Damu earlier, a question that – as I describe below – acquired a central 
role in those media portrayals in which the issue of domestic violence finally started to 
emerge. 
 A shift in the use of legal terminology can be observed after the first court trial on 
12 September 2011, when the terms “abuse” (bántalmazás) and “domestic violence” 
(családon belüli erőszak) (the latter mostly used by RTL Klub) began to emerge in the 
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coverage of the story. Media outlets reported, for example, that “the actor [was] sentenced 
to six years of prison because of abuse and violence” (RTL Klub, Híradó, 15 September 
2011); “after their break-up, he abused her and raped her” (RTL Klub, Fókusz, 15 
September 2011); or made reference to “their abusive relationship” (TV2, Mokka, 15 and 
24 September 2011); or began to use the term “domestic violence” (e.g. RTL Klub, Fókusz, 
16 and 20 September 2011). Until then these terms had been nearly exclusively used by 
Tímea, the victim, in her narrative about her relationship with Damu (for an exceptional 
earlier use of “abuse” see e.g. TV2, Aktív, 16 June 2011). Tímea, throughout the whole 
case, consistently named what she had gone through as “abuse”, as an “abusive 
relationship” or less frequently as “domestic violence”. For example, when she first spoke 
to the cameras, on 17 April 2011 in the celebrity talk show Frizbi on TV2, she recalled that 
Damu “quarrelled with me every day, and there was abuse, too, nearly every day”. Just 
after the first court trial she told RTL Klub that “now I understand those women who do not 
dare to step out of an abusive relationship like mine was. Because going through this whole 
process, this indeed requires a lot of strength” (Híradó, 12 September 2011). The fact that 
Tímea's terminology was picked up temporarily by the media outlets after the first court 
trial can be read as a sign of her growing credibility among the public (given that a trial 
court's decision had just been made in her favour), and may also be indicative of the fact 
that her terminology – and the concomitant discourse on abuse and domestic violence – 
was slowly beginning to acquire the status of “truth” with regard to Damu's past actions 
(for truth claims, see Foucault 1976/1978, pp. 92-102; 1977/1980, pp. 131-133). 
 Another shift in terminology led in the direction of narrowing down the content of 
the crime. In close connection with the new strategy of the defence before the second court 
trial – when information leaked out that Damu's new barrister would seek to question the 
rape element in the story – media outlets began to focus more intensively on rape. 
Accordingly, Damu's crime was often summarised with a distinct focus on rape – for 
example, he was described as soon to stand in court for having “committed, among other 
crimes, rape” (TV2, Tények, 29 September 2011, 2 October 2011, 6 March 2012; RTL Klub, 
Hírek, 7 March 2012). Or he was described as having committed exclusively rape: “Roland 
Damu, the actor suspected of rape” (RTL Klub, Hírek, 28 February 2012), Damu's “severe 
rape case” (TV2, Mokka, 12 March 2012) or “ongoing rape case” (TV2, Tények, 14 March 
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2012). This focus on rape was especially intensive from early February 2012 onwards, 
when concrete details became public about the planned strategy of the defence, and 
continued until 20 March 2012, when the final sentence (four and half  years of 
imprisonment) was announced in court, and TV channels returned to their earlier use of 
legal terms. This shift towards rape-centredness went in a completely opposite direction 
than the one discussed earlier, that is towards a radical reduction of the complex chain of 
events to only one of its components, the sexual component. This emergence of rape 
discourse into prominence in the media coverage of the case, however, also made it 
possible for rape-specific victim-blaming to enter the media coverage of the case.  
 Overall, the above shifts in terminology show that the Hungarian news media did 
not have a coherent answer to the dilemma of naming. Their terminology was oscillating 
considerably. This oscillation already in itself marks an inconsistency in media texts, in 
other words a discursive change in the domain of domestic violence. As Fairclough has 
pointed out, inconsistencies and contradictions in texts are indicative of a lack of a 
solidified order of discourse, and therefore of the fact that a seemingly contradiction-free, 
naturalised discursive construction of reality – here: the “reality” of domestic violence – is 
not available (1992, p. 97). 
 At the same time, it is worth noting that the two terminological shifts discussed 
above have something in common, namely the fact that both were moving from more 
gender-neutral terms – such as severe assault” or “illegal restraint” – towards gendered 
types of violence, such as “rape” and “domestic violence”. This shift towards gender 
becomes more evident if we also consider the ways in which domestic violence, as I 
discuss in the next section, was unambiguously constructed as male violence against 
women in the Damu case (in sharp contrast with the earlier uses of the same term during 
the Simek case in 2002). The fact that, whenever the constraints of legal discourse were left 
behind in the news discourse, terminology moved towards being gendered is already 
indicative of  how the issue of gender played a significant role in this terminological 
oscillation, and consequently also in the discursive change that took place around domestic 
violence in 2010-2012 in Hungary. In the next section, I examine the ways in which this 
emergence of gender and the fact that – in contrast with the Simek case – the victim was an 
adult woman, were ambivalently connected to the general issues of violence, agency and 
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blame. 
 
 
5.4 Connecting violence, gender and agency: The ambivalent place of blame 
 
In this section I explore in more detail how violence and its actors (that is, perpetrators and 
victims) become discursively connected to gender, with special attention to the 
implications of this connection for the construction of agency and victimhood. Firstly, I 
discuss the ways in which the Damu case, after the first guilty verdict was announced in 
September 2011, entered the current affairs programmes of both commercial TV channels, 
and was constructed there, with the help of feminist experts, as an exemplary instance of  
gendered violence – firstly of domestic violence (TV2, Mokka, 15 and 24 September 2011; 
RTL Klub, Fókusz, 20 September 2011), and to lesser extent of rape (TV2, Mokka, 15 
September 2011; RTL Klub, Házon kívül, 28 March 2012). Here I also discuss briefly the 
context that the media constructed for these expert discourses, and the ways in which their 
political decontextualisation set the boundaries for discussing gendered violence in the 
media. Secondly, after establishing that existing victim-blaming media portrayals were a 
significant concern in these expert discourses, I extend my focus to the broader news 
coverage of the Damu story, and argue that victim-blaming emerged as a central issue 
there, too. Accordingly, I dedicate the major part of this section to the ways in which 
victim-blaming discourses permeated the news coverage of the story on multiple levels, 
ranging from indirect and covert forms to explicit blaming. As examples of the latter, I 
discuss in more detail the two 20-minute-long interviews that Tímea gave on a celebrity 
talk show (TV2, Frizbi, 17 April 2011; 15 April 2012) and the long excerpt aired by TV2 on 
their prime-time news bulletin from the footage of the plea of Damu's barrister during the 
trial (TV2, Tények, 7 March 2012). Victim-blaming emerged slightly differently according 
to whether the story was constructed as an instance of domestic violence or of rape. While 
rape-related victim-blaming was mostly made unwelcome in the studio, in the case of 
domestic violence the media took a more tolerant and ambiguous approach. Below, I 
therefore consider separately domestic violence-related and rape-related discourses of 
victim-blaming .   
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5.4.1 Connecting domestic violence, gender and agency 
 
Generally speaking, the current affairs programmes that the two commercial broadcasters 
dedicated to domestic violence presented relevant public discussion on the issue (TV2, 
Mokka, 15 and 24 September 2011; RTL Klub, Fókusz, 20 September 2011). They touched 
upon such important aspects as the latency of the issue, the systematic and cyclical nature 
of abuse in domestic settings, the difficulty of identifying potential perpetrators during the 
courtship phase of a relationship, and one expert even pointed out that the assumption that 
helpless women do not try to leave their abusive relationships was mistaken and it was 
rather “the legal framework that does not protect women who try to speak up, and neither is 
public opinion women-friendly” (TV2, Mokka, 15 September 2011). Another important 
aspect of all these programmes was the fact that, by consistently referring to perpetrators as 
“husbands”, “ex-husbands” or “boyfriends” and victims as “women” or “abused women”, 
participants discursively constructed domestic violence as male violence against (known) 
women. Moreover, by refraining from marking these men and women in terms of further 
social characteristics like their ethnicity, social standing or age, these programmes 
practically located domestic violence in mainstream society.53  
 Interestingly, despite the fact that the programmes relied heavily on expert 
knowledge from feminist sources, the media outlets tended to refrain from marking these 
expert discourses as feminist or even as women-focused (experts interviewed or invited 
into the studio were predominantly working for NANE or Patent Egyesület, two Hungarian 
NGOs specialising in working with violence against women and overtly embracing 
feminist values). Rather, experts were typically referred to as “rights defenders” 
(jogvédők), that is without a clear indication of exactly whose rights they would be 
defending, and their NGOs as “associations for the defence of rights” (jogvédő szervezetek) 
(see e.g. TV2, Mokka, 15 September 2011; 12 March 2012; TV2, Tények, 11 March 2012). 
Programmes in which the experts’ strong connection to women's issues was not obscured 
were less numerous. On these, experts were always referred to as “women's rights 
                                                 
53 The one and only current affairs magazine programme that framed the Damu case as an example of both 
domestic violence and rape similarly constructed these types of violence as male violence against women 
(RTL Klub, Házon kívül, 28 March 2012). 
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defenders” (női jogvédők), and their NGOs as “associations for the defence of women's 
rights” (női jogvédő szervezetek) (TV2, Mokka, 24 September 2011; RTL Klub, 9 March 
2012). The advantage of this strategy – that expert knowledge on domestic violence was 
mostly left unmarked by a gender perspective or any political view (such as feminism) – 
was that media outlets could endow these discourses with objectivity, impartiality and 
authority, and thereby give more “truth value” to the issues they discussed and the 
perspectives they employed.54 On the other hand, in line with this lack of reference to 
feminist contexts, none of these news programmes touched upon the connection between 
domestic violence and the social inequality between the sexes in Hungarian society, and in 
general this connection was left undiscussed throughout the entire media coverage of the 
case. 
 The issue to which the above programmes paid the most attention was that of 
victim-blaming and its critique. In the Western world, domestic violence against women is 
usually perceived in terms of a binary of victimhood and agency, with, on the one hand, 
“helpless” and “powerless” women seen as forcibly subjected to their spouse's rule and 
unable to rescue themselves, and, on the other hand, women “voluntarily” staying in 
abusive relationships that they could have “freely” left. This binary, as previous literature 
has pointed out, fails to account for the complexity of victims’ experiences, which typically 
lie somewhere between these two extremes, and are rather shaped by a dialectical tension 
between agency and powerlessness (Picart, 2003). In this respect, the coverage of Damu's 
story was no exception, given that agency and victimhood emerged as central issues, either 
in the form of direct victim-blaming or in indirect form, through a reflexive referencing of 
previous victim-blaming in the case. Specifically, victim-blaming – as I show below – 
emerged in the media coverage of the Damu case firstly in the form of questions put to 
Tímea during her two interviews on the Frizbi celebrity talk show on TV2 about why she 
had not left her abusive relationship with Damu earlier, and, to a lesser extent, in the form 
of Damu's barrister publicly placing the blame on her for having been raped, during the 
second trial on 7 March 2012, which was broadcast later that day on the TV2 evening news 
                                                 
54 This strategy of promoting women's issues without their original feminist context had already been widely 
used – although not necessarily in connection with domestic violence – in Hungary, where the social 
recognition of feminism until recently had been, to say the least, sporadic and low (for a discussion of 
previous examples of this strategy as employed in Hungarian literary criticism, see Horvath, 2011). 
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bulletin. Current affairs magazines that approached the Damu case with a social issue 
frame strongly resonated with these instances of victim-blaming, and kept it at the centre of 
attention and critique, as illustrated  by some of their headlines (“Why had Palácsik not left 
Damu?”; “Why do women put up with violence?”, TV2, Mokka, 15 and 24 September 
2011).  
 These current affairs programmes, meanwhile, did practically try to serve as a kind 
of counterbalance to the freshly emerged victim-blaming discourse in the media by 
mapping the potential reasons that made women stay in abusive relationships and put up 
with the ongoing abuse. They addressed important questions that until then had not been 
discussed publicly, and thereby disseminated relevant information on domestic violence. 
The importance of these programmes, therefore, is difficult to dispute, in terms of their role 
in raising social awareness of the difficulties of leaving an abusive relationship. On the 
other hand, due to their nearly exclusive focus on women as victims, they were unsuitable 
to shed light on other, similarly important actors of domestic violence, on the perpetrators. 
By assigning centrality to the “why did she stay?” question, at the expense of asking about 
perpetrators, their responsibility, motivations and what they gained through violence – a 
characteristic and pervasive pattern in media portrayals of domestic violence across the 
Western world, as Berns (1999, 2001, 2004) has convincingly pointed out – they obscured 
the role of perpetrators. Of the 178 items of news in my sample, there was only one that 
brought into focus the perpetrator’s motivations and potential gains (RTL Klub, Fókusz, 20 
September 2011). In all other cases the focus either remained steadily on women who 
stayed in abusive relationships, or neither party's motivations were explored at all. 
 The question: “why did she stay?” acquired a prominent role not only in the current 
affairs programmes focusing on domestic violence discussed above, but also in the two 
roughly 20-minute-long interviews that Tímea gave on the prime-time celebrity talk show 
Frizbi, on TV2, where she talked in detail about her abusive relationship with Damu (TV2, 
Frizbi, 17 April 2011; 15 April 2012). While these current affairs magazine programmes, as 
already pointed out, gave ample space to expert opinion and thereby disseminated 
important information on domestic violence that should have refuted many pre-existing 
assumptions, including the image of “helpless women” who “bring domestic violence on 
themselves”, the two interviews with Tímea on Frizbi were less helpful in this regard. 
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Tímea sat alone in the studio with an anchor who was – like the vast majority of media 
presenters in Hungary – untrained in domestic violence issues. In the 2011 conversation, 
after Tímea publicly confessed that Damu had hit her in the sixth month of their 
relationship, the anchor (who otherwise was very much sympathising with Tímea) started 
to bombard her with a string of questions like: “then why did you stay with him for another 
one and a half years?”; “but were you being this naive? You believed him each and every 
time that he would change?”; “how is it possible to stay in love with a man who beats you 
up every day?”.55 Later he even asked her whether “a woman can be raped, in your 
opinion?”. The following excerpt is from their next conversation, which took place a year 
later in April 2012, but was conducted in a similar tone: 
 
Anchor: There is a certain type of women, and you are one of them, who for some 
reason always go back, they no matter what restart with their husband, their 
boyfriend, the men who had abused them. There must be a particular psychology 
for this... why? Why can't someone say after the first slap in their face that this has 
been enough? And that I leave, and never again? 
Tímea: Well, on the one hand I was in love, and on the other hand I am a weak-
willed person. That is, I lack the ability to assert myself. And sometimes I even 
thought it was my fault.  
 
The anchor's opening phrase, according to which “there is a certain type of women”, was 
already pathologising. It located the problem in the victim’s personality, instead of 
considering the effect that abuse typically has on victims’ self-esteem, and even more 
importantly the outer factors that make it difficult to just simply leave a relationship.56 This 
phrase, like some of the anchor's previous questions (“then why did you stay with him for 
                                                 
55 Anchor: So, after the first half year you realised that he was aggressive. He even hit you. Then why did 
you stay with him for one and a half more years? 
 Tímea: Because I was deeply in love with him. And when I tried to step out of the relationship, he always 
told me that I would get into the newspaper headlines […] he tried to blackmail me. And when he hit me, 
or kicked my leg, or slapped my face with his fist... 
 Anchor: But are you being this naive? That you believed him each and every time that he would change? 
 Tímea: I was naive, and love has a huge power, too.  
 Anchor: How is it possible to stay in love with a man who beats you up every day? 
 Tímea: I have no idea. If I think back now, I am simply unable to understand myself, but in that situation, 
when your partner is there telling you in your face never again, then you always believe it, and it gives 
you a bit of hope. 
56 The latter was especially relevant in Hungary, given that – as was pointed out by international 
organisations repeatedly during the 2000s and 2010s – there was not much state support available for 
victims. See e.g. Amnesty International, 2007. 
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one and a half more years?”; “but are you being this naive?”), completely ignored the 
structural element of coercion, and therefore also the fact that a lack of agency cannot be 
routinely taken as a personality trait (see Stark, 2007, pp. 176-191). Ironically, in these 
moments the anchor seemed also to ignore a series of other facts that could easily have 
questioned the “naive” and “helpless” status that he so quickly assigned to Timea – namely 
that, in contrast to  the majority of victims, whose cases remain invisible, she reported her 
case to the police and followed through with a humiliating year-and-a-half-long legal 
procedure, as well as the media warfare launched against her, and even had the courage to 
stand in front of the cameras, things that later in the same interview she said she would 
never do again because they had been “so humiliating”.57  
 
5.4.2 Connecting rape and agency 
 
Like domestic violence, as discussed earlier, the issue of rape received separate coverage in 
a couple of news programmes during late 2011 and early 2012 as a result of the Damu case, 
and on these occasions the anchors, with the help of experts, tore apart some popular 
victim-blaming assumptions about rape. For example, that a clear mark of physical injuries 
on victims – which Tímea did not have – would be essential in order to prove a rape case 
(TV2, Mokka, 15 September 2011), or that victims could bring rape on themselves by 
dressing provocatively (RTL Klub, Házon kívül, 28 March 2012). Experts also discussed 
the ways in which the practice of barristers humiliating rape victims in court – which 
happened during the trial of Damu, as discussed below – may contribute to victims 
refraining from reporting their abuse to the police (TV2, Mokka, 12 March 2012). Of these 
reports, one eight and a half minutes-long investigative segment on the subject of rape and 
domestic violence, aired on Házon kívül on RTL Klub (28 March 2012), dedicated 
particular attention to the issue of victim-blaming.  
 Interestingly, a comparison of the news programmes dedicated to domestic violence 
and those dedicated to rape show that while the “why did she stay?” question was well 
accepted in the studio and by editorial teams, and was practically resorted to as the 
                                                 
57 For a similar reading of an earlier, 22 October 2010, edition of Frizbi, in which the very same anchor 
interviewed actress Athina Papadimitriu – similarly a victim of domestic violence, but her case received 
much less publicity – with roughly the same questions, see Kocsis, 2011.  
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apparent key to a better understanding of the phenomenon of domestic violence, the typical 
victim-blaming questions and assumptions connected to rape were not accepted in the same 
way. Popular elements of the “rape myth” – such as, for example, that women can trigger 
the act of rape by dressing provocatively, by flirting or by generally too approachable 
conduct, or that only women who are not respectable can be raped – were never posed as 
questions, but were always presented as forming part of the very problem of rape, and 
interlocutors and reporters always took a firm stand against their legitimacy.58 An 
illustrative example of this discursive strategy is the voiceover added to footage aired on 
one of these news magazines, where a reporter documented with a hidden camera the 
reactions of passers-by to a strikingly attractive young woman, “Anett”, wearing a  mini-
skirt on the streets of Budapest:  
 
Here we have the catcall, but another man, for example, walked up to her to tell her 
how attractive she was. Anett says she's okay with all of these. If someone dresses 
in a striking manner, then she has to bear the consequences, she says. But this is the 
limit. Going further cannot be justified. Like, for example, violence cannot. (RTL 
Klub, Házon kívül, 28 March 2012) 
 
The strong resistance of TV studios to victim-blaming rape discourses may partly be 
connected to the fact that only a couple of years earlier, in 2007, rape and rape myths had 
been extensively discussed in the media as a result of a scandalous rape case in the country, 
that of “Zsanett” (see Kormos 2011). Accordingly, the one and only instance of 
straightforward rape victim-blaming seen on screens during the Damu case was footage of 
Damu’s barrister György Ruttner’s plea during the trial on 7 March 2012, from which TV2 
aired a long excerpt on its prime-time news bulletin Tények later that day. Here Ruttner 
could be seen trying to question the credibility of the rape claim by putting forward, among 
others, the classic “provocative dress” argument against Tímea: 
                                                 
58 “Myths of rape” or “rape myths”, a term coined by Schwendinger & Schwendinger (1974) and 
Brownmiller (1975), were first brought to public attention by second-wave feminism in the 1970s, and 
have been widely discussed in academia ever since. Generally speaking, they refer to widely held 
stereotyped beliefs in Western societies about rape (including its causes and context), rape victims and 
rapists, which generally downplay or justify rape and create a climate hostile to rape victims (Burt, 1980, 
p. 217). Scholars have repeatedly pointed to victim-blaming as one of the crucial elements of rape myths, 
including, among others, the belief that women bring rape on themselves, the suspicion of the credibility 
of rape victims, and the tendency to exculpate perpetrators. On rape myths, see also Lonsway & 
Fitzgerald, 1994; Horvath & Brown, 2009; specifically on rape in the news media,  see e.g. Benedict, 
1992; Franiuk, Seefelt & Vandello, 2008; O'Hara, 2012; Sacks, Ackerman & Shlosberg 2018). 
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So she [Tímea] brought her pink knickers and spaghetti strap top with her, both of 
which later got torn up by the plaintiff, but were left in the flat. By the way, these 
are the pieces of clothing that were left in the flat. Well, if the plaintiff goes there 
like this, the alleged plaintiff, then I see no reason why a rape would have been 
needed here. [Later Ruttner told a joke] What is the best contraceptive? And then 
they said that it is the aspirin, that was the answer to the best contraceptive. And 
then the layman asked, how would that be? And then the answer was that [Ruttner 
smiles] it is pretty simple, you just need to press it between your legs. 
 
Although TV2 did not comment directly on Ruttner's sexist and victim-blaming 
argumentation, probably in order to meet requirements of impartiality in reporting, the 
wording of the voiceover that they added to the footage suggested that the barrister may 
have gone too far, and that his conduct in the courtroom was at least unusual: “he spoke for 
five hours”, “he even told a joke”. At the same time, both RTL Klub and TV2 reported very 
early on their prime-time news bulletins that Patent Egyesület, a local feminist NGO 
specialising in work on violence against women, was planning to organise a demonstration 
against the barrister's argumentation, which the NGO considered harmful to future rape 
victims and their willingness to report their cases to the police (RTL Klub, Híradó, 9 March 
2012; TV2, Tények, 12 March 2012). Later, on 20 March 2012, TV2 Tények even dedicated 
a separate  news item to the demonstration. But, in general, media outlets did not condemn 
Ruttner openly for his sexist discourse. The one and only news item where Ruttner's 
discourse was explicitly disapproved of by an anchor or reporter, was on the morning news 
magazine Mokka on TV2 on 12 March 2012. The young and conventionally attractive 
anchorwoman – after Ruttner, who had been invited into the studio, interrupted her several 
times and voiced his opinion that the planned demonstration would be a ”silly thing”, and 
that giving credit to rape victims in his opinion could threaten “men's rights” – finally lost 
patience, cut him short, and made it clear that she disagreed. 
 In general, victim-blaming repeatedly emerged, although in different forms, in the 
media portrayal of the case, and became particularly prominent whenever Tímea's 
motivations for staying in relationship/contact with Damu were explored. Current affairs 
programmes dedicated to the issue of domestic violence and/or rape tried to serve as a 
counterbalance to this victim-blaming discourse, and either used it as a tool to refute 
misconceptions or overtly treated it as part of the problem itself. But in certain respects 
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these expert discourses, too, inadvertently created a favourable context for victim-blaming. 
Specifically, by mapping the potential reasons why women stay in abusive relationships 
and put up with the ongoing abuse, while at the same time mostly leaving perpetrators' 
motivations and gains undiscussed, experts, too, directed the focus of attention to victims 
exclusively, and thereby created a favourable context for locating the root causes of 
domestic violence once again on the victims’ side. A more radical approach, where 
gendered violence could have been explored in the context of perpetrators’ interest in 
maintaining (or even increasing) existing power inequalities between the sexes, was not 
taken. 
 
 
5.5 From bad-boy image to pity play. Media images and discursively constructed 
emotions 
 
The fact that Damu, especially after September 2011, had practically conquered the 
Hungarian news media with his own image-building, and that Tímea made her voice heard 
only sporadically (altogether three times over the year and a half), put Damu, at least in 
principle, in a very advantageous position. Nonetheless, the two commercial TV channels 
differed considerably in the extent to which they gave space to Damu's self-representations 
and announcements and especially in the level of “truth value” they assigned to these acts 
of image-building. TV2 was very selective about which of these could be included in their 
more serious news programmes (such as their prime-time news bulletins), and tended to 
restrict Damu's image-building only to their more entertainment-driven or explicitly soft-
news-oriented news programmes, while RTL Klub was much more lenient in this respect. 
With these tactics, TV channels could considerably influence which perspectives, 
announcements or confessions acquired more truth value on their screens. In the following 
section I give an overview of the most typical types of such image-building, giving special 
consideration to the emotions that these images discursively constructed and offered to the 
public as a way of emotionally engaging with the story – most importantly through pity 
and compassion. I also examine the different stands that the two TV channels took with 
regard to these images and the ways in which they distributed truth claims between the 
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perpetrator's and the victim's narratives.  
 As already noted, the two broadcasters followed different strategies with regard to 
Damu and his image-building in the media, and accordingly the ways in which they 
constructed Damu's personality also differed. TV2 assigned a special relevance to the story 
right from the start, since it had been Damu's employer; it took a clear stand against him 
right from the beginning and stuck to it throughout the whole unfolding of the case. As a 
consequence, TV2 strongly focused on the suspicious elements in Damu's narrative and 
character. Even before the first-court verdict, when the newsworthiness of the story 
considerably increased, negative pieces of information were published about him, such as, 
for example, that he had “tried to hack” the lie detector (TV2, Aktív, 18 May 2011). In 
another example, they advertised one of their upcoming Frizbi celebrity talk shows – 
where Damu first spoke about what happened in detail – by pointing out that he 
“contradicted himself several times” (TV2, Aktív, 9 December 2010). After the first-court 
verdict, TV2 even reported on their prime-time news bulletin that proof had emerged that 
Damu had been lying about his abstinence (TV2, Tények, 9 December 2011), and one of 
their anchors, on Frizbi, even launched a public call to “Damu's other victims” to come 
forward – a call to which indeed many responded. At the same time, though, TV2 invited 
Damu or his relatives a total of six times onto their evening celebrity talk show Frizbi 
during that year and a half when the story was hot (but excerpts from these conversations 
very rarely made into the broadcaster's other, more serious, news programmes). 
 A good example of TV2's general approach to the story was the news item on their 
evening news programme on 18 November 2010, in which they broke the news. This also 
functioned as the broadcaster's public announcement that it was terminating Damu's 
employment (“TV2 in today's evening announcement terminates its working contract with 
Roland Damu with immediate effect”). Therefore, as a kind of additional justification, TV2 
also added a mention of one of Damu's previous scandals (“three years ago he already hit 
one of his female colleagues after a TV2 party, and back then he defended himself by 
saying that he was drunk”), as a result of which Damu was practically presented on TV2 as 
a repeat offender right from the start. In order to get a clearer glimpse of how his repeat-
offender status was discursively constructed, it is worth citing the opening sentences of the 
report:  
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[anchor:] Roland Damu, who plays Előd Várnagy, the villain in the soap Jóban-
rosszban, was interrogated by the police this afternoon. He is suspected of having 
battered a woman again. This time he battered his fiancée, who was taken to 
hospital by ambulance late last evening. Subsequently, the woman reported her own 
fiancé to the police [in the meantime newspaper headlines are shown in the 
background about one of Damu's previous woman-battering cases, the title reading 
“I did not hit, I just stroked her a bit”]. The soap actor is still under interrogation by 
the police, suspected of rape and severe assault. TV2, in today's evening 
announcement, terminates its working contract with Roland Damu with immediate 
effect. 
 
Damu's criminal act is repeatedly presented as recurring (“he... battered a woman again”; 
“this time he battered his fiancée”), with a strong emphasis on the victim’s gender 
(“battered a woman”; “the woman reported... to the police”; “he battered his fiancée”), 
which powerfully constructs him as a repeat woman-batterer. This interpretation was 
further supported by the old newspaper headlines, re-mediated into the news item, 
according to which “I did not hit, I just stroked her a bit”, and later also headlines that read 
“Roland Damu was even beating his women” and “Roland Damu is a sex maniac”. The 
video footage played in the background in one part of the report, in which Damu was 
shown as doing his regular boxing training (he was an amateur boxer), and another taken 
from the soap, showing a minor outburst of rage by the aggressive character he played, 
similarly drew attention to Damu's aggressive traits.  
 This type of portrayal, which, based on previous audiovisual documents, presented 
Damu as a repeat woman-batterer, remained central on TV2 throughout the entire media 
coverage of the case, with the only significant difference being that the broadcaster soon 
stopped utilising excerpts from the soap  and switched to the exclusive use of non-fictional 
audiovisual documents in order to illustrate and strengthen its claims about Damu's 
recurring aggressivity. Previously documented audiovisual material about Damu's past 
criminal acts and non-criminal misconduct emerged in large numbers, especially after the 
September 2011 first-court verdict. For example, the footage of a 2007 talk show where 
Damu confessed that he had already been in court for battering a woman (TV2, Frizbi,  25 
September 2011), or the earlier footage, already mentioned,  of one of his outbursts of rage 
on a celebrity cookery show in 2008.  
 By contrast with TV2, RTL Klub did not take such a clear stand and eagerly gave 
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space to Damu's image-building when, after the first-court verdict in September 2011, he 
significantly increased his appearances on the broadcast media, quickly re-inventing 
himself from a “bad boy” to a person worthy of pity and trust. At that time Damu was very 
actively using his existing media contacts and his celebrity status in order to appear on 
screens, re-fashion his image, and thereby bend public opinion more in his favour, a tactic 
that – as a legal expert pointed out – may have also been intended to place decision-makers 
involved in the upcoming second-court trial under emotional pressure (TV2, Aktív, 28 
February 2012). The members of the Damu family (his mother, father, sister, current 
girlfriend and the girlfriend's family) mostly used RTL Klub's evening current affairs 
magazine Fókusz, besides the tabloid press, to declare their loyalty to and faith in Damu 
before the broader public. In one edition of RTL Klub's Fókusz, for example, in which 
Damu, his girlfriend and the girlfriend's mother were interviewed as a group, the mother 
confessed to the cameras her deep “happiness” that the two “youngsters” were planning to 
marry, “because then I would feel my daughter was safe” (17 September 2011). On another 
edition Damu told the reporter that “wherever I go, people come up to me, hug me, we 
shake hands, they ask me how I am. In the market an old lady made a package for me, and 
told me I didn’t need to pay for it. I feel that people support me” (15 September 2011). The 
fact that Damu, throughout the entire case, declared himself innocent and talked about “an 
outer force that stands above” him and would be the real reason for his fall (TV2, Frizbi, 9 
December 2010), also fitted this image, and Damu consistently stuck to this even after the 
first-court (and later the second-court) verdicts: “this is a well-thought-out defamatory 
campaign against me that was planned in advance, in order to leave my life in ruins” (RTL 
Klub, Fókusz, 12 September 2011). 
 This new image of Damu as a person worthy of pity, compassion and trust for a 
while entered the prime-time news bulletins of both commercial channels, that is RTL 
Klub's Híradó and TV2's Tények. On these bulletins, Damu and his barrister informed the 
public that, for example, Damu's father, “a man of advanced age, diabetic” had broken 
down when he heard about the guilty verdict, and “he needed medical assistance”, or that 
Damu, after being fired “found himself in a terrible financial situation” (RTL Klub, Híradó, 
15 September 2011). Broadcasters also reported that Damu's 16-year-old son was “so 
worried for his father that he had to be taken to a mental health clinic” (TV2, Tények, 2 
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October 2011). This news – like  much else, as TV2 later revealed (TV2, Aktív, 28 March 
2012) – may well have been leaked to the tabloid press by Damu and his barrister 
themselves, but Damu later commented: “I beg everybody, please do me this favour, leave 
my family in peace” (RTL Klub, Fókusz, 3 October 2011). 
 Opinion, however, from other sources than Damu's close environment was usually 
negative, and was available in relative abundance, especially on TV2, after the first-court 
verdict, and occasionally aired on their prime-time news bulletin, Tények. A Professor of 
Law, for example, who was invited to give his opinion on the case as an expert, referred to 
Damu as a “violent personality” (Tények, 13 September 2011). On Mokka, TV2's morning 
news magazine, two of Damu's colleagues expressed their concern that he was “to put it 
concretely, [mentally] ill”, and added that “he can go insane from one moment to the next 
so swiftly, that I indeed think he needs [medical] treatment”, and that “he cannot tolerate it 
if he doesn't win” (TV2, Mokka, 16 September 2011). Another colleague, however, 
defended Damu, saying “if Tímea knew that Roland was so quick-tempered, then she 
should have been more careful not to upset him” (TV2, Mokka, 16 September 2011). It was 
also during this time that both TV2 and RTL Klub interviewed one of Damu's former 
romantic interests, for the battering of whom he had received a suspended sentence a 
couple of years earlier (TV2, Frizbi, 25 September 2011; RTL Klub, Aktív, 22 September 
2011), and that excerpts from the infamous edition of the Hal a tortán celebrity cookery 
show, where Damu had had a temper tantrum, were aired on TV2's prime-time news 
bulletin (Tények, 24 September 2011). The spectacle of a raging Damu, vehemently cursing 
and kicking objects around in front of a bunch of frightened celebrities sitting silently and 
watching him, and the account of Damu's former romantic interest, in which the woman 
recalled in detail in front of the cameras – although without revealing her face – how Damu 
had battered her for four and a half hours solely because she did not want to become his 
girlfriend, definitely added more credit to depictions of Damu as a violent person 
pathologically incapable of controlling himself, and retrospectively also validated TV2's 
initial assessment that he was a repeat woman-batterer. 
 In contrast to Damu, who intensively tried to control his image in the media and 
often appeared on screen, his ex-fiancée, Tímea, mostly evaded media exposure, and 
appeared in front of the cameras altogether three times: twice for a longer interview on 
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TV2's late-evening celebrity talk show, Frizbi (on 17 April 2011 and 15 April 2012) and 
once, only briefly, just after the announcement of the first-court verdict on 12 September 
2011, when she spoke to both commercial broadcasters in the corridor in front of the court 
room. However, since her relationship with Damu as well as her full name and her face had 
been publicly known since early 2010 the latest, when she and Damu attended a celebrity 
show on TV2 as a couple, Tímea could not evade the negative consequences of media 
exposure even before she had spoken to any media outlets.59 Damu, especially at the early 
stage of the unfolding of the case, repeatedly depicted her in a very negative light, accusing 
her of, among other things, uncontrollable jealousy, cheating, faking pregnancy, procuring 
prostitutes and smuggling (see e.g. TV2, Frizbi, 12 December 2010), allegations which 
later were circulated mostly by the tabloid press. Nonetheless, Tímea's image in the 
broadcast media was mostly constructed around her vulnerability and lack of self-assertion 
in the face of the man she loved, which, combined with her visible middle-class status (she 
was always well groomed, well spoken and strikingly well dressed) and her physical 
attractiveness, constructed her as a woman conforming to patriarchal ideals of femininity 
and moreover as someone who had had to endure these vicissitudes only because of having 
loved her man too much, and who was therefore especially worthy of compassion, pity and 
protection.  
 Her vulnerability was most evident during those episodes when she burst into tears 
in front of the cameras, such as during her first interview on Frizbi, but also after the 
announcement of the first-court verdict when she spoke to reporters, and was “sobbing”, a 
fact that later that day both broadcasters highlighted in their coverage of the story (see e.g. 
RTL Klub, Híradó, 12 September 2011; TV2, Tények Reggel, 14 September 2011). 
Similarly, her first interview on Frizbi was advertised with a slogan that already established 
compassion as the adequate emotional reaction to her narrative (“and now, what melts even 
the coldest hearts, the confession of the week!”), and the anchor's closing sentences on the 
show, in which he summarised the essence of Tímea's story, similarly pointed to 
compassion as the adequate reaction: “your story is indeed very shocking and surprising 
                                                 
59 I should note that, in contrast to her sporadic appearance in the media in 2010-2012, today Tímea Palácsik 
is a recurrent name in Hungarian celebrity news. Since August 2013, when she married Hungarian–
American ex-Hollywood producer Andy Vajna – a man who, under the Orbán government, has emerged 
into a position of power in the Hungarian film (2011) and broadcast industry (2015) –, her luxurious way 
of life receives repeated media coverage. 
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[…] it could have been very difficult for you” (TV2, Frizbi, 17 April 2011). At the same 
time, however, as already pointed out, Tímea had to face many victim-blaming questions 
during her two interviews on Frizbi, and on these occasions, instead of trying to defend 
herself, she repeatedly put herself down (“I was naive”; “I am simply unable to understand 
myself”; “I am a weak-willed person”; “I lack the ability to assert myself”), which may 
have added some negative traits to her media image. However, despite all self-put-downs, 
she also managed to present herself as a woman who was relatively collected, capable of 
summarising her story with intelligence and insight, and in general had already made some 
significant progress in her journey towards healing and greater self-assertion (for example, 
she repeatedly made reference to a campaign where she was helping other abused women 
and collecting signatures for the criminalisation of domestic violence). 
 In brief, both the victim's and the perpetrator's media images were strongly built 
upon their ability to provoke compassion and pity, and the two commercial broadcasters 
differed considerably regarding towards whom they encouraged compassion. In close 
connection with this, the broadcasters differed also as to whether they were receptive to 
Damu's new, re-fashioned image or continued circulating the old one which was likely to 
fix him more firmly in the perpetrator's position and present him as a repeat woman-
batterer. Meanwhile, Tímea appeared only sporadically on screens, consistently activated 
elements of traditional femininity, including those of vulnerability and weakness, and 
thereby  managed to come across as a victim of violence who was worthy of compassion, 
but at the same time did not threaten the patriarchal social order. However, due to the 
presence of discourses of victim-blaming in the media coverage of the case, her particular 
susceptibility to male violence strongly marked her on-screen personality and did not 
always receive satisfactory explanation, thereby leaving an important aspect of the issue of 
domestic violence unexplained. Since both the perpetrator's and the victim's on-screen 
personalities were constructed in order to activate the same public emotional engagement 
of compassion and pity, the media coverage of the story in many respects implied a public 
competition for these emotions, to which only the final verdict would put an end, by 
declaring Damu the guilty party. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
 
The Damu case introduced the aspect of gender into the media discussion of domestic 
violence in Hungary, and offered a unique opportunity to shed public light on the everyday 
face of this type of violence, which traditionally had not received much media attention. In 
this respect, the issue, in terms of its newsworthiness, benefited from the televisual fame 
and concomitant public attention that Damu, a television personality and soap actor, had 
accumulated over time in the tabloid segment of the Hungarian media. This accumulated 
attention would not have been possible without the televisual celebrity culture – 
characteristically tied to commercial broadcasters and their tabloidised current affairs 
agenda – that had slowly and steadily established itself in the country over the previous 
decade of the 2000s. Due to Damu's fame, the case remained newsworthy over a prolonged 
period (one and a half years), and the broader public was able to  keep following its 
unfolding in the public arena. Overall, by giving prolonged and extensive coverage to a 
case of domestic violence that involved a prevalent type of male violence against women, 
and where the perpetrator in the end was found guilty and sentenced, the Hungarian news 
media successfully raised attention to domestic violence both as gendered and as 
criminalised under Hungarian law – two aspects that during coverage of the earlier case in 
2002, discussed in Chapter 4, had been sidelined.  
 At the same time, the fact that domestic violence emerged into publicity through the 
news platforms and through such genres  as tabloid media and soft news, which were 
characteristically connected to celebrity culture in Hungary, in many respects shifted 
attention away from the social relevance of the case. The story was steadily confined to the 
news platforms of commercial broadcasters and the tabloid press, and was not covered by 
more serious media outlets, including the public-service segment of the Hungarian news 
media. The public-service broadcaster consistently ignored the story until the final verdict 
was out. Therefore, paradoxically, the task of mapping the social relevance of the case fell 
on exactly those media outlets – the two major commercial broadcasters, RTL Klub and 
TV2 – that were, at the same time, interested in keeping the story tabloidised. Accordingly, 
the case received a social-issue framing only in a handful of current affairs magazine 
programmes aired on the above-mentioned TV channels. In these, domestic violence was 
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constructed as male violence against women, and the programmes primarily sought to 
refute, with the help of feminist experts, some popular misconceptions about the issue – 
primarily victim-blaming. The embeddedness of the expert knowledge in feminist 
discourses, however, tended to be concealed on screen. Therefore, the possibility of 
connecting domestic violence to the issue of inequality between the sexes in societies was 
missed. 
 Overall, despite the fact that the gender aspect received particular consideration 
during the media coverage of the case, and that domestic violence was acknowledged as a 
type of gendered violence, the media portrayal of the case remained inadequate in many 
respects with regard to domestic violence. A consistent discourse for articulating domestic 
violence was not yet available in 2010-2012 in the Hungarian news media, as is evidenced 
by the considerable oscillation also of the terminology that media outlets used to label 
Damu's crime, such as assault, restraint, rape, abuse, and finally domestic violence. 
Adequate coverage was particularly not helped by the fact that, of the aforementioned 
terms, preference was mostly given to legal terms that did not shed light on the core 
element of domestic violence, that of coercive control. Nor was it helped by the fact that 
the elements of rape received disproportionately high attention, while control strategies 
attacking the victim’s agency were often not discussed. This, combined with the fact that 
expert discourses typically focused on victims and not on perpetrators, constructed 
domestic violence as a social issue characteristically affecting women, but at the same time 
continued to place women's enigmatic susceptibility to this type of violence at the centre of 
media attention. One of the focal points of the coverage remained the question of why 
women let themselves be abused, which opened up a vast symbolic space for victim-
blaming discourses. Tímea, the victim was often questioned about how she contributed to 
the violence she had suffered, which ultimately created a discourse of complicit victimhood 
around this news story. 
 As with the issue of blame, the proper place of compassion and pity as adequate 
emotional responses to domestic violence was not reassuringly clarified, since Damu had 
launched a strong media campaign to bend public opinion towards himself, and repeatedly 
attempted to put himself in the position of the “real victim”, targeted by a “well thought-
out defamatory campaign”. On the other hand, Tímea, too, managed to come across as a 
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victim worthy of compassion, pity and protection, by presenting a victim profile which was 
not threatening the patriarchal social order: she consistently activated elements of 
traditional femininity, including those of vulnerability and lack of self-assertion. As a 
result, compassion and pity, too, were constantly re-distributed on screen between Damu 
and Tímea, turning the entire media portrayal of the case into a kind of mediated 
competition over public emotions.  
 All in all, despite bringing the aspect of gender into publicity, and shedding light on 
the everyday face of domestic violence, the public debate provoked by the Damu case 
ultimately closed down possibilities of challenging patriarchal assumptions about domestic 
violence, including the issues of agency and victimhood and the emotions associated with 
these. This case was successful, however, in bringing attention to the fact that domestic 
violence – even if it did not figure as a separate entry in the Hungarian Criminal Code in 
2010-2012 – was against the law, and that (at least some) perpetrators could be brought to 
court, and even convicted. All in all, Damu’s fall from grace was indicative of the fact that 
domestic violence, once ignored and relegated to the realm of private matters in Hungarian 
society, had established itself firmly as a public matter in the country’s public sphere, and 
become an issue to which Hungarian society would no longer automatically turn a blind 
eye, once it was out in the open. The next chapter explores how this new status that 
domestic violence had achieved by the early 2010s in Hungary – having clearly become a 
controversial public issue and capable of mobilising broader support from civil society – 
was utilised in Hungarian political life and feminist political advocacy in a new, more 
networked media environment. 
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6. Feminism on the Internet and on Television News: Negotiating the Boundaries of 
Public Morality with Regard to Domestic Violence in the New Media Era in Hungary,  
2012-13 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the following pages I analyse the domestic-violence-related political scandal from 2013 
of “komondor” József Balogh – an MP from the ruling right-wing, national-conservative 
political party FIDESZ, in possession of two thirds of seats in the Hungarian Parliament 
since 2010 – who became infamous in the country as a woman-batterer. The mere fact that 
in this chapter we reach the field of political life and political scandals, and that a politician 
battering his girlfriend could become an object of public ridicule and embarrassment in the 
country, is already indicative of the fact that by 2013 the status of domestic violence had 
significantly changed in Hungarian society. Unlike in 2002, when breaking the silence 
around the issue could be achieved only through a tragic case of domestic abuse that ended 
in parricide, or 2010, when an eighteen-month-long case could completely evade the 
attention of serious media outlets just because the perpetrator was a tabloid celebrity, by 
2013 the discursive terrain around domestic violence had shifted, enabling the issue to be 
recognised as more significant than just a piece of crime news or a tabloid story, and 
instead to develop into a fully-fledged political scandal and completely destroy a 
politician's public credibility.  
 To be sure, Balogh was far from being the first Hungarian politician to batter a 
woman, but previous cases had repeatedly evaded public attention (for details, see Oroszi, 
2013).60 In contrast to these, the Balogh story was followed by an intensive public reaction, 
including not only various forms of bottom-up political action and expression, but also 
responses from elected officials and even changes in policy instruments. The story also 
inflated public emotions around the issue to a previously unseen extent and, by creating a 
largely homogeneous emotional regime around the incident, intensively “socialised” the 
                                                 
60 In one sense, attention, at least scholarly attention, to the Balogh story is still lacking, given that as of 
2018 the story is entirely unresearched. 
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public to the proper expression of emotion with regard to the events, thereby forming 
certain social solidarities around domestic violence through emotional citizenship (that is, a 
sense of community through feelings shared in common. On emotional citizenship, see  
Pantti, 2011; Pantti & van Zoonen, 2006). However, as I argue in this chapter, the main 
issue at stake in this case was that of re-opening a public and symbolic space where the 
boundaries of public morality with regard to  domestic violence could be discussed, 
negotiated and above all affirmed, and concomitant “feeling rules” – that is, rules that 
regulate socially approved ways of expressing and managing emotions (Hochschild, 1983, 
p. 64) – shaped and settled. On the other hand, I also argue below that this discussion and 
negotiation over the boundaries of acceptable public conduct with regard to domestic 
violence often merged with the public outcry over the fact that Balogh had lied about the 
battering, and in a ridiculously obvious manner, in front of the cameras. Moreover, public 
discussion of the broader issue of domestic violence – although it did take place to some 
extent and gender-related aspects of violence in particular did received some special 
consideration – was pushed into the background in favour of a focus on public morality 
with regard to violence. 
 In close connection with my focus on public morality shaped by a media story, I 
take the Balogh incident as an instance of mediated scandal (Thompson, 2000, pp. 31-59). 
Scandals, by definition, involve a transgression of moral norms and values (Adut, 2009; 
Lull & Hinerman, 1997; Thompson, 2000) that becomes “known to others and [perceived 
as] sufficiently serious to elicit a public response” (Thompson, 2000, p.13). To be sure, the 
strong reaction of Hungarians to the Balogh story does not automatically imply that in 
2013 there would have been a solid and broad consensus across Hungarian society with 
regard to the unacceptability of domestic violence – and still less with regard to the 
meaning of domestic violence. On the contrary, I would argue – in line with Lull, 
Hinerman and Thompson's general insights on the potential norm-setting role of scandals – 
that the Balogh scandal served rather as a catalyst for the articulation, assertion and 
negotiation of new boundaries of public morality and public emotions in the face of 
domestic violence (and specifically woman-battering) at a specific historical moment when 
there was an increased uncertainty about and public awareness of these boundaries. The 
national public discussion of domestic violence had changed only shortly before, and this 
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was also a moment of increased expectations of the Hungarian government to make its 
standpoint clear with regard to domestic violence in general (a context that I clarify in more 
detail below).  
 In such a situation, the exposure of a member of the ruling party as a perpetrator of 
violence understandably triggered a massive public reaction, and also put pressure on the 
ruling party to clarify its standpoint. Indeed, the scandal was followed by a number of 
responses from the party, including public announcements, investigations into the case and, 
most importantly, also the introduction of a new policy instrument (a law) against domestic 
violence, for which feminist activists in Hungary had been fighting for a decade. A bill on 
“partner violence” (kapcsolati erőszak) (the elaboration of which had previously been 
repeatedly blocked by the FIDESZ government) was presented in the Hungarian 
Parliament on 10 May 2013, in the direct aftermath of the scandal, by the FIDESZ 
government, and was discussed four days later and passed in parliament on the 10 June. 
The subsequent Act on Partner Violence came into force on 1 July 2013.61 Considering its 
role as a catalyst of an important change of legislation, the Balogh scandal can also serve as 
an interesting example of the role that the media and public opinion can play in the 
formation of state-level interventions against domestic violence – an aspect that I do not 
elaborate further here, but only briefly note, given that this aspect has been mostly 
neglected in previous literature from the Central-Eastern European region (see Krizsán, 
Paantjens and Lamoen 2005; Dombos, Horváth and Krizsán 2007; Krizsán and Popa 2010, 
2014; Fabian 2010c, 2014a, 2017; Tóth 2014; Krizsán and Roggeband 2018a). 
 As I have already briefly indicated, I also discuss here Balogh's transgression in the 
                                                 
61 Although the content of this new law does not form part of the object of the present study, I should briefly 
note that it differed considerably from what feminists in Hungary were lobbying for. Most notably, it 
referred to “partner violence” (kapcsolati erőszak – a term freshly coined by the government in September 
2012, and previously unheard of), and described this as being directed against “a co-parent, a relative, an 
ex-spouse, an ex-life partner, a guardian, a ward, a foster carer, or a foster child with whom the perpetrator 
is living or has lived in the same household”, and which would consist of repeated behaviour that is either 
“violent and severely erodes human dignity” or “pulls material goods out from jointly-held or jointly 
managed assets and thereby exposes the aggrieved party to severe deprivation”. Such a wording, as NGOs 
have pointed out, made it possible to ignore many existing forms of domestic violence – for example, 
stalking or reproductive coercion, and, most notably, forms of violence that occur between intimate 
partners or relatives who do not cohabit – and sometimes expected too many criteria to be fulfilled in 
order to acknowledge that violence had taken place at all – economic abuse, for example, would not be 
seen as taking place until victims suffered “severe deprivation”. Legislators also failed to set minimum 
penalties, thereby reducing the dissuasive power of the law. For more details of the drawbacks of this new 
law, see the press announcement signed by three Hungarian NGOs – MONA, NANE, Patent – and 
released on 5 June 2013: Nőkért Egyesület [Association for Women], 2013 (in Hungarian).  
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context of mediation. In modern societies, scandals are inevitably mediated: they do not 
exist independently of the media, but are constituted by them, in various ways, according 
to the available platforms and technological means (Lull & Hinerman, 1997; Thompson, 
2000, pp. 31-59). In the present case, although it was an online news magazine that 
originally broke the news on 29 April (Kerner, 2013), and subsequently all forms of mass 
media covered the story until it faded after 2 May, it was television and internet memes that 
most notably shaped the ways in which the story played out in the media and developed 
from an incident into a fully-fledged political scandal. Specifically, television, through its 
capacity to bring physically distant people into close intimacy with spectators through 
close-up images and footage, thereby allowing spectators to scrutinise their conduct at 
close range, was able to expose Balogh to the public as both a woman-batterer and a liar, 
simply by confronting the politician in front of the cameras about the allegations of 
battering and capturing him apparently lying. This footage, therefore, served as a trigger 
for the scandal and subsequently remained a focal point of the entire media coverage of the 
story. On the other hand, internet memes, enabled by a complex media environment, 
quickly picked up the news of this exposure and, through their capacity to move swiftly 
across a vast range of media platforms and media texts, were able to accumulate, make 
visible and thereby inflate public emotions around Balogh's exposure, and to add more 
attention and drama to it; and they also played a major role in bringing spectators to a 
common platform in relation to the events by shaping shared emotions and values with 
regard to Balogh's transgressions.  
 This co-operation, so to speak, between television news and internet memes in 
shaping a media story into a political scandal was enabled by the existence of a complex 
media environment in Hungary in 2013 (as discussed in Chapter 3), where television news 
was increasingly being produced and consumed in a converged way, that is by intersecting 
with other media platforms, genres and news media material. After the rise of the 
multimedia era, the quick spread of online journalism and networked media as well as the 
spread of “media multitasking” habits among media users, television news, which had once 
been a mono-platform type of news discourse, evolved into a multi-platform discourse with 
convergent circulations of news material (Briggs, 2009). In Hungary in 2013, as in modern 
societies elsewhere, television viewers had increasingly developed habits of shifting from 
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one media device to another or even using them simultaneously (for example, combining 
surfing the internet with watching television) and, accordingly, televised news stories, too, 
had penetrated and converged with digital interactive media content, which internet memes 
were actually part of. Within such a media milieu, boundaries between televison and social 
media platforms had become relatively fluid, with media content often re-mediated across 
these boundaries, a development which thus assigned a strongly intertextual character to 
television. 
 This chapter therefore examines the ways in which the Balogh story was portrayed 
on television news in a complex media environment strongly affected by internet memes. I 
examine the discourses that television news and internet memes (the latter understood as 
user-generated, bottom-up public discourses) employed and combined in order to portray 
domestic violence to the broader public, and also the ways in which they discursively 
engaged the public morally and emotionally in the events, and in which they brought about 
a change (if there was any change) in the existing order of discourse on domestic violence 
in the country. Given that the Balogh story developed into a leading news story at a 
historical moment when public discussion of domestic violence had changed considerably 
only shortly before – a fact that resulted in new discursive antagonisms and shifting 
relations of power between major local discourses shaping the social meaning of domestic 
violence in the country – I also examine how television and internet memes related to these 
discourses specifically.  
 
6.1.1 Television and its capacity to discredit politicians through mediated intimacy and a 
politics of trust 
 
In order to understand better how televised footage could trigger a political scandal, and to 
some extent also shift the public focus from the battering to the perpetrator's lies, here I 
briefly comment on the notion of mediated intimacy in the context of political life. Today 
politicians all over the world are assessed, to a considerable extent, according to a logic of 
mediated intimacy, in other words on the basis of their public conduct in front of the 
cameras and – based on these mediated performances – their (assumed) personal qualities 
as individuals, rather than of their achievements in the field of politics (Thompson, 2000, 
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pp. 119-158). The rise of mediated intimacy originally occurred in the context of a decline 
in traditional class-based party politics and the rise of television in European and North-
American countries, both taking place during the postwar years. But mediated intimacy 
continues to shape political life even today (pp. 119-158) and, as noted in Chapter 4, lately 
has become particularly prominent in Western media in general, through their tendency to 
place intimate life at the heart of media representations (Barker, Gill & Harvey 2018, pp. 
24-26). Regarding television specifically, mediated intimacy in the context of political life 
is particularly enabled by the capacity of television to convey close-up images, thereby 
allowing spectators to scrutinise politicians’ conduct in front of the cameras at close range, 
looking for signs of credibility and trustworthiness by monitoring such elements of conduct 
as, for example, facial expression, body language or tone of voice, but also the 
appropriateness in general of their conduct to the situation (Bucy, 2011; Thompson, 2000, 
pp. 119-158). Accordingly, mediated political life today is strongly shaped by the logic of a 
“politics of trust”, where politicians’ personal integrity, credibility and trustworthiness 
acquire central importance (p. 112), an aspect that achieved a crucial role in the breaking 
and development of the Balogh scandal.  
 To be sure, credibility and trustworthiness achieved through mediated intimacy are 
highly susceptible to manipulation and deceit: conduct in front of the cameras can be 
practised, and, through good televisual skills, controlled to a considerable extent. Although 
television, too, is capable of orienting spectators’ attention towards certain details of 
politicians’ on-screen performances (or away from others), through such techniques as, for 
example, the angle and distance of the camera, the object of zoom shots, or details pointed 
out by voice-overs, these techniques – even if they can without doubt be misused for 
manipulative purposes – are ineliminable elements of televised news reporting. Attempts at 
manipulation and deceit, however, if these are by politicians themselves in front of the 
cameras, make up so-called “second-order transgressions”. These are actions through 
which politicians attempt to conceal their original transgressions from the public eye – a 
frequent feature of mediated scandals, which often receive more public attention than the 
perpetrator's original missteps (Thompson, 2000, p. 17). Still, given that denials, lies and 
deceitful behaviour in front of the cameras sometimes are successful, politicians and other 
public figures are repeatedly attracted to controlling their public image through such 
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manipulative actions.  
 Therefore, when on the evening of 29 April 2013 millions of Hungarians watched 
Balogh on their TV screens with his injured fists and briefly explaining the battering 
incident to the cameras by blaming the family’s blind komondor dog for his girlfriend's 
injuries (“our komondor dog... sprang at her and pushed her over... I don't remember”) – 
footage that I analyse in a later section in more detail – spectators closely scrutinised his 
conduct (and physical appearance) for signs of credibility and trustworthiness. The fact that 
he lied – what is more, in a very apparent and ridiculous manner – immediately destroyed 
Balogh's credibility and personal integrity in the public eye, and it was this moment that in 
effect triggered the scandal. As a consequence the battering and the lying, both understood 
as transgressions, were often merged in the coverage of the story, as I will later elaborate in 
detail, and public responses were alternately to either or both of these, while internet 
memes often inextricably merged the two. 
 
6.1.2 Internet memes: Shaping mindsets, shared values and emotions  
 
Internet memes are characteristic products of the new media age, and are understood as 
user-generated  “multimodal artefacts” – typically videos or still images – remixed by 
countless participants, which typically employ “satirical humour for public commentary” 
(Milner, 2013, p. 2359). Internet memes are today widely considered the “lingua franca” or 
the vernacular of digital political discourse (Rentschler & Thrift  2015, p. 334). Nowadays 
nearly all major events are followed by internet memes in the Western world, and it is 
therefore not strange that Balogh's public exposure by Hungarian broadcasters was also 
followed by the intensive circulation of internet memes commenting on this exposure. As 
Shifman has pointed out, internet memes typically arrive in groups and individual items 
may show considerable variety, but as a group they make up one polyvocal discourse in 
which the “different memetic variants represent diverse voices and perspectives” (2014, pp. 
7-8). Therefore, even if internet memes individually do not look like a discussion, they do 
qualify as acts of engaging with matters of public concern (Milner, 2013, p. 2363), and 
therefore can be considered as forming part of socially constructed public discourses 
(Shifman, 2014, pp. 7-8). In line with the above, this study considers internet memes as 
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acts of bottom-up public expression of opinion, and consequently a public discourse.  
 Internet memes are primarily enabled by an interactive digital media environment, 
where they can be quickly produced, shared and remixed, and swiftly move from one 
media platform to another, but they can ultimately feed into the traditional media, too, as 
happened in the case of the Balogh story. Due to their capacity to reach and circulate across 
a high number of media platforms and texts, memes are able to accumulate, increase and 
empower perspectives, voices or even emotions, and thereby “shape the mindsets, forms of 
behaviour, and actions of social groups” (Shifman, 2014, p. 18), and articulate shared 
values and emotions concerning trending issues (Mina, 2014). Moreover, given that shared 
emotions have a crucial part to play in forming collective identities and are able to form or 
break social solidarities (see Anderson 1991; Ahmed 2004), internet memes also have the 
power to create emotional citizenship around issues of public concern (on emotional 
citizenship, see Pantti, 2011; Pantti & van Zoonen, 2006). All in all, internet memes have 
the capacity to articulate, circulate and even shape public perspectives, emotional and 
moral engagements and shared values regarding matters of public concern in a complex 
media environment such as Hungary’s in 2013. Before this, matters of domestic violence 
had once already provoked an intensive flow of internet memes in the country, in 
connection with an earlier domestic-violence-related event that I discuss in the next 
section.  
 
6.1.3 Historical and policy context: The earlier events of 2012 and their legacy for the 
Balogh scandal 
 
As indicated earlier, the Balogh scandal broke at a specific moment of increased suspense 
and public awareness of domestic violence, and increased expectations of the Hungarian 
government to make their standpoint clear with regard to the issue. This specific historical 
context had been created by another incident that preceded the Balogh story by only a 
couple of months. In September 2012 domestic violence briefly re-emerged in Hungarian 
public life through the rise of digital feminist activism in the country as a response to a 
failed inclusion of domestic violence on the parliamentary agenda, which brought a change 
in the national public discussion on domestic violence. It also made visible a wider social 
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feeling against domestic violence in the country than had previously been thought to exist, 
and made it evident that certain forms of public conduct on the issue that had once been 
accepted or at least tolerated were now susceptible to public contestation. The September 
2012 events also created an expectation of the government to bring into force new policy 
instruments against domestic violence. 
 These changes were catalysed by the 11 September 2012 parliamentary discussion 
of a so-called citizens’ initiative for the creation of a separate law on domestic violence 
(supported by more than 100,000 signatures), and by the fact that when, during this 
discussion, István Varga, an MP of the ruling party FIDESZ, suggested, in line with the 
party’s policy, rejecting the initiative, he also added that in his opinion domestic violence 
“would not even come up” if women gave birth to more children (see “Fidesz Macho”, 
2012). Although this was not the first time such an initiative had been  rejected, since local 
feminists had been using the institution of citizens’ initiatives already for a decade to 
submit the issue of a separate law on domestic violence on the parliamentary order of the 
day, and absurd and sexist claims about domestic violence had been heard before in the 
Hungarian Parliament, this time Varga's insensitive words provoked a massive public 
reaction. Within hours, satirical memes mocking the MP’s claim started to circulate on the 
internet (“Egy éjszaka alatt”, 2012; Puskás, 2012; “Szeptember legjobb”, 2012), and a 
demonstration dubbed the Women's Uprising was announced on Facebook by feminist 
activists and quickly gathered mass support (Abonyi, 2012). Within a few days, the 
quickly-growing support for the demonstration and the intensive circulation of internet 
memes across a vast range of online platforms and texts were so powerfully articulating 
public discontent that even major national TV channels finally started to cover the issue. 
Varga made a public apology, and the FIDESZ government, too, quickly backed down 
(FIDESZ, 2012). They announced the re-discussion of the initiative in Parliament even 
before the demonstration actually took place, and within a week legislators indeed passed a 
resolution to elaborate the initiative into a bill. The elaboration process, however, seemed 
to have reached an impasse by January 2013,62 until József Balogh became involved in a 
                                                 
62 In January 2013 domestic violence experts left the committee set up by parliament to elaborate the 
initiative into a bill, with the explanation that their suggestions had repeatedly not been taken into 
consideration. After this there were no manifest signs that the remaining members of the group would 
continue the work. 
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scandal of domestic violence in late April 2013.  
  As a consequence of the events in September 2012, feminist discourses, voices and 
social actors, which previously had been severely marginalised in the mass media and 
repeatedly ignored by political decision-makers, unexpectedly emerged at centre stage of 
national public discourses on domestic violence through a powerful digital feminist media 
activism.63 Moreover, they also proved capable of attracting wider social support and even 
of achieving a change to the initial neglect of the issue by both political decision-makers 
and the traditional media. In fact, the networked media, by enabling Hungarian citizens to 
very visibly engage in matters of public concern by simply clicking on a button, offered a 
more open platform for political expression and in general for articulating political dissent 
on matters of domestic violence than did the mass media (on this relative openness, see 
Milner, 2013, p. 2360).64 Therefore, the advent of the networked media – once backed up 
by traditional and digital forms of feminist activism in the country – was capable of 
significantly extending public discussion on domestic violence in Hungary in September 
2012, compared with on previous occasions, and of embracing new, previously unheard or 
marginalised discourses, voices and perspectives, most importantly those of women and 
feminists. This implied an important change in the national public discussion of domestic 
violence in Hungary. 
 In September 2012 it also became evident that there was a significant difference in 
how the Hungarian government and feminist activists saw the issue. Feminists created the 
demonstration with strong gendered connotations (“Women's Uprising”), described 
domestic violence as primarily affecting female victims, and the majority of the internet 
memes, too, mocked the “woman as a child-bearing machine” element of Varga's claims, 
so the public outcry constructed domestic violence overall as a women's issue. The 
government's standpoint, however, when it finally ceded to the pressure and agreed to 
elaborate the initiative into a bill, was based on a gender-neutral notion of violence. It 
stressed in a public announcement that victims of domestic violence could be not only 
women, but children and men as well, and specified that the word “family” could not figure 
                                                 
63 On the networked media as a relatively new arena of bottom-up political expression and mobilisation in 
the country, see Wilkin, Dencik & Bognár, 2015. 
64 Digital forms of feminist activism, compared with traditional ones, required considerably less financial 
and human resources for a successful mobilisation on issues of feminist concern, which was also an 
important advantage. 
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in the text of the upcoming law (see MTI, 2015). Whereas it would be difficult to argue 
against the fact that people of any gender or age can fall victim to domestic violence, the 
governmental standpoint failed to highlight the facts that, compared with men, women (and 
children) more often experience this type of violence, and that gender – exactly because it 
is constitutive of a system of unequal power relations in societies – is therefore a crucial 
aspect of the issue. Moreover, the broader context of this governmental claim –  for 
example, the government's repeated refusal to sign the Istanbul Convention, which 
understands domestic violence as mostly violence against women; its adherence to 
addressing female citizens mainly through their role as mothers; its long-standing 
reluctance to acknowledge the family as a potential site of violence – made it evident that, 
even if there was be a change in governmental handling of the issue, it would not be easy 
to reconcile a tackling of domestic violence with the conservative-nationalist agenda that 
FIDESZ had been pushing (see Fábián, 2014a).  
 The Balogh scandal, therefore, broke at a specific historical moment when 
dominant values and norms with regard to domestic violence had just been abruptly and 
strongly questioned by bottom-up voices and social players. No consensus had been 
reached, even temporarily, over these norms and values, and although a public outcry over 
the inadequate handling of domestic violence by the government had been spectacularly 
articulated and even a concrete policy tool had been named and backed by broad social 
support, the introduction of this policy tool seemed to be delayed. It was also a specific 
moment when new meaning-making claims regarding domestic violence had emerged 
powerfully into publicity and clashed with existing norms, and new discursive antagonisms 
had been formed, in particular around the issue of gender. Overall, the rise of feminist 
discourses, and their spectacular movement from the margins to the centre of the 
Hungarian public sphere in September 2012, had unsettled the existing power relations 
between the various public discourses on domestic violence, but without reaching any 
lasting “resting point” or closure. This had created a situation of generalised uncertainty 
about domestic violence. Within such a context, the Balogh scandal was able to catalyse a 
range of domestic-violence-related social processes, including the clarification of norms 
and values with regard to domestic violence. It was further able to shape discursive 
antagonisms, and would even bring the process of law-making to a new stage. 
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6.2 Data, data selection and methods 
 
In accordance with the approach established in Chapter 3, I employ here critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) to follow how the scandal developed and was covered by the three major 
Hungarian TV channels. I also examine how the story was commented on by internet 
memes. CDA is traditionally employed to analyse items that, even if multimodal (such as 
television news), usually have a textual component, and not all internet memes have such a 
component. So my choice of also analysing internet memes through CDA may seem 
unusual. But, as indicated earlier, I take memes as acts of socially constructed, bottom-up 
public expression, and therefore as being of a discursive nature. In fact, in the last couple of 
years, CDA has repeatedly been successfully employed on internet memes by a number of 
authors (see e.g.  Adegoju & Oyebode, 2015; Milner, 2013; Rentschler & Thrift, 2015). 
Regarding television news, I investigate, as mentioned earlier, the three major national 
broadcasters, that is the prime-time evening news bulletins of RTL Klub and TV2, the two 
national commercial broadcasters that in 2013 had the highest viewing figures in Hungary, 
and the news programme of M1, the public broadcaster (in 2013 under strong government 
control), which was ranked third by viewing statistics (see AGB Nielsen, 2018). Given that 
the newsworthiness of the story significantly fell after the 2 May, when Balogh resigned 
from the FIDESZ parliamentary fraction, I focus only on the first four days of the media 
coverage of the case, from 2 April to 2 May 2013. Of this narrowed-down pool of texts, 
which includes altogether eight items of prime-time news (mainly produced by the two 
commercial channels, since M1 mostly ignored the story), I discuss in more detail certain 
texts that had a more prominent role in influencing the outcome of the scandal (such as, 
most importantly, Balogh's exposure in the news on 29 April). In terms of internet memes, I 
identified altogether 40 items – 37 still images and three videos – the majority of which 
were widely circulated on the internet, including by major online news magazines and also 
the online versions of major traditional news media outlets. Some of these were even 
reported on off-line news bulletins. Specifically on the basis of what element of the Balogh 
story they were mocking, I grouped these into four categories and  analyse them 
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accordingly. 
 
 
6.3 The portrayal of the Balogh case on television 
 
Between 29 April and 2 May 2013, when media attention to the Balogh case was at its 
peak, RTL Klub reported on the story every day, TV2 three times altogether, and M1, the 
public broadcaster, which was under strong government control and therefore mostly trying 
to completely ignore the story, reported on it only once, when on the 2 May Balogh 
resigned from the parliamentary fraction of the ruling political party FIDESZ and became 
an independent MP.65 Therefore, the available media texts are mostly those produced by 
RTL Klub and TV2. In general, RTL Klub and TV2 covered the Balogh scandal roughly 
along the same lines. After their initial focus on the perpetrator and his lies, on the second 
day – that is 30 April – both TV channels switched to a more domestic-violence-focused 
portrayal, which they continued with throughout the rest of the media coverage. RTL Klub 
also complemented this switch with an increased focus on the victim’s suffering. Moreover, 
as I elaborate in more detail below, both commercial broadcasters endorsed a feminist 
perspective on domestic violence, with both of them repeatedly presenting information on 
the issue from feminist sources. TV2, for example, conducted an interview with a feminist 
expert on domestic violence, while RTL Klub presented excerpts from an anti-domestic-
violence campaign video that the same feminist NGO had produced. On 2 May, RTL Klub 
even connected the Balogh scandal to the events of September 2012, and informed 
spectators that the elaboration of a bill on domestic violence had been stalled for months. 
Since there was a major change in the portrayal of the case on the second day (with a 
switch of focus from lies to battering), I dedicate more space to items of news from the first 
two days. Moreover, since the trigger for the scandal was Balogh's exposure in front of the 
cameras on the very first day, I discuss this footage at greater length. 
                                                 
65 As a side note, it needs to be emphasised that having to leave the parliamentary fraction was not a severe 
punishment in any sense: Balogh was able to keep his MP status, his membership of the FIDESZ political 
party, and also his position as the mayor of his village, Fülöpháza. His loss, overall, was that at the next 
general elections in 2014 he could not run again for a parliamentary mandate, and when he was finally 
convicted in court of severe assault in February 2016 he had to pay a moderate financial penalty for the 
battering (400,000 HUF, which, as of December 2018, is equal to 1,107 GBP). 
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6.3.1 Constructing violence: Names, claims and opposing discourses 
 
Generally speaking, the ways in which Balogh's story was reported differed considerably 
according to the degree of political control that broadcasters (and their selected 
interviewees) were subject to. The broadcaster M1 (and the spokesperson for the Chief 
Prosecutor's Office and the Head of the FIDESZ parliamentary group, whom broadcasters 
regularly interviewed or referenced) were under strong control and therefore tended to 
obscure and downplay the crime, whereas the two commercial broadcasters were less 
bound by political constraints, and therefore able to explore the subject more freely. 
Overall, Balogh's crime was reported on in three distinct ways: i) as an assault (a one-off 
physical act) committed by an MP against his girlfriend, with added emphasis on the 
perpetrator's status as an MP and his attempt at concealing the crime; ii) as an instance of 
domestic violence, understood as a pervasive social problem; iii) as a dubious action by a 
MP of FIDESZ, which FIDESZ condemned and distanced itself from. The first type of 
portrayal was characteristic of the two commercial broadcasters’ initial approach to the 
story, the second one became popular during the next couple of days, while the third type 
was employed by M1, which was strongly interested in demonstrating that FIDESZ was 
not liable in any sense for Balogh's misbehaviour. 
 Initially, both RTL Klub and TV2 constructed the story as a high-ranking politician's 
involvement in a severe legal incident – an MP caught assaulting his girlfriend and trying 
to deny it. Accordingly, these broadcasters dedicated the major part of their news reports to 
Balogh, the perpetrator, whom they also interviewed, focusing intensively on his status as 
an MP (both broadcasters mentioned his MP status repeatedly, including in the title of their 
news reports), and explored the usual course of legal actions if such an accusation was 
made about an MP. Although initially broadcasters dedicated significantly less attention to 
the details of Balogh’s crime than to his personality and to his lies, they were very clear 
about the severity of the crime and that it had been committed against a woman. TV2 
referred to Balogh’s action as an instance of woman-battering (“he battered his girlfriend”), 
whereas RTL Klub identified it as an instance of “abuse” of a “cohabiting partner”, whom it 
identified as a woman (TV2, Tények este, 29 April 2013; RTL Klub, Híradó Este, 29 April 
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2013). Moreover, both broadcasters informed their viewers that the girlfriend's injuries 
were “severe” and that she had been hospitalised. RTL Klub also added that her nose had 
been broken. All in all, these pieces of information, although lacking in additional details, 
ultimately constructed Balogh's crime as male violence against a female intimate partner, 
more specifically an instance of woman battering. The two descriptions of Balogh’s crime 
that did not fit this construction, but still appeared in these initial news reports, came from 
interviewees. The spokesperson for the Chief Prosecutor's Office described the case to 
viewers as a “family conflict” – and thereby partly shifted the blame onto the victim, as if 
both parties had been equally involved in the event. Meanwhile, the press announcement 
from FIDESZ, read out by an anchor, condemned “all violence, especially if directed 
against the weak, that is children, the elderly and women” (RTL Klub, Híradó Este, 29 
April 2013). With this, FIDESZ managed to avoid commenting directly on what Balogh 
had done, but distanced itself, on a more abstract level, from violence against “the weak”. 
 In contrast with the outspokenness of RTL Klub and TV2 about what type of crime 
Balogh had committed (an approach they adopted from the start), and the ample proofs 
they provided – from Balogh’s on-screen exposure – that the politician had indeed been 
involved in battering, public broadcaster M1 ignored the story for a long time and, when it 
finally reported it on 2 May, obscured the proofs of the battering and also Balogh’s 
perpetrator status to some extent. Instead, M1's main concern was to stress that FIDESZ 
had already distanced itself from the MP on whom suspicion had fallen. Accordingly, the 
title of its news report was: “József Balogh Resigns From FIDESZ Parliamentary Group 
and Becomes Independent” (M1, Híradó Este. 2 May 2013). The only person M1 
interviewed was a high-ranking member of FIDESZ, and in general the broadcaster 
dedicated significantly less effort to informing spectators about exactly what Balogh had 
done, compared with the detailed clarification it gave of the consequences of his 
resignation. Accordingly, M1 only reported that “a couple of days ago the politician's life 
partner was hospitalised, because, based on information from the press, the politician has 
abused her” (emphasis mine). Thus, although M1 did communicate the basic pieces of 
information about the nature of Balogh's crime – the words “abuse” and “hospitalised” did 
appear in the text – at the same time it also created a context around these claims that 
obscured the sources of information and their credibility, including the fact that the 
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girlfriend's injuries had been officially documented and reported to the police. The causes 
of her hospitalisation were especially vaguely described and presented as mere speculation 
by the press (“because, based on information from the press, the politician has abused 
her”).  
 This vague reporting style employed by M1 – specifically, the way in which it 
partly acknowledged the abuse, but at the same time also obscured important details about 
it – was reproduced by a high-ranking member of FIDESZ, the only person M1 
interviewed. Antal Rogán, the Head of the party's parliamentary fraction, severely 
downplayed Balogh's responsibility, referring to his crime as “a severe problem going on 
between the politician [Balogh] and his life partner”, even if later he added that he “as an 
individual, a husband and a politician condemn[ed] domestic violence, similarly to all other 
members of the [FIDESZ] parliamentary fraction” (M1, Híradó Este. 2 May 2013). Rogán 
also stressed that, since by then Balogh “has resigned from the FIDESZ parliamentary 
fraction, it is only him who is in charge of deciding about the fate of his mandate”. With 
these ambiguous discursive tactics, the broadcaster was able to shift attention from the 
inconvenient details of the crime, and instead frame the story from the perspective of 
FIDESZ, and as something already resolved. Thus, spectators could feel reassured that, 
even if something bad had happened, it did not have any impact on the reputation of the 
political party, since the party member under suspicion was no longer in the respective 
parliamentary group. This news item, therefore, mainly offered spectators the opportunity 
to engage morally with FIDESZ, much less with the perpetrator (whose actions were both 
condemned and obscured), and even less with the victim (whose suffering was mostly 
concealed).    
 The third characteristic way in which Balogh's crime was discursively constructed 
became dominant after he had already been exposed as a liar. By 30 April, RTL Klub and 
TV2 had shifted their attention from the politician to the nature of the crime – which they 
understood as “domestic violence” – and the ways in which players in relevant positions 
(that is, Balogh's party and domestic violence experts) were taking a stance against it. This 
switch of focus enabled the two commercial broadcasters to give ample space on screen to 
feminist, human rights approaches to domestic violence and thereby to counterbalance the 
conservative-nationalist, gender-neutral approach that FIDESZ had promoted in its press 
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announcements from the start.66 TV2, for example, in its news report on the Balogh story 
on 30 April, explored the issue of “domestic violence” specifically. Although the 
spokesperson for Balogh's party, FIDESZ, once again briefly appeared in this news report 
and repeated the announcement from the previous day, according to which FIDESZ 
condemned all forms of violence “against the weak”, TV2 gave an employee of an NGO 
specialising in domestic violence the status of expert, allowing her to appear on screen in a 
long video footage. This footage took up approximately half of the news report dedicated 
to the Balogh story. The expert, after pointing out that Balogh’s explanation, according to 
which he did not remember battering his girlfriend, was not feasible, and also argued that 
“in a democratic, European country in the 21st century the equality between the sexes is not 
an issue of party politics, or one of taste, it is an issue of fundamental human rights”. The 
anchor also summarised the expert's view that “violence occurs in nearly all types of 
partnerships, independent of age, location and education”.  
 It is worth noting the tension between the two ways in which the expert and the 
spokesperson for FIDESZ constructed domestic violence. The expert employed a feminist 
approach and understood violence in terms of a violation of human rights, in close 
connection with the issue of equality between the sexes. Besides giving an expert opinion 
on the credibility of Balogh's explanation (namely, that not remembering was unfeasible) 
and locating domestic violence in mainstream society by stressing its high social 
prevalence, the expert also invoked certain political values (“democratic”, “European” and 
“of the 21st century”) and thereby located the issue of prevention of domestic violence in 
the broader context of the country’s EU membership and of a generally democratic political 
establishment. At the same time, however – despite the fact that there was no child 
involved in the Balogh story – the expert also placed a special focus on children as victims 
in her discursive construction of domestic violence: “we simply do not belong to the club 
of civilised countries as long as we question to any extent the right of women and children 
to live their lives in peace, safety, free of physical, emotional, or sexual violence” 
(emphasis mine). This wording testifies that a children-focused understanding of domestic 
                                                 
66 This change also allowed RTL Klub to shift the focus from the perpetrator to the victim and – given that 
Balogh's current girlfriend did not want to talk to the press – to present long excerpts from a 40-minute-
long interview with Balogh's ex-wife, who claimed that Balogh had repeatedly beaten her, too, during 
their 25-year-long marriage (footage that I discuss in more detail below). 
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violence, originally formed in the Hungarian mediated public sphere in 2002 and explored 
in Chapter 4, was still embraced by Hungarian feminists in 2013. In contrast to the feminist 
approach, FIDESZ understood domestic violence as being “directed against the weak, that 
is children, the elderly and women”. With this wording – as explained earlier – FIDESZ 
homogenised the different types of victims under the broader label of “the weak” and 
thereby shifted attention away from the gender aspect (it also, as pointed out earlier, 
refrained from expressing a clear message about Balogh's responsibility for the battering). 
These two discourses, however, were not given equal status or equal space on the news 
bulletins. TV2 gave significantly more space to the opinion of the NGO employee and 
presented it as expert knowledge, while the FIDESZ announcement was only given the 
status of a political opinion, although one that had been voiced by the political party that 
had the most power to influence the outcome of the case.  
 
6.3.2 Exposure through mediated intimacy: Self-narrated agency, responsibility and on-
screen emotion-management 
 
As mentioned earlier, the trigger for the scandal – and the focal point of the entire media 
coverage of the story – was the footage of an interview, conducted with Balogh and aired 
by the two commercial broadcasters on 29 April, in which they exposed the politician as 
both a woman-batterer and a liar, by confronting him in front of the cameras about the 
allegations of battering. Through exploiting the capacity of television to bring physically 
distant people into close intimacy with spectators through close-up images, broadcasters 
allowed spectators to scrutinise Balogh's conduct at close range, and thereby arrive at their 
own conclusions about his trustworthiness, moral integrity and credibility (or rather lack of 
these). In this section I explore these pieces of footage, with special attention to Balogh's 
on-screen transgressions of norms – which I have earlier identified as “second-order 
transgressions” (Thompson, 2000, p. 17) – which ultimately triggered the scandal, and 
which took the form of either hard-to-believe elements and contradictions in his own 
narrative about his responsibility, or violations of certain social norms that regulate 
emotional expression and/or on-screen conduct in general. I also discuss how, through 
close-ups and anchors’ summaries, the broadcasters oriented spectators’ attention to certain 
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elements of the footage that yielded further evidence that Balogh was lying. At the end of 
this section I compare Balogh's on-screen conduct with that of the victim – or, more 
specifically, an earlier victim of Balogh, as his current girlfriend did not speak with 
journalists – whom RTL Klub interviewed on 30 April (and subsequently repeatedly aired 
excerpts from that footage), and who came across on screens as a credible person. 
 On 29 April Balogh presented himself in front of the cameras as a tired, hard-bitten 
person with limited memory or knowledge, who had access to the events of the night of the 
crime only indirectly, through the contradictory accounts of his son and girlfriend. Balogh 
reported both versions to the two TV channels, but went into detail only about the version 
he allegedly heard from his son, according to which “our komondor dog, who weighs about 
80 kilos, and is unfortunately blind, became frightened of something, sprang at her 
[Balogh’s girlfriend], and pushed her over” (RTL Klub, Híradó, 29 April 2013): “the dog 
got frightened, that's what Szabi [Balogh's son] says, and as Terike [Balogh's girlfriend] 
entered the room with the tray in her hands, the dog sprang at her, and pushed her over” 
(TV2, Tények, 29 April 2013). At the same time Balogh did not reject his girlfriend's 
claims, according to which it was him who hit the woman, but recalled the girlfriend’s 
account with some visible unease and much more briefly: “she told me, too, when I asked 
her about what had happened, that I had hit her. But I do not remember” (RTL Klub). In the 
RTL Klub footage he claimed a total of  three times that he “did not remember” anything. 
Similarly, when the reporter on TV2, after asking him about the girlfriend’s account, 
directly confronted him in front of the cameras about whether he could imagine at all that 
he might have hit the woman, he again claimed lack of knowledge: “I don't remember, 
frankly, I don't remember” (TV2).  
 Besides the fact that Balogh's attempt to shift responsibility for his own actions to 
their family dog (not to mention his claim that he could not remember whether he had hit 
his girlfriend) was hard to believe, his conduct in the broader context of the interview was 
also shockingly inappropriate to the situation. This inappropriateness became particularly 
apparent in the RTL Klub interview, where Balogh, who had previously looked rather sad 
(an acceptable emotional state in such a situation) quickly and visibly warmed up when he 
was asked about the village wedding party that he attended just before the crime happened, 
and recounted with great pleasure and joviality the large number of drinks he had that 
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night: “and we were in a wedding party, too, we drank a little, I drank, too, three, four, 
five.... er.... shots of pálinka, and about, no, altogether three decilitres of wine, I didn't drink 
beer, because I didn't like the beer they served” (RTL Klub). In short, by apparently lying in 
front of the cameras, and by showing considerable pleasure in a situation where society 
would have rather expected regret, shame, sadness or fear for his hospitalised girlfriend, 
Balogh violated not only the rules of appropriateness (Bucy 2011), but also feeling rules, 
that is rules that regulate the socially approved ways of expressing and managing emotions 
in a given situation (for the latter see Hochschild, 1983, p. 64). Combined with the hard-to-
believe komondor story, these mistakes chipped away at his credibility almost immediately, 
exposed him to public ridicule, and made him an object of public embarrassment and 
outcry in the country. 
 While both TV channels clearly made efforts to report on the events with 
objectivity,  they – especially RTL Klub – had already discredited Balogh to some extent 
even before the MP appeared on screen. First of all by the brief summary of the story that 
the anchor of RTL Klub gave at the very beginning, just after the audience was informed 
that Balogh had been accused, and his girlfriend hospitalised with a broken nose: “The MP 
has informed us that he had drunk a lot that evening, does not remember anything, but in 
his view it is their blind komondor dog who is responsible for everything”. While this was 
a more or less accurate summary of Balogh's words, by condensing all the relevant pieces 
of information into one short sentence the shock value of the komondor dog was increased 
and the absurdity of Balogh's explanation highlighted. The other point where RTL Klub 
hinted at some suspicion regarding Balogh's credibility was at the very end of the 
interview, when the reporter confronted him with the oddity of his story: “Well, that’s kind 
of a strange story, isn’t it?”. Furthermore, both TV channels pointed out the injuries to 
Balogh's hands (both in the voiceover and by showing close-ups), although both of them 
quickly added Balogh's explanation according to which “he obtained these while cooking 
stew”. With these tactics the TV channels were able further to enhance spectators' suspicion 
(in case they were still in doubt) towards Balogh's credibility, and to orient their  attention 
towards available visual and audiovisual proofs that the politician was lying. These early 
news items, by uncovering Balogh’s lies in front of the cameras, had a major role in putting 
a perpetrator of domestic violence at the centre of public attention and suspicion, and 
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thereby practically triggered the scandal. 
 Whereas the earliest news reports focused intensively on the perpetrator, and 
moreover Balogh's girlfriend throughout the entire case remained strongly reluctant to be 
interviewed, RTL Klub on its evening news bulletins on 30 April and 1 May managed to 
shed some light on the story from the victim’s perspective, too. The broadcaster presented 
long excerpts from an interview, originally 40 minutes long, with Balogh's ex-wife, who 
thereby practically became a substitute for his girlfriend in the victim role. She not only 
talked about her painful experiences during her 25-year-long marriage to Balogh, but was 
also presented by the anchors as an insider witness, that is someone who “claims that she 
knows the man [Balogh] better than anyone else”. Endowed with such high authority, the 
ex-wife, who looked a well-groomed, decent and intelligent woman capable of speaking 
about her painful memories in a reserved and easy-to-follow manner – that is, in high 
contrast with Balogh, a credible person – not only went into shocking details in front of the 
cameras about one of the many instances of physical abuse she had suffered from Balogh 
when one night he had beaten her with an aluminium kettle and she had had to flee, but 
verified the experiences of Balogh's current girlfriend, too, by claiming, as one of the 
anchors reported her words, that the girlfriend “had been seen many times in the village 
with a black eye or a broken nose”. Anchors also reported that the ex-wife had warned the 
girlfriend, “but the woman allegedly did not believe her”. Apart from this minor sign of 
doubt that the use of the word “allegedly” indicates in the anchors’ account, the TV channel 
did not question in any sense the credibility of the ex-wife, and generally used her as a 
reliable person in a position of authority to further underpin the suspicion raised against 
Balogh – thereby creating a discourse of righteous victimhood around the story. 
Furthermore, this footage, by presenting a credible, trustworthy person in the victim 
position, was also able to engage spectators with the victim’s suffering and provoke 
compassion – this although the general direction of the scandal pointed towards a focus on 
Balogh, the perpetrator, the public emotions associated with his perpetrator status, and also 
the boundaries of public morality in the face of violence. 
 
6.3.3 Political-party-related incident or broader social issue? How the broadcast news 
media covered public actions against domestic violence 
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Ultimately FIDESZ, by making Balogh resign from its parliamentary group on 2 May 
2013, managed to distance itself from the MP who had fallen under suspicion, and as a 
consequence the party-political context of the case decreased to the extent that the 
newsworthiness of the Balogh incident significantly fell. Accordingly, the political protests 
organised by both feminists and opposition parties were largely not covered by any of the 
major TV channels, since these protests mostly fell beyond the period (from 29 April to 2 
May) when media attention was still high. During these four days, RTL Klub and TV2 
reported on two cases where opposition politicians came out against Balogh (they wanted 
him to resign from his MP role completely), but the demonstration organised by feminist 
activists on 16 May and the protests of opposition parties after the 2 May, in which they 
called for a purification of  parliament from domestic violence perpetrators and the 
intervention of the Hungarian state against domestic violence, were not covered by any of 
the major news media outlets in my sample. The one and only exception was a 
demonstration in Parliament by a feminist NGO on 6 May, on which RTL Klub reported, 
and in which activists were portrayed as calling on Balogh to step down and on the 
government to ratify the Istanbul Convention. Media outlets also ignored the anti-
domestic-violence actions of FIDESZ, namely that on 10 May the governing party quickly 
presented in Parliament the Bill on Partner Violence, discussed it four days later and passed 
it on 10 June 2013. In brief, due to the rapid fall-off in media attention to the Balogh story 
after 2 May, the majority of social actions against domestic violence were ignored by the 
mainstream broadcast news media. Once Balogh’s ties to the ruling party FIDESZ had 
been visibly loosened, the media lost interest in covering the additional, domestic-violence-
related aspects of the story.  
 
 In summary, while M1 completely ignored the Balogh scandal until 2 May, RTL 
Klub and TV2 dedicated considerable attention to it, and covered it along roughly the same 
lines. After an initial focus on the perpetrator and his lies, on the second day both TV 
channels switched to a domestic-violence-focused portrayal, and they then stayed with this. 
Moreover, both TV channels unambiguously embraced a gender-based notion of domestic 
violence, repeatedly presented information on domestic violence from feminist sources as 
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expert knowledge, and thereby implicitly took a stand against the rather gender-neutral 
notion of the issue that FIDESZ had promoted right from the start. RTL Klub even 
presented a reliable person in the victim's position and thereby introduced a discourse of 
righteous victimhood in the media portrayal of the story. Nonetheless, constructions of 
violence that sidelined the gender aspect, and shifts of responsibility away from the 
perpetrator, repeatedly appeared on screens, typically voiced by elected officials or 
members of Balogh's party. 
 Although RTL Klub put considerable effort into engaging spectators with the 
victim’s suffering, by regularly presenting long excerpts from video footage in which they 
interviewed Balogh’s ex-wife about her experiences, spectators in general had more chance 
to develop emotional and moral engagements – negative ones – towards Balogh, the 
perpetrator. Since Balogh was effectively caught lying in front of the cameras, and these 
were very apparent and absurd lies, he was very early on constructed as an object of public 
ridicule, embarrassment, shame and outcry. However, despite the facts that the Balogh 
scandal started as a story about an MP battering his girlfriend and the two largest national 
TV channels (RTL Klub, TV2) subsequently dedicated considerable attention to the issue of 
domestic violence in their coverage of the story, media attention quickly fell away after 
Balogh's ties with the ruling party FIDESZ were apparently – but not factually – loosened. 
This, together with the fact that many subsequent domestic-violence-related developments 
(such as demonstrations and changes in legislation on the issue) that followed from the 
scandal were not covered by the TV channels in my sample, indicates that the story 
received high newsworthiness only as long as it seemed to affect the FIDESZ government.  
   
 
6.4 “Komondor Balogh” internet memes: Shaping mindsets, identifying 
transgressions 
 
In this section I discuss the “komondor Balogh” internet memes, understood as acts of 
bottom-up public commentary about the Balogh story in a satirical mode. Moreover, given 
that these memes were also instances of political humour, which typically targets specific 
transgressions of existing values and norms, I also understand these internet memes as a 
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device of critique, that is public acts or attempts to “regulate” or “correct” misbehaviour 
through satire and humour.  
 Specifically, “komondor Balogh” internet memes appeared within a short time after 
RTL Klub and TV2 exposed Balogh as a woman-batterer and a liar on 29 April 2013, and 
subsequently spread swiftly across media platforms. The day after Balogh’s exposure on 
television, Index.hu, one of the most popular online news magazines in Hungary, was 
already reporting an intensive meme circulation, and published 18 memetic variants from 
the series (see LB, 2013). 24.hu, another online news magazine, published ten “komondor 
Balogh” internet memes the same day, of which five overlapped with those on Index.hu 
(Panda, 2013). In the next couple of days the “komondor Balogh” internet memes made 
their way into practically all major online (and some off-line) news media outlets, and 
some even reached mainstream television. On 2 May TV2 re-mediated three of these on 
their prime-time evening news bulletin, as an illustration of the “embarrassment” that “the 
politician's explanation provoked in many people”. As of 2018 my collection, gathered 
from various sites on the Hungarian-language part of the internet, consists of altogether 40 
“komondor Balogh” memetic variants (37 still images and three videos). 
 Nearly all these memes – with the exception of only four – contain a komondor 
dog, mostly a blind one, as either an image (with blindness evidenced by dark glasses), or a 
text, or both. Moreover, all memetic variants take a stand against Balogh, that is, no 
“counter-current” items were produced, which in general indicates that there was relatively 
strong agreement in Hungarian society on the negative assessment of the story (for a 
counter-example, see Milner, 2013, where he discusses memetic variants pro and con 
Occupy Wall Street). Their guiding formatting principle, in line with Shifman's observation 
on internet memes in general, is either mimicry or remixing (2014, p. 20). The simplest 
variants are composed of just a textual overlay on Balogh’s picture or an image of a 
komondor dog, while others lack any textual components but come up with surprising 
juxtapositions, and still others are primarily inter-discursive and relate in complex ways to 
existing discourses, often remixing elements of pop culture. Regarding their object of 
criticism, they show a relatively high variety. The simplest ones seem to be nothing more 
than humorous visual mementos of the Balogh story. Others aim at highlighting and 
mocking diverse inconsistencies in Balogh’s narrative, while still others more noticeably 
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express outcry, dissatisfaction or distrust over the ways in which the FIDESZ government 
handled the case, but always blend their criticism with a satirical tone. These types of 
criticisms often overlap in individual memetic variants.  
 Since I am primarily interested in these memes as public commentaries on the 
Balogh scandal, in the rest of this section I discuss the various memetic variants in terms of 
their main objects of criticism, that is specifically which component of the Balogh story 
they mock satirically as a transgression of norms and values. Since this component of 
mockery is not particularly highlighted in the currently most-referenced literature on 
internet memes, although it does acknowledge the importance of satire in this multimodal 
media genre (Milner, 2013; Shifman, 2014), I borrow here from Tsakona and Popa's 
concept of political humour (2011), which considers critique the core function of the genre. 
They understand political humour as social correctives, that is, public discourse attempting 
to “regulate” or “correct” misbehaviour through humour. In this sense, I argue that the 
“komondor Balogh” memes are devices of critique: they form a public discourse that, 
through mocking certain elements of the Balogh story, politicises the issue of domestic 
violence in various ways.  With this criterion in mind, I have divided memetic variants into 
four groups: those mocking Balogh's lies and his attempt to shift responsibility to his dog; 
those mocking the fact that he had committed domestic violence; variants mocking 
governmental politics; and finally memes lacking such an apparent object of criticism, but 
which, I argue, can ultimately be considered as pointing to a national symbol of declining 
public morality. 
 
 The largest and relatively easily distinguished, group in my collection (nine of the 
40 memes) mocks the specific element of Balogh's fabricated story where the blind 
komondor dog took over the role of the perpetrator of battering, that is the element of a 
shift of responsibility (see Figure 1 in Appendix). These memetic variants come up with 
various satirical interpretations of what an abusive, constantly belligerent dog can look like 
– for example, in one of the videos there is a flying, blowsy komondor who attacks 
innocent passers-by from behind a car – or, by means of sharp juxtapositions, they place 
the blind komondor dog in surprising contexts, thereby creating absurd “battering” 
situations. In this latter subcategory, the dog typically appears next to people who are being 
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pushed, beaten up or killed (for example, next to football players who are pushing each 
other on a football field, or next to a beaten-up Rocky Balboa). One of the most popular 
memes, which uses a famous example of war-time photo-journalism, The Falling Soldier 
by Robert Capa, also belongs to this subcategory: the blind komondor is pasted in just 
behind the soldier, as the cause of his fall. This group does not comment on the specifically 
domestic-violence-related component of the scandal, and neither is there any indication in 
them of woman-battering or violence against women in general. Instead, violence is 
portrayed as incidental episodes of the use of physical force in public spaces (which are 
often explicitly “male spaces”, such as football fields, boxing rings or frontlines of war), 
and inflicted on predominantly male victims – in fact, what they depict is male (physical) 
violence against men. This is a very traditional understanding of violence, and is 
characteristically untouched by the feminist discursive constructions of the issue that, as I 
have discussed earlier, were relatively strongly present in the broadcast coverage of the 
Balogh scandal. 
 The second largest group in my sample (eight of the 40 internet memes), in sharp 
contrast with the first group, mocks Balogh as a perpetrator of domestic violence (see 
Figure 2). Accordingly, these memetic variants typically portray bizarre episodes from the 
“idyllic” family life of domestic violence perpetrators, as imagined on the basis of Balogh's 
narrative, for example, what playing “mummies and daddies” may look like in such a 
family, or a video depicting Balogh dancing with his girlfriend at a village wedding party 
and repeatedly and rhythmically slapping her face between dance steps. Some of these 
variants also mock Balogh's denial, and the fact that he had shown no sign of regret, for 
example, in a memetic variant where his head is pasted onto a half-naked muscular male 
body, the textual overlay reads “OK then, I've broken Terike's [Balogh's girlfriend’s] nose. 
And now what? The komondor dog was indeed blind”. Notably, if there is a victim 
portrayed in these memes, they are always women, either female family members (wives 
and girlfriends), or a young woman whose relationship with the perpetrator (Balogh) is not 
further specified, or a little girl playing “mummies and daddies” (that is, imitating the 
behaviour of adults in her own environment). Perpetrators, in turn, are nearly always male: 
in half of the memes the perpetrator is Balogh, in the rest the perpetrator is by turns a 
husband, a little boy, Adolf Hitler and a komondor dog whose gender is not explicitly 
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indicated (but probably male). This distribution of genders between victims and 
perpetrators shows that netizens predominantly understood domestic violence as 
committed by adult men against adult women, and even if children were in the images their 
abusive behaviour was portrayed as an imitation of adult life. In short, this group of 
internet memes unambiguously mocks the domestic violence component of the scandal, 
and understands this type of violence as male violence against women, strongly relying on 
available feminist discourses on the issue.  
 A third group of internet memes specifically targets governmental discourse and the 
ways in which the government handled the scandal (see Figure 3). For example, the remix 
of the “Keep Calm and Carry On” motivational poster originally produced by the British 
government in order to raise the public morale of the British population in preparation for 
the 2nd World War, re-interprets the original message of the poster as promoting the 
“morale” of FIDESZ and Balogh, encouraging them to “keep calm” and thereby sweep the 
matter under the carpet. Similarly, one of the most popular internet memes, which shows a 
panoramic view of one section of the Hungarian Parliament with MPs sitting in their seats 
and one of them, a male figure (probably Balogh?) with a blind komondor dog's head in 
place of his own, mocks Hungarian political culture as a space that tolerates perpetrators, 
and lets them stay in prominent positions. One of the internet memes in this group 
concretely references feminism: it shows the image of a komondor dog with a textual 
overlay that reads “I don't need feminism, only a good pair of glasses” and thereby mocks 
the government’s blindness to domestic violence and its repeated reluctance to come out 
against perpetrators, but also constructs domestic violence as a feminist issue. Therefore, 
these memes first of all reflect the implications of the Balogh story for Hungarian political 
life and the lack of a satisfactory public morality, and specifically the questionable ways in 
which the FIDESZ government had “handled” the case and the broader issue of domestic 
violence in general. 
 Finally, memetic variants in the fourth group contain only images of komondor 
dogs, with or without dark glasses (although the latter case is less frequent) (see Figure 4). 
Representatives of this group had already figured in the two early meme collections that 
Index.hu and 24.hu published on 30 April, showing how the komondor dog element of 
Balogh’s narrative very quickly acquired a central position, so that the image of a 
158 
komondor dog was understood by itself as meaningful enough to be circulated as a 
reference to Balogh. Their object of criticism, however, is less explicit, since the simplicity 
of these images implies a very open meaning structure, capable of embracing a vast range 
of meanings. As of 2018, the “komondor dog” is still understood as both a concrete 
reference to woman-battering and a national symbol on a more abstract level that 
encompasses a range of negative sentiments about Hungarian political life, including anti-
FIDESZ sentiments, dissatisfaction with the moral conduct of Hungarian politicians and 
disappointment at their corruptness (on these meanings, see Kárász, 2013; Nagy, 2015). 
Overall, these “komondor dog” memes quickly became a national symbol of a declining 
public morality – in other words, a strongly intertextual reference that, once this reference 
had been established, did not necessarily need to be anchored to a specific case. 
  In short, the “komondor Balogh” internet memes focused alternately on Balogh's 
violence, his attempt to ward off responsibility through denial, and the implications for 
Hungarian political life of the inadequate handling of the case by the government. Acts of 
physical violence were understood either as domestic violence (and as male violence 
against women), or as any type of physical violence between males in public places. This 
shows that producers and sharers of internet memes, when mocking types of violence 
within four walls, leaned towards accepting a gendered concept of domestic violence, that 
is one more in accordance with the feminist discourse than with the local conservative-
nationalist discourse promoted by the FIDESZ government. On the other hand, the large 
number of internet memes in which violence was portrayed as affecting mainly men in 
public places is indicative of a lack of awareness of domestic violence in general. To sum 
up, although the komondor Balogh internet memes expressed many critical voices on the 
Balogh story, including feminist and anti-violence voices, battering was not their exclusive 
focus. Rather, they articulated a public outcry over Balogh’s lack of moral integrity in 
general, and also served as a satirical counter-discourse to the government standpoint, and 
specifically its four-day delay in distancing itself from persons of questionable personal 
integrity or seeking to prevent perpetrators of violence from getting away with their crime. 
Ultimately, the memes even became a national symbol of declining public morality. 
Moreover, as mediated devices of bottom-up social and political critique in a satirical form, 
the “komondor Balogh” internet memes created a largely homogeneous emotional regime 
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around the incident: one of ridicule, outcry, indignation and embarrassment – public 
emotions that moved swiftly across a range of media platforms, and thereby powerfully 
”socialised” the public to an adequate emotional response to these events. 
 
 
6.5 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I have analysed the Balogh scandal as it unfolded in a complex media 
environment strongly affected by internet memes. I investigated selected extracts from 
three major news broadcasters across a period of peak coverage from 29 April to 2 May 
2013, and internet memes following Balogh’s public exposure on television on 29 April. 
Using a CDA framework that employs the analytical categories of lexical choices, 
allocation of responsibility, characterisation and context, I explored the ways in which 
domestic violence was constructed on screens in terms of the identity of the event, its 
actors (perpetrator and victim), proposals by the media for emotions associated with these, 
and also media proposals (or, rather, the lack of these) for social intervention on violence. 
Given that the actual trigger for the scandal was the perpetrator’s televised exposure as 
both a woman-batterer and a liar, I have dedicated special attention to these pieces of 
footage, and explored the specific ways in which Balogh violated certain norms that, in 
general, regulate politicians’ on-screen conduct through the “politics of trust”. The 
subsequent flow of internet memes, which I identify as having played a major role in 
bringing spectators to a common platform in relation to the events by shaping shared 
emotions and values with regard to Balogh’s transgressions, have been analysed as devices 
expressing bottom-up social and political critique, and, on the basis of their specific object 
of critique, I have identified four major meme groups. 
 Regarding the issue of domestic violence, news broadcasters, overall, were fairly 
explicit about what type of crime Balogh had committed. Although M1, the public service 
broadcaster under strong governmental control, ignored the story for a long time and was 
particularly obscure about the nature of Balogh's crime and his responsibility for it, the two 
commercial broadcasters very early on exposed Balogh to the public as a woman-batterer 
and a liar, and dedicated considerable attention to the battering element of the story, which 
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they understood as an instance of domestic violence. Moreover, both RTL Klub and TV2 
endorsed a feminist perspective on domestic violence: they repeatedly shared information 
on the issue from feminist sources that they presented as expert knowledge, and thereby 
implicitly took a stand against the notion of the issue that FIDESZ promoted from the start 
and which, in line with the party's nationalist-conservative agenda, attempted to sideline 
the importance of the  gender aspect. Internet memes, however, were more ambiguous in 
this respect, and produced considerable oscillation between gender-based and gender-
neutral understandings of violence. All in all, the broadcast media, at least its commercial 
segment, occupied a more feminist position on the issue than did the internet memes. 
Nonetheless, despite uncertainty on the gender aspect, the sheer fact that a perpetrator of 
domestic violence was located among the MPs of the ruling party remarkably raised the 
overall public visibility of domestic violence in the country, and, what is more, this was at a 
historic moment when the preparation of an important policy instrument against this type 
of violence had temporarily stalled in the Hungarian Parliament. The Balogh scandal, 
therefore, besides raising public attention to domestic violence, also re-introduced the issue 
to the public agenda after a couple of months of silence, even if the newsworthiness of the 
story quickly fell away after Balogh's party visibly loosened its ties with him. The majority 
of social actions against domestic violence were not covered by broadcasters because by 
then the political context of the case had started to fade.  
 In line with what has already been stated above, the focus of media attention 
remained steadily on Balogh, the perpetrator, throughout the entire media coverage of the 
case, despite the fact that commercial broadcasters, after their initial focus on his rank as an 
MP and his public exposure, quickly switched to a more domestic-violence-focused and 
victim-focused portrayal. They dedicated considerable coverage to the discussion of the 
broader issue of domestic violence, and one broadcaster (RTL Klub) even interviewed one 
of Balogh’s victims, and portrayed her in terms of a righteous victimhood, i.e. as a 
trustworthy and credible person, in connection with whom questions about her complicity 
in her own victimisation do not arise. However, the ways in which Balogh's identity was 
constructed on screen through his exposure on television – that is, as someone whose 
attempts to conceal his crime with the help of absurd and ridiculously apparent lies violated 
rules of appropriate conduct on many levels, and who, despite his prominent position, 
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completely lacked the skills to manoeuvre in the world of the media – offered the 
possibility of a much stronger emotional and moral engagement (even if a negative one), 
than what was available towards any other agents in the story including the suffering 
victim. At the same time, the fact that his perpetrator status was evidenced through his on-
screen conduct (he was obviously lying), also implied that the aspects of battering and 
lying merged in public responses to his exposure. This was well-reflected in the complexity 
of the komondor Balogh internet memes, which alternately mocked Balogh's violence, his 
obvious and absurd lies, and the implications of the case for Hungarian political life and 
public morality. But they all expressed, without doubt, a critique of the events, and thereby 
powerfully circulated public emotions of distrust, outcry, indignation and ridicule across 
media platforms. Overall, whereas the intensive focus on the perpetrator acted in favour of 
bringing attention to the boundaries of public morality and adequate emotional expression 
on violence, its drawback was that public discussion of the broader issue of domestic 
violence, including the gender aspect, around which governmental and feminist expert 
discourses spectacularly clashed, was pushed into the background.  
 All in all, the main legacy of the Balogh scandal was that, by focusing media 
attention on a high-profile perpetrator, it re-opened a nationwide public discussion of the 
boundaries of acceptable public conduct with regard to domestic violence, and asserted 
new boundaries. Moreover, for the first time in Hungary’s history, it created a largely 
homogeneous and unambiguously disapproving emotional regime around a perpetrator and 
his actions of domestic violence, and thereby intensively socialised the public to outcry, 
disgust, embarrassment, indignation and ridicule as adequate forms of emotional 
expression with regard to perpetrators. The fact that an MP of the ruling political party 
could became an object of these public emotions across the country – as evidenced by the 
intensive meme circulation – made it evident that by 2013 Hungarian society had become 
much less tolerant towards perpetrators of domestic violence than before. Unlike in 2002 
and 2010, when such a homogeneous emotional regime around perpetrators had not been 
created, either because the focus remained steadily on the victim of abuse (as discussed in 
Chapter 4) or because the perpetrator actively and repeatedly appealed for spectators’ pity 
and compassion and attempted to present himself as the “real victim” in the case (as 
discussed in Chapter 5), the Balogh scandal offered an unambiguous public response, in the 
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form of mediated public emotions, to an instance of domestic violence. Domestic violence 
thus not only emerged as a centre of public attention for a short period through this scandal, 
but also created certain social solidarities around the issue, by bringing spectators to a 
common platform with regard to violence. Unsurprisingly, following this scandal in 2013, 
domestic violence and other gender-based types of violence (most importantly sexual 
harassment and sexual violence) remained a focus of media attention, and the news media 
covered stories of this kind in growing number, despite the fact that “anti-gender” and 
“anti-feminist” governmental propaganda began to take a strong hold in the country. In the 
next and closing chapter, after summarising the main findings of this thesis and drawing 
conclusions, I discuss briefly these post-2013 developments, and give an overview of the 
political, legal and cultural contexts of these, and why additional research on the topic 
would be particularly beneficial. 
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7. Findings and Conclusions 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis explores the discursive emergence of domestic violence in the Hungarian media 
between 2002 and 2013. Specifically, it explores the role of the news media in constructing 
domestic violence in the public eye and in morally and emotionally engaging the public 
with the issue over the given time period. My research interest was triggered by the fact 
that in Hungary – as in many other EU member countries, and despite the fact that there 
was no large-scale feminist movement in the country – there was a major transformation in 
the social perception of the issue in the 2000s, but no research has hitherto discussed this 
transformation. Research was especially lacking in relation to the contribution of the media 
to this process, despite the fact that surveys have repeatedly indicated that it was primarily 
from the mass media that Hungarian citizens informed themselves about domestic violence 
(European Commission, 2010, p. 12; Gregor, 2014, p. 21).  
 After reviewing the broader feminist literature on the subject, it became evident that 
this scholarly ignorance about the role of the media in matters of domestic violence is not 
in fact country-specific, but is based on a chain of assumptions that are also evident on 
more general theoretical levels. Firstly, this neglect of the media seems to be endemic in 
the entire literature discussing domestic violence in the Central-Eastern European region 
(Dombos, Horváth & Krizsán, 2007; Fabian 2010c, 2014a, 2017; Krizsán, Paantjens & 
Lamoen, 2005; Krizsán & Popa, 2010, 2014; Krizsán & Roggeband, 2018a). This literature 
has mostly been restricted to the analysis of legislative and policy changes (a focus that 
reflected the primary goals of local feminist activism), and has tended to see these either as 
products of backstage negotiations between decision-makers and local advocates, or as 
outcomes of pressures from international and supranational institutions, in particular the 
European Union. In either case, the role of the media in the construction of domestic 
violence for the broader public has not been considered, still less explored in detail.  
 Secondly, and even more importantly, it also became evident that the broader 
feminist literature on the media portrayal of domestic violence tended to view the media in 
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terms of an institution of social control, at the expense of their potential role in fostering 
progressive change (see e.g. see e.g. Berns, 1999, 2001, 2004; Boyle, 2005, pp. 84-93; 
Braber, 2015; Bullock, 2007; Carll, 2003; Carter, 1998; Gillespie, Richards, Givens & 
Smith, 2013, Meyers, 1994, 1997; Nettleton, 2011; Sunindyo, 2004; Zeynep, 2006). This 
literature, which emerged in the 1990s and early 2000s in Anglo-Saxon countries, very 
convincingly points out how patriarchal discourses typically play out in the media portrayal 
of domestic violence, and how this contributes to the reproduction of gendered social 
inequalities and of a culture of violence. But I found that it did not address (or only 
occasionally addressed) the link between constructions of domestic violence and proposals 
for social or political action, despite historical evidence – including  from Hungary – that 
domestic violence in the media, even if mostly portrayed in terms of patriarchal norms, is 
sometimes capable of generating massive public outcry and of engaging broader publics 
with the issue, and in some cases has even led to public action being taken against 
violence. 
 Therefore, in contrast to these previous tendencies and assumptions, I decided to 
make the agency of media texts in facilitating societal change the focus of my research. 
More closely, I was looking for something that established a connection between changing 
conceptions of domestic violence and proposals for social action, without implying a causal 
connection between media discourse and societal change or assuming that society would 
automatically be changing because media discourses were changing. Instead, I accepted 
societal change as multi-factoral, and took historical changes in media discourse(s) as only 
one – although a relatively important and often-neglected – dimension of a broader matrix 
of societal change around domestic violence. As a first step towards such an approach, I 
have argued here that media texts shape the social perception of domestic violence through 
their agency in discursively constructing this type of violence in the public eye. Therefore, 
I reached out to the concepts of discourse and, in close connection with this, of mediation. 
I took domestic violence as inevitably relying on discourses (that is, meaning-making 
systems) in order to become at all meaningful  or to orient us towards others in the world. 
This was a key decision at the very beginning of my research, since I thus located my 
approach within the context of post-structural epistemologies, and more specifically 
Foucault (1969/1972, 1975/1977), and this decision also allowed me to analyse domestic 
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violence through the lens of historical changes in (mediated) discourses. I was able, 
thereby, to theorise discourse as a – historically and locally specific – productive 
technology of social practice, which on the one handsubjects people to certain forms of 
power, and on the other hand also provides them with “spaces of agency and possibilities 
for action” (Chouliaraki, 2008b, p. 675). Moreover, considering that domestic violence is a 
contested concept and typically shaped by several (feminist and non-feminist) discourses 
simultaneously, I complemented my Foucauldian notion of discourse with the concept of 
hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). 
 Also, by accepting that it is primarily the media that circulate these discourses 
within societies, I located my research within the context of mediation, a key critical 
concept that stresses the omnipresent and multidirectional influence of the media on our 
everyday life, by emphasising that the media not only reflect, but – through their symbolic 
power – also fundamentally shape and construct our perception of the social world 
(Couldry & Hepp 2013, Livingstone 2009;). I thereby pinpointed a theoretical angle from 
which domestic violence could be theorised as being inevitably mediated; that is, its social 
meaning is constantly shaped by discourses that are typically regulated by the media. These 
mediated discourse(s) on domestic violence, then, could be explored in the light of the 
various proposals made by the media for meaning-making, feeling and taking action with 
regard to domestic violence – capitalising on the insight that, with regard to human 
suffering, the media may serve as a means of moral education, that is a symbolic space 
where proposals for (acceptable) emotions and moral claims are part of the very process of 
articulation of discourses (Chouliaraki, 2006, 2008a). More closely, through the lens of this 
theoretical framework, mediated discourses of domestic violence could be investigated in 
terms of their use of language to articulate agency (i.e. by identifying actors in violence – 
perpetrator, victim – and their attributes and characterisation) and articulate emotions (i.e. 
specific feelings organised around these actors’ actions and personal attributes), thereby 
establishing normative claims concerning what is or is not right in the face of domestic 
violence, and what is the most appropriate course of action. This insight into the fact that 
meaning-making, feeling and taking action are closely intertwined in the articulation of a 
discourse served as a guiding principle in the formulation of my research questions. 
 I also needed a definition of domestic violence that I could accept as normative, that 
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reflected my own position regarding the object of my study, and from the perspective of 
which I could critically evaluate the emerging Hungarian discursive constructions that I 
was about to investigate. I took as a starting point Jeff Hearn's definition, according to 
which violence is always a form of social inequality regulated by a network of hidden and 
tacit assumptions within societies concerning “who is allowed to do what to whom” (1998, 
p. 15), wherein actions in pursuit of control/power over fellow human beings are always 
perceived differently along the violence–non-violence spectrum according to participants’ 
social standing (with the violence of superordinate groups typically receiving less attention 
and more easily passing as non-violence). I was able thereby to re-formulate domestic 
violence as a form of interpersonal, structural and also symbolic violence which strongly 
contributes to reproducing and naturalising existing social inequalities, so that these appear 
to be a kind of “second nature” (Bourdieu, 1998/2001). Although, on the basis of this 
formulation, domestic violence is capable, at least in principle, of exploiting any form of 
social inequality, I accepted the feminist claim that it is most commonly gender inequality 
that perpetrators of domestic violence take advantage of in order to gain power over their 
partners (although this often intersects with other social inequalities), given that 
romantic/intimate relationships are typically built on practices that are strongly guided by 
gendered norms. Kelly's notion of a continuum of violence (1988, pp. 74-137) also allowed 
me to theorise domestic violence as a prevalent form of violence against women. 
Following Johnson (1995) and Stark (2007), I also accepted that domestic violence – 
contrary to earlier understandings that focused on battering – is best understood, at least in 
modern societies, in terms of a calculated, instrumental, ongoing and cumulative abuse of 
power and control in relationships. The core component of this type of violence thus 
becomes coercive control, understood as a fundamental attack on the victim’s agency, that 
is exactly that quality that modern societies celebrate and expect from their adult members 
(Stark, 2007). 
 It was this theoretical framework that informed my main research question: “What 
specific discourses concerning domestic violence did the Hungarian news media use, 
combine and/or challenge between 2002 and 2013?”. I narrowed down my research to the 
time period between 2002 and 2013. On the one hand, until 2002 domestic violence had 
received only sporadic mentions in the Hungarian media (as demonstrated by statistics 
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from the archive of the Hungarian news agency MTI) (see Magyar Távirati Iroda, n.d.). On 
the other hand, the passage in 2013 of a Law on “Partner Violence”, which entered into 
force in the immediate aftermath of a domestic violence-related scandal extensively 
covered by the Hungarian media, seemed an ideal closing point, since this was a highly 
visible instance of media-related state intervention against domestic violence which 
officially acknowledged its status as violence. Moreover, given that, as explained above, I 
was interested in addressing the mediated discourses on domestic violence as articulating 
and regulating not only meanings but also emotions and moral claims – considering that 
discourses have the power to offer paradigmatic forms of relating to and acting upon 
oneself and others – I also reached out for additional theories to further underpin and fine-
tune my theoretical framework with special reference to the differing forms of emotions 
and moral norms articulated in mediated discourses on domestic violence in Hungary 
between 2002 and 2013. 
 First, I reached out to the concept of engaged publics and the today widely 
acknowledged facts that the portrayal of public issues by the media usually also creates 
some kind of emotional and/or moral engagement on spectators’ side, and that this 
engagement plays a crucial role in taking action on the given issue (see Dahlgren, 2009; 
Hall, 2005). This insight shaped my two supplementary research questions: “What forms of 
emotion and moral norms did the media discursively articulate with regard to the suffering 
of  the victims of domestic violence during this period?”; and, relatedly: “How did the 
media discursively activate certain moral and emotional proposals for engagement with  
victims and perpetrators, and, more generally, with regard to the issue of domestic 
violence?” These questions served in general to map the ways in which the media 
discursively regulate possible moral and emotional engagement with the issue of domestic 
violence, and the forms of social intervention following from these. Specifically, these 
questions enabled me to enquire into the ways in which media texts engage spectators with 
both victims and perpetrators (and occasionally benefactors), set norms of public conduct 
and/or feeling with regard to domestic violence, appeal to shared (moral, social and/or 
cultural) values and imagined communities, establish (or break with) social solidarities, 
and build (or deny) senses of belonging around the issue, and ultimately also the ways in 
which media texts, through engaged publics, occasionally lead to social and political 
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action. Given that this agency of media texts in discursively regulating spectators’ moral 
and emotional engagement with public issues and thereby contributing to social change had 
been under-researched in existing literature on domestic violence, I had to reach out for 
theories that already had a better-elaborated grasp of this agency of media texts, and to re-
conceptualise the media portrayal of domestic violence in the context of these.  
 Although the critical analysis of discourse, particularly discursive psychology, has 
always paid special attention to the ways in which affect is signified through linguistic 
choice, I needed theories specifically dedicated to the media. Theories of mediated 
suffering were particularly useful in this respect (Boltanski, 1999; Chouliaraki, 2006, 
2008a), but I also relied heavily on other theories, which, in brief, have from the 2000s 
onwards made emotions a focus of scholarly attention in media studies. Specifically, since 
the early 2000s the mediated public sphere has increasingly been thought of as also an 
“emotional public sphere”, that is a place where emotions are selected, constructed, 
managed and displayed publicly and often intertwined with political issues (Lunt & 
Stenner, 2005), and also a space of “affective economies”, that is where emotions are 
empowered and accumulated through the circulation of media texts (Ahmed, 2004, pp. 45-
46; Kuntsman, 2012; Papacharissi, 2015). Particularly useful in this regard was research 
that has specifically studied news discourse in terms of its potential for engaging publics 
emotionally and/or morally with major events involving human suffering (such as reporting 
on natural or man-made disasters, or the violent death of public figures), and thereby 
establishing (national or global) citizenship around the issue (see e.g. Pantti, 2001; Pantti & 
van Zoonen, 2006), as well as media research on humanitarian discourse and its power to 
engage “people's potential to care” (Chouliaraki, 2010, 2015). These theories, overall, 
offered me a theoretical framework for thinking about domestic violence in the media as a 
discursively constructed public discourse where meaning-making, emotions and normative 
claims are closely intertwined.  
 Given that I was primarily interested in discursive constructions and their change 
over time, the choice of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough) as a method was an 
obvious one. Faircloughian CDA has allowed me to apply the Foucauldian notion of 
discourse (1969/1972, 1975/1977) and that of hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001) to 
concrete texts, to investigate discursive change in these, and, through historical 
169 
comparisons, to draw conclusions about long-term shifts in the social meaning of domestic 
violence in the Hungarian media between 2002 and 2013. Considering that CDA typically 
makes ample reference to the context of the discourses under study (Meyer, 2001, p. 15), 
combining CDA with a multiple case-study design seemed a natural match. I applied CDA 
to some data-rich cases selected on the basis that they achieved an exceptionally high level 
of media coverage in the given period – and which thereby, due to their high public 
visibility, had the greatest chance of generating a change in the social meaning of domestic 
violence in the country. I was thereby able to grasp three key moments of the domestic 
violence story in the Hungarian media: the moments of i) acknowledging the existence of 
domestic abuse; ii) gendering domestic violence in the public eye, and iii) clarifying the 
boundaries of public conduct with regard to domestic violence.  
 I also restricted my analysis to television news, given that, according to numerous 
studies, television is still today the most influential medium across the world, including in 
Hungary. In addition, in order to address the fast-changing media environment that 
Hungarian television was a part of between 2002 and 2013, and the implications of this 
change in the dominant forms and platforms of mediation through which domestic violence 
was mediated, I added a third supplementary question: “How might the historical changes 
in media ecology have also contributed to changing the discourses on domestic violence in 
the Hungarian media?” This question was important because during the 2000s the 
Hungarian media environment gradually became more complex. With first commercial 
broadcasting and a concomitant infotainment-driven news reporting style and local 
celebrity culture gaining hold, and then interactive and online media becoming stronger 
and expanding considerably, it was logical to assume that the place of television news 
discourses in this media ecology may also have gone through some modification through 
increasing interaction with other media genres and platforms. Changes in media ecology 
also provided a justification for complementing my focus on television news stories with 
additional media materials, as case-specific media-ecology-related contexts (but at the 
same time keeping television as a focal point of my study). I gave specific consideration to 
coverage of my selected cases in: the print media (the tabloid Blikk and the left-wing 
political daily Népszabadság) in 2002; celebrity-related infotainment programmes in 2010, 
and internet memes in 2012-2013. This allowed me to present three snapshots of domestic 
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violence cases mediated by television in three different, historically specific media milieus.  
 On the other hand, my research intentionally did not address political changes in the 
media environment, although these were fundamental in the 2010s. The gradual 
transformation of the entire Hungarian media landscape after 2010 – when a new political 
regime started to gradually establish itself in the country and spectacularly increased 
government control over the media – first resulted in qualitative change only in 2015, 
which fell outside my period of investigation.  
 Given the above considerations, I carried out a CDA-based multiple case study, 
exploring my three cases through a threefold set of analytical frameworks. I investigated 
discourses in terms of: naming (that is terms or names that the media employed to describe 
and construct types of violence, including the characterisation of these specific types of 
violence, and –  if there were any – references to their social prevalence); agency (that is 
the portrayal of the actors in violence – perpetrator, victim – their attributes and 
characterisation), and emotions (that is proposals by the media regarding appropriate forms 
of emotion and moral claims with regard to these actors’ actions and personal attributes). I 
also explored, if there were any, the articulation of normative claims concerning the most 
appropriate course of action with regard to domestic violence, and specific links to social 
actors taking action.  
 
 
7.2 Key findings 
 
7.2.1 The Kitti Simek Case (2002): Acknowledging abuse 
 
The “Simek case”, a shocking case of adolescent parricide (that is, the killing of a parent 
by a teenage perpetrator) discussed in Chapter 4, has a specific role in my narrative as, I 
argue, it was through this crime news story that domestic violence was originally brought 
to public attention in Hungary. Given that the focus of media attention shifted very early 
from the act of murder to the preceding abuse that the underage perpetrator (the 14-year-
old girl Kitti Simek) had suffered from the parent-victim (her stepfather), the roles of 
victim and perpetrator were soon re-distributed between the teenager and the parent, and a 
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new discourse emerged: one that was specifically shaped for articulating and making 
meaningful the abuse element of the events, instead of the usual focus on the element of 
homicide. Accordingly, I argue, the main legacy of this case was that it brought public 
attention to abuse occurring in citizens’ intimate and private life and acknowledged this as 
a type of violence. Hungarian society until then had been largely ignorant of violence 
within families, and tended to see it – with the exception of its most extreme forms – as a 
legitimate form of exercising control over family members (as demonstrated by a large-
scale survey launched in the country a couple of years earlier, see Tóth 1999a). In contrast 
with this earlier perspective, the abuse that 14-year old Kitti Simek had endured was named 
by media outlets as an instance of “child abuse”, “domestic violence” or “terror in the 
family” – the last two taken from two earlier, ground-breaking Hungarian feminist 
publications on domestic violence (Morvai 1998; Tóth 1999a) – all terms indicating a type 
of violence occuring within four walls, in intimate/family relationships. I explored this case 
through selected extracts from three major news outlets – the public service broadcaster 
MTV1, the left-wing political daily Népszabadság and the tabloid Blikk – across a period of 
peak coverage in September 2002. 
 My main findings are that the status of victim was mostly assigned to the teenage 
girl exclusively, most importantly excluding the mother, who, like her daughter, suffered 
decade-long abuse. The abuse was constructed so that its sexual component received 
disproportionately high media attention. The teenage girl, who was practically granted a 
monopoly over the position of victim, was portrayed – until a major turn in the media 
coverage of the story changed her public image – in positive terms (good-natured, 
amicable) and also as strongly marked by her vulnerability, and therefore as a subject 
particularly worthy of sympathy, compassion, understanding and help. Detailed 
descriptions of the girl's suffering and the stressing of the irrevocability of her emotional 
and physical injuries were particularly likely to provoke compassion and pity, especially 
initially. At the same time, media texts created a monster-like personality for her abusive 
stepfather, and thereby depicted him as clearly an outsider from society. With these 
discursive constructions, media texts effectively created a black and white discourse on 
domestic violence that activated strong positive emotions towards victims, while at the 
same time encouraging condemnation of perpetrators’ violence. Disgust and 
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embarrassment were particularly highlighted as appropriate emotional responses to the 
sexual abuse perpetrated by the stepfather and spectators were thus intensively socialised to 
what would be the socially “approved” emotional reaction to child sexual abuse in general.  
 On the other hand, I argue, depicting the stepfather as a monster-like personality 
also had profoundly negative implications for the overall media portrayal of the case: 
removing the perpetrator from mainstream society meant that his abusive behaviour was 
also not seen as a feature of mainstream society, but instead presented as exceptional rather 
than prevalent, and the coverage thereby failed to highlight its social context. The tabloid 
media in particular constructed the domestic violence as mostly rooted in the perpetrator's 
specific deviance and, therefore, as an individual problem. In this type of portrayal, 
understandably, neither the high social prevalence of the issue, nor the spectrum of 
behaviour that connects “normal” people with perpetrators was investigated. Instead the 
focus was on “exotic” details presented in a sensationalist manner. With these distancing 
discursive tactics that put a distance between violence and spectators, the tabloid media 
texts – besides shaping the case so that it conformed to a voyeuristic type of consumption – 
implicitly portrayed domestic violence in terms of the received grand narratives of 
violence: that is, as if only people on the edges of society would behave in this way (on 
these narratives, see Walby, 2012, pp. 96-97). Not least, the tabloid media texts also thus 
activated a very common way of portraying domestic violence, already intensely criticised 
in Anglo-American feminist literature as a type of portrayal that contributes to a culture of 
violence (see Berns, 1999, 2001, 2004; Boyle, 2005, pp. 84-93; Braber, 2015; Bullock, 
2007; Carll, 2003; Carter, 1998; Gillespie, Richards, Givens & Smith, 2013, Meyers, 1994, 
1997; Nettleton, 2011; Sunindyo, 2004; Zeynep, 2006). The public broadcaster MTV1 and 
the political daily Népszabadság, however, employed a more socially engaged approach, 
repeatedly attempting to call attention to the high social prevalence of child abuse and 
domestic violence in Hungarian society. 
 Overall, the increased focus on the child as victim in the case strongly pushed the 
entire meaning of the element of abuse in the direction of child abuse and child sexual 
abuse, although of the three media outlets in my sample only one (MTV1) explicitly 
embraced this interpretation. The other two media outlets (Népszabadság and Blikk) 
employed cognate terms; specifically, Népszabadság consistently referred to the case as an 
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instance of “domestic violence” and repeatedly emphasised that this type of violence 
affects mainly women and children, while Blikk used the terms “physical and emotional 
terror” and “terror in the family” (without commenting on the main victims). This 
oscillation of terms, together with the contradictions and inconsistencies they brought into 
the general media portrayal of the story, I argue, shows how back in 2002 domestic 
violence, understandably, was far from having an established discourse in the country. The 
new discourse that started to emerge was mostly focused on domestic abuse in general (that 
is, violence committed within a domestic relationship, by an intimate partner or another 
family member), which proved to be a very broad and loosely-defined discursive object. 
Moreover, as previously indicated, the media portrayals showed a strong tendency to give 
priority to the age-related aspects of the victimisation. In this way other, similarly 
widespread, types of domestic abuse that typically exploit gendered inequalities, such as 
male violence against female intimate partners – in this  case Kitti's mother – were 
marginalised and mostly ignored during the media coverage of this story. Thereby a 
discourse of gender-neutral victimhood emerged. 
 This increased focus on a child-victim – that is someone who, due to her age, could 
not be held responsible for her own victimisation – had, overall, ambiguous implications 
for the general media portrayal of the case. On the one hand, and on the positive side, it 
did, at least initially, keep the coverage of the case entirely free of victim-blaming 
discourses – shifts of responsibility for their own victimisation from perpetrators to 
victims, which is a frequent discursive counter-move in portrayals of domestic violence, 
and which serves, among other things, to question, blur or conceal the violence aspect of 
domestic violence. The element of abuse was acknowledged as a type of violence (even if 
not necessarily a gendered type of violence) without any specific difficulty, and – after 20 
September, when feminist activists launched a petition against domestic violence – it was 
possible to mobilise  relatively wide social support against this “new” type of violence. On 
the other hand, because of this intense focus on innocent and vulnerable child-victims, 
other victims who did not conform fully to this description could be marginalised or even 
publicly stigmatised. This became particularly evident when the teenage girl’s public image 
underwent a major tranformation in the media, roughly a week after the news broke. She 
had not shown the emotions that society expected from somebody who had just murdered a 
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parent and as a consequence was no longer deemed able to fulfil the role of the “good 
victim”. Similarly, I found that at a later date, when domestic violence was further re-
fashioned in the Hungarian media in order to be deemed worthy of social intervention, the 
focus on children as cultural emblems of innocence and vulnerability intensified.  
 So the discursive object that emerged through this novel discourse in 2002 in 
Hungary, and was named, alongside other terms, as domestic violence, conformed only 
partially to feminist constructions of domestic violence. Most notably, while it was 
successfully presented as a type of violence, its specific connection to gender remained 
unacknowledged. Ironically, as I point out, the focus on children was also embraced by 
local feminist activists, who called for – and successfully mobilised – wider social support 
for the criminalisation of this type of violence. One of the takeaways from the Simek case, 
therefore, was the fact that wider social support for the issue could be successfully 
mustered only if the focus was on children. This approach, however, raised serious 
questions regarding the concealment of other social groups as victims. Moreover, the 
ambiguous ways in which the media reported on the feminist activists’ petition against 
domestic violence indicated that during this initial period the news media remained 
sceptical about the relevance of (feminist) civic bottom-up actions against domestic 
violence, and instead saw only the state as a competent social actor. 
 Within this context, I would like to further argue that the emergence of the Simek 
case, with its strong focus on hitherto “hidden” violent aspects of citizens’ intimate and 
family lives, also coincided with a shift in Hungary towards the rise of mediated intimacy 
in the country – that is, a growing abundance of media representations of intimate 
relationships – and thereby followed a trend first observed in Anglo-American media 
cultures in the 1990s (Barker, Gill & Harvey, 2018, pp. 24-26). This trend – usually 
described as a rise in the confessional and personalising tendencies of the media, and 
traditionally linked to the advent of media genres focusing on citizens’ intimate lives, such 
as reality TV shows, reality dating shows or celebrity-related broadcasting genres – placed 
intimate life at the heart of media representations (Pantti, 2011; Pantti & van Zoonen, 
2006). In Hungary, this shift was primarily enabled by the launch of national commercial 
broadcasters with the new Media Law in in 1997 (see Bajomi-Lázár & Monori, 2007; 
Terestyéni, 2007). Commercial broadcasters introduced novel types of infotainment and 
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entertainment-oriented programmes including reality TV shows – as I point out, the launch 
of the first reality TV show, a localised version of Big Brother, coincided almost to the day 
with the breaking of the news about the Simek story (which, in turn, was shaped into a 
daily live soap opera by Blikk). Therefore, I suggest, media attention to the violent aspects 
of the Simeks’ intimate and family life – besides benefitting from the high newsworthiness 
that female and underage perpetrators traditionally enjoy across the Western world – should 
also be understood in the context of this broader shift that Hungarian television went 
through in the early 2000s in the direction of a previously unseen increase in media 
representation of intimate relationships and citizens’ private lives. The Simek case, which 
made public a large amount of private information about the abuse, gave the broader 
Hungarian public an unprecedented insight into the nature of violence in families.  
 As an instance of mediated intimacy, the Simek case was also highly vulnerable to 
voyeuristic types of media consumption, which previously had been enabled only by the 
tabloid print media in the country and their sensation-seeking modes of news delivery. In 
my study, the tabloid media were represented by Blikk, in 2002 the largest tabloid 
newspaper in Hungary, which developed the story into a daily real-life soap opera, rich in 
personal details that violated the victim’s rights to privacy on many levels. Violations of the 
Simeks’ privacy, however, extended beyond the tabloid media: not only Blikk, but also the 
public service broadcaster MTV1 revealed the victim’s full identity, including her face and 
full name, and also let her appear in front of the cameras, where she – unaware of the 
potential negative consequences of media exposure – willingly gave interviews, and even 
talked at length about both the crime that she had committed and the abuse that she had 
suffered previously. By this, media outlets repeatedly violated certain general ethical norms 
regarding how abused children should be portrayed in the media. I conclude that this shows 
how the majority of the Hungarian news media was unprepared for the phenomenon of an 
underage perpetrator-victim, and did not handle the situation with the required 
responsibility and self-restraint. The only media outlet in my sample that never interviewed 
the teenage girl, and that generally tried to refrain from directly exposing her to public 
attention, was Népszabadság, a political daily. However, after a week even Népszabadság 
gave up this strategy as pointless and published the girl’s full name and photograph, which 
by then were well-known to the whole country. This shows how a solitary attempt at 
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ethical reporting on victims of abuse proved ineffective when not backed up by the broader 
national media environment in relation to the portrayal of similar cases.  
 
7.2.2 The Roland Damu Case (2010): Gendering domestic violence  
 
After long years of silence following the Simek case in 2002, the next high-profile case of 
domestic violence in the country occurred in 2010, when soap opera actor and TV 
personality Roland Damu was outed as having abused his ex-fiancée. The main issue at 
stake in this case was, as I argue in Chapter 5, the re-defining of domestic violence – which 
had previously, as already mentioned, been mostly constructed as gender-neutral and as 
affecting mostly children – to include the gender aspect. Specifically, this case was relevant 
because it shed public light on the “everyday face” of male violence against female 
intimate partners, which traditionally had evaded the attention threshold of the media (see 
e.g. Meyers, 1995, 1997; Carter, 1998). In this respect, the story, in terms of its 
newsworthiness, benefited from Damu’s existing televisual fame in the tabloid segment of 
the Hungarian media. This accumulated prominence, I suggest, was possible only in the 
televisual celebrity culture characteristically tied to commercial broadcasters and their 
tabloidised current affairs agenda and to the rise of mediated intimacies, which had slowly 
and steadily established itself in the country over the previous decade. The story remained 
newsworthy for a prolonged period (a year and a half), so the broader public was able to 
keep following its unfolding in the public arena, including the news of the perpetrator 
finally being sentenced to imprisonment. Hence, I suggest, through the Damu case the 
Hungarian news media successfully raised attention to domestic violence as gendered, and 
also to the fact that it was against the law (irrespective of the fact that in 2010-2012 
domestic violence was not yet a separate entry in the Hungarian Criminal Code). On the 
other hand, I also identify some problematic points where media outlets closed down 
certain possibilities of challenging patriarchal assumptions about this type of violence. In 
line with the main focus of my thesis, I analyse the Damu case through selected extracts 
from three major national broadcasters (M1, RTL Klub, TV2). 
 A shift towards genderedness was most spectacularly present in the current affairs 
programmes of the two national commercial TV channels (RTL Klub, TV2), which 
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specifically dealt with the issue of “domestic violence” (named as such) apropos of the 
Damu story; and also in the shifts that occurred between the two trials in the labels and 
names by which news media outlets referred to Damu’s violence. The most important 
aspect of these current affairs programmes was the fact that, by consistently referring to 
perpetrators as “husbands”, “ex-husbands” or “boyfriends” and victims as “women” or 
“abused women”, they unambiguously constructed domestic violence as male violence 
against female intimate partners. These programmes primarily aimed to refute some 
popular misconceptions about the issue – primarily victim-blaming – with the help of 
feminist experts (the embeddedness of expert knowledge in feminist discourses, however, 
tended to be concealed on screens. Therefore, the opportunity to connect domestic violence 
to the issue of inequality between the sexes in societies was missed). At the same time, 
however, the names and labels employed in media texts elsewhere in relation to Damu's 
violence showed the particular connection to gender only during two major shifts in 
terminology, when the initial and widespread use of legal discourse – which offered mostly 
gender-neutral terms, such as “severe assault” and “illegal restraint” – was temporarily 
replaced by discourses on “rape” and “domestic violence” (where both terms were 
unambiguously constructed as male violence against women). Nonetheless, I argue, 
whenever the constraints of legal discourse were left behind, the terminology moved 
towards characteristically gendered types of violence, which was indicative of the fact that 
the issue of gender indeed played a significant role in the discursive change taking place 
around domestic violence in 2010-2012 in Hungary.  
 On the other hand, the legal terminology that media texts predominantly used, 
especially initially, to describe Damu's violence dissected the process of his violence into 
separate and one-off acts of (mostly) physical force and thereby wiped out exactly those 
characteristics of intimate partner violence that relevant literature had been stressing since 
the mid-1990s: its nature as an ongoing and cumulative abuse of power and control in 
relationships, with coercive control at its core, that is an oppressive tactic with which 
perpetrators characteristically target their victims’ agency (Johnson, 1995; Stark, 2007). 
The notion of coercive control was present on screens only sporadically, in the account 
given by Tímea, the victim, or indirectly through the frequent “why did she stay?” 
question, which occupied a central place in the media discussion of this news story. The 
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centrality of this question also shows that, along with acknowledging the importance of 
gender in this type of violence and the emergence of female adults – that is, actors with 
apparent agency – as the main victims, discourses of victim-blaming which, for reasons 
discussed earlier, were not present in 2002, also emerged with particular intensity. 
 The discourse on agency and victimhood emerged as central in the coverage of the 
story. This was present either in the form of direct victim-blaming – which was particularly 
strong in the two 20-minute-long interviews that Tímea gave, but also in the long excerpt 
that one of the broadcasters aired from the footage of the plea by Damu's barrister during 
the second trial. In an indirect form this was most apparent when experts appearing on 
current affairs magazine programmes reflexively pointed out the existing victim-blaming 
aspects of the coverage, and attempted to map the potential reasons why women might stay 
in abusive relationships and put up with the ongoing abuse. With this, I suggest, these 
programmes addressed important questions that until then had been undiscussed publicly. 
Still, the “why did she stay” question continued repeatedly to place the focus of attention 
back on women who stay, instead of mapping the motivations, gains and oppressive tactics 
of perpetrators who abuse. Therefore, I argue, one of the focal points of the media coverage 
remained the question of why women “let themselves be abused”, which – as previous 
literature had already pointed out – opens up a vast symbolic space for victim-blaming 
discourses (e.g. Berns, 1999, 2001, 2004). All in all, although domestic violence was 
unambiguously constructed as gender-based and characteristically affecting women, there 
was an increased focus on women's enigmatic susceptibility to this type of violence, and 
their specific lack of the agency required to stand up to it – it was a discourse of complicit 
victimhood that emerged around the case, with an increased focus on adult women's alleged 
contribution to their own victimisation. Thereby an important aspect of the issue was left 
unexplained.  
 Another important aspect of the case was the fact that the status of the perpetrator, 
Damu, as a soap actor and TV personality – someone whose fame relied on a local 
televisual celebrity culture – did shape the media coverage of the case considerably on 
many levels. This case therefore allowed me to explore the specificities of how domestic 
violence was mediated through this celebrity-news-oriented segment of the Hungarian 
broadcast news media – a segment fundamentally shaped by mediated intimacies and a 
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increased focus on private life (see Bennett, 2008; Bennett & Holmes, 2010; Rojek, 2001; 
Turner, 2004). I argue that, as a celebrity, Damu’s on-screen public persona was on many 
levels already a product of media genres and texts that focused on his private life (both 
“real-life” and fictional). Therefore, understandably, after the news of his domestic 
violence story broke, media outlets had ample opportunity – through reaching back to 
earlier footage about him – to shed additional light on Damu as a private individual, by 
placing the domestic violence story in the context of an already existing set of media 
representations about his private exploits. Meanwhile, due to his excellent contacts with the 
media industry, the actor was able to launch a media campaign to redeem his public image 
and present himself as someone worthy of compassion and trust.  
 Damu's celebrity status added greatly to the newsworthiness of his story, but 
exposed the entire case to tabloidisation and thereby shifted media attention from its social 
relevance. The story became steadily confined to the news platforms of commercial 
broadcasters and the tabloid press, and was not covered by more serious media outlets, 
including the public service segment of the Hungarian news media (the public-service 
broadcaster consistently ignored the story until the final verdict was out). Therefore the 
task of mapping the social relevance of the case fell, paradoxically, on exactly those media 
outlets (the two major commercial broadcasters) whose interest was in  keeping the story 
tabloidised. In fact, the media coverage of the Damu case was in many respects similar to 
that of the Simek case: both cases were fundamentally shaped by a tension between 
tabloidisation, spectacularity and sensation-seeking on the one hand, and on the other hand 
more socially engaged approaches that sincerely attempted to raise attention to important 
aspects of the issue and its social relevance. 
 The Damu story, in contrast to both the Simek case in 2002 and the Balogh case in 
2013, led to both the perpetrator and the victim appearing in public and telling their own 
versions of events. This specific feature of the story also had far-reaching implications for 
the moral and emotional engagement that the media portrayal of this case discursively 
activated with regard to victims, perpetrators and domestic violence in general, I argue. 
Specifically, as with blame (as discussed in an earlier paragraph), the proper place of 
compassion and pity, as appropriate emotional responses to domestic violence and 
victimhood, had not been reassuringly clarified, given that Damu had launched a strong 
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media campaign to bend public opinion towards himself, and repeatedly attempted to put 
himself in the position of the “real” victim, allegedly targeted by a “well thought-out 
defamatory campaign”. His image (re-)making practically occupied a large part of the 
media coverage of the story, and was mostly aimed at constructing Damu as a subject 
worthy of compassion in the public eye, and moreover as someone who was still popular 
and whom people trusted. On the other hand, Tímea, too, despite the fact that she appeared 
only sporadically on screens, in many respects managed to come across as a victim worthy 
of compassion, pity and protection. Tímea’s image in the broadcast media was mostly 
constructed in terms of her vulnerability and lack of self-assertion in the face of the man 
she loved, which, combined with her clearly visible middle-class status and her traditional 
attractiveness, altogether constructed her as a woman deeply conforming to patriarchal 
ideals of femininity, and moreover as someone who had endured these vicissitudes only 
because of loving her man too much. Thereby she ultimately managed to come across as 
not threatening the patriarchal social order, and thereby qualified as what earlier literature 
describes as a “good victim” (see especially Benedict, 1992). As a result, sympathy, 
compassion and pity were constantly re-distributed on screens between Damu and Tímea, 
thereby, I argue, turning the entire media portrayal of the case into a kind of mediated 
competition for public emotions. 
 The one and only public action that media outlets reported on in connection with 
the Damu case – a protest organised by a feminist NGO – addressed the inadequacy of 
state institutions when it stood up against victim-blaming in court. The fact, however, that 
both commercial broadcasters reported on this event shows that, in contrast to 2002, taking 
action on the issue was no longer perceived as a monopoly of the state. On the contrary, the 
position of the most competent social actor in matters of domestic violence was repeatedly 
assigned to domestic violence experts and activists, and, accordingly, bottom-up civic 
actions against violence were also acknowledged as a valid and newsworthy form of 
action.  
 
7.2.3 The “blind komondor” József Balogh case (2013): Clarifying the boundaries of 
public morality with regard to domestic violence 
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The political scandal of József Balogh – an MP from the ruling right-wing, national-
conservative political party FIDESZ, exposed by television as both a woman-batterer and a 
liar – indicated, I suggest, that by 2013 the discursive terrain around domestic violence had 
shifted and enabled the issue to be recognised at a more significant political level. As I 
argue in Chapter 6, the main issue at stake in this scandal was that of re-opening a public 
and symbolic space where the boundaries of public morality with regard to domestic 
violence could be discussed, negotiated and affirmed, and concomitant “feeling rules” – 
that is, rules that regulate socially approved ways of expressing and managing emotions 
(see Hochschild, 1983, p. 64) – shaped and settled. Moreover, the story inflated public 
emotions around the issue to a previously unseen extent, and, by creating a largely 
homogeneous emotional regime around the incident – one of embarrassment, outcry, 
indignation and ridicule – intensively “socialised” the public to the proper expression of 
emotion with regard to the events, and thereby also formed certain social solidarities 
around domestic violence through commonly shared public emotions. 
 Since the unfolding of the Balogh story in the media relied heavily on a complex 
media environment, and was strongly shaped by both television and internet memes, I 
analysed the Balogh scandal through selected extracts from the three major national 
broadcasters (M1, RTL Klub, TV2) over a peak coverage period – dedicating specific 
attention to two pieces of footage that unmasked Balogh as a woman-batterer and a liar – 
and also through the flow of internet memes that followed Balogh’s exposure on television. 
Internet memes, I suggest, served as a form of digital bottom-up political expression, as 
well as a device of critique at the time of the scandal. Due to their ability to swiftly move 
across media texts, they actively shaped collective mindsets, emotions and perspectives 
with regard to Balogh's transgressions (Milner, 2013; Mina, 2014; Shifman, 2014). 
Nonetheless, I argue, the central medium mediating this scandal was still television. 
Balogh’s MP status, meanwhile, prevented the public service broadcaster from covering the 
story, and therefore the provision of media coverage of an important incident of domestic 
violence – as with the Damu story – once again fell to commercial broadcasters, which, in 
contrast to the public service broadcaster, were less subject to political control by the 
current Hungarian government.  
 This scandal – together with an earlier political incident from September 2012 – 
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also made it apparent that, for the first time in Hungarian history, there was a public 
controversy over domestic violence in the country, with two characteristically different sets 
of meaning-making claims clashing over the issue in the public sphere, both backed by 
powerful social players. Specifically, feminist constructions of domestic violence (which in 
September 2012 had already been backed by wider social support for criminalisation) 
constructed domestic violence with an increased focus on gender and on women as victims, 
whereas its counter-constructions, promoted by the Hungarian government (which was 
particularly reluctant to cede to the aforementioned bottom-up pressure), heavily 
downplayed the relevance of gender, and instead pushed for an understanding of the issue 
as violence “against the weak”.  
 Given that the majority of television news stories in my sample were produced by 
commercial broadcasters that gave preference to the feminist constructions of domestic 
violence, the dilemma of naming was less spectacular during this case. Media texts nearly 
unanimously referred to Balogh's deeds as “battering” and “abuse”, and understood them 
as pertaining to the broader issue of “domestic violence”, understood as male violence 
against women. In turn, governmental counter-constructions – which were mostly present 
on screens either directly, as voiced by state officials, or indirectly, as quoted from the press 
announcement of FIDESZ – referred to the battering as either “abuse”, or “family conflict” 
and as “a severe problem going on between the politician and his life partner”, and thereby 
partly shifted the blame onto the victim. In a similar manner, the press announcement from 
FIDESZ, which condemned “all types of violence, especially if targeted at women, 
children, the elderly or other people in vulnerable positions”, listed women as only one 
among the many social groups vulnerable to domestic violence, and thereby shifted 
attention away from the gender aspect of violence. With these discursive tactics, the 
government was able to conceal the perpetrator’s responsibility to some extent, and to 
question the gender-based nature of the violence he had committed. This governmental 
discourse, therefore, showed a strong similarity to the widespread discursive tactics that 
previous feminist literature had identified in other countries as patriarchal discursive 
resistance to domestic violence (see Berns, 1999, 2001, 2004; Boyle, 2005, pp. 84-93; 
Braber, 2015; Bullock, 2007; Carll, 2003; Carter, 1998; Gillespie, Richards, Givens & 
Smith, 2013, Meyers, 1994, 1997; Nettleton, 2011; Sunindyo, 2004; Zeynep, 2006). In a 
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similar manner, a considerable fraction of the internet memes, I found, remained entirely 
blind to the gender aspect of domestic violence. Still, as I argue, memes that commented 
specifically on domestic violence typically constructed it as gender-based and as typically 
targeting women, that is, in terms of the feminist constructions of the issue.  
 In order to acquire a better insight into the media-related dynamics that triggered 
the scandal, I also considered in more depth the two examples of broadcast footage that 
exposed Balogh as a batterer and a liar. Specifically, I point out how the two broadcasters 
captured Balogh in front of the cameras not only lying about the battering, but also 
violating a number of unspoken rules that regulate on-screen public conduct, and on the 
basis of which politicians today are increasingly judged. Here I borrow from Thompson's 
understanding of mediated intimacy in the specific context of political life (2000, pp. 119-
158). He points out the centrality of politicians’ televised public conduct to their political 
credibility, and more specifically how these mediated performances by politicians – 
enabled by the technological means of television – create a certain “politics of trust”, 
whereby politicians are judged on the basis of their assumed personal qualities as 
individuals, and primarily for their credibility and trustworthiness, rather than their 
achievements in the field of politics. I point out that Balogh's attempt to locate himself 
outside his own story and to avoid responsibility for his own actions was shockingly 
inappropriate to the situation, and violated all rules of appropriateness. Moreover, by 
looking happy in a situation where society would have expected sadness, regret or fear for 
his hospitalised girlfriend, he also violated feeling rules, that is rules that regulate the 
socially approved ways of expressing and managing emotions in a given situation (on these 
rules see Bucy, 2011; Hochschild, 1983, p. 64). Combined with the hard-to-believe story 
about his komondor dog being – in Balogh’s recollection – the real perpetrator of the 
battering, these mistakes chipped away at his credibility. The two pieces of film footage, 
therefore, served as triggers for the scandal. Internet memes, which quickly picked up the 
news of this exposure and circulated it across platforms, also played a prominent role in 
arousing public emotions around Balogh and brought spectators to a common platform on 
the events by shaping shared emotions and values with regard to his transgressions. 
 Accordingly, one of the key findings of this case study was that, in contrast to the 
two other cases discussed, from 2002 and 2010, the Balogh scandal activated public 
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emotions specifically connected to the perpetrator and his actions, and only to a much 
lesser extent to the victim. (The victim – or rather, her substitute, Balogh's ex-wife – was 
constructed in terms of a righteous victimhood: a subject position implying trustworthiness 
and credibility, in harsh contrast with how Balogh, the perpetrator was constructed). 
Therefore, the emotional regime that the Balogh scandal created around the issue of 
domestic violence was characteristically different from what was seen earlier. Instead of 
sympathy, compassion, pity and understanding, this scandal activated public ridicule, 
embarrassment, and to some extent also disappointment and indignation. On the other 
hand, the object of these public emotions was often not Balogh’s perpetrator status 
exclusively, but also his baffling and improper conduct in front of the cameras, when he 
tried to conceal his crime. My analysis of footage and internet memes indicates overall that 
the public outcry over the “komondor” Balogh story, although it specifically included anti-
violence concerns, was not triggered by the battering exclusively. Rather, the scandal 
articulated indignation over Balogh’s lack of moral integrity in general, and since he was 
also an MP of the ruling political party it also tapped into specifically anti-government 
sentiments. In this sense, the scandal worked as a sarcastic “social corrective” to the 
standpoint of the government, including its four-day-long delay in distancing itself from a 
person of questionable personal integrity, its by then long-standing reluctance to 
criminalise domestic violence, and the way it was shaping Hungarian political life in 
general. However, I argue, the fact that Hungarian society by 2013 did not tolerate women-
batterers among politicians was successfully articulated, and thereby new norms of public 
conduct around the issue were asserted and supported by the largely homogeneous 
emotional regime that broadcasters and internet memes created around the incident.  
 Furthermore, and in close connection to the very apparent party-political context of 
the case, both television news and internet memes repeatedly established a connection 
between standing up to domestic violence – that is, normative claims regarding what 
course of action should be taken in the face of such events – and the discourse on a 
democratic establishment and Hungarian political life in general. One of my points of 
reference here is a prime-time news bulletin in which an expert described adequate state 
interventions against domestic violence and, more specifically, standing up against Balogh 
as closely connected to certain political values (“democratic”, “European” and “of the 21st 
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century”), thereby locating the matter in the broader context of the country’s EU 
membership and in general of a democratic political establishment. Similarly, internet 
memes, which strongly shape, among other things, commonly shared moral values, also 
throughout the case often established a link between these two discourses, typically 
merging the outcry over Balogh's public conduct and dissatisfaction over the corruptness of 
Hungarian political life (or the decline of public morality in the country). On the other 
hand, despite these proposals from the media for action against domestic violence, the 
story quickly went cold once the FIDESZ government visibly (although not effectively) 
loosened its ties with Balogh. Therefore, only a small fraction of the political protests 
against Balogh organised either by feminists or by opposition parties were covered by any 
of the major TV channels, since  these – especially the ones organised by feminist activists 
– continued mostly beyond the period when media attention was still high. This, I 
conclude, was indicative of the fact that the Balogh incident was mostly considered 
newsworthy because of its political context, and therefore the media subsequently, and 
understandably, lost interest in covering the additional, domestic violence-related, aspects 
of the story, including protests and legal changes in the form of the new Law on “Partner 
Violence” that the government introduced a couple of weeks after the scandal broke. 
 
 
7.3 Conclusions 
 
First and foremost, my findings indicate that the discursive emergence of domestic 
violence in the Hungarian broadcast news media was not a product of local feminist 
activism and grass-roots awareness, as previous literature has suggested (see Fabian, 
2010a, p. 21; 2014, pp. 161-162; Vanya, 2006b, pp. 122-124;), but rather was connected to 
a broader shift in the country towards mediated intimacies, and, accordingly, also to the rise 
of commercial broadcasting, its more tabloid news agenda and sensation-seeking reporting 
style, and the consolidation of a local televisual celebrity culture and its specific genres 
(Barker, Gill & Harvey 2018, pp. 24-26; Pantti, 2011; Pantti & van Zoonen, 2006). 
Specifically, at the beginning of the time period under study, Hungary had not experienced 
a widespread feminist movement, and accordingly feminist perspectives were present 
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rather sporadically in the media texts I investigated from a period ending in the early 
2010s. Therefore, this sphere was different from post-1990 Anglo-American mediated 
public spheres, which, according to Gill, have been characterised by “the entanglement of 
feminist and anti-feminist ideas”, where “feminist discourses are expressed within the 
media, rather than simply being external, independent, critical voices” (2007, p. 161).67 In 
such a situation, the discursive emergence of domestic violence in the Hungarian 
mainstream broadcast news media, which I undertook to investigate, has inevitably taken 
place without local feminist activism having much control over the process, that is mostly 
independently of local feminist activism (the only exception being the case from 2012 
discussed in Chapter 6), and accordingly also mostly independently of feminist 
considerations or specific sensibilities towards women’s issues in Hungarian newsrooms. 
Instead, my cases indicate that the emergence of high-profile domestic violence news 
stories was mostly rooted in the sensation-generating capacity of these stories – a dramatic 
crime story, a piece of celebrity-related gossip news and a politician's major on-screen 
faux-pas. This matches the insights of previous Anglo-American literature, according to 
which forms of violence against women are often reported in sensationalised ways (Boyle, 
2005, pp. 84-85, 91; Braber, 2015; Cameron & Frazer, 1987; Soothill & Walby, 1991). 
However, I found that once these stories of outstandingly high newsworthiness had 
appeared feminists were able to push the issue further in the direction of social awareness 
and socially engaged approaches. 
 Within such a context, the gendered aspects of domestic violence, understandably, 
were initially pushed into the background, even within local feminist media activism that 
quickly reacted to the emergence of the issue into the limelight, as the Simek case from 
2002 demonstrates. Through this case a new discourse emerged, that of domestic violence 
(családon belüli erőszak). Although the issue was mostly constructed in ways that sidelined 
the gender aspect in favour of an increased focus on children as victims, the terms that the 
Hungarian news media employed for this “newly discovered” type of violence did indicate 
that media outlets were reaching out to already available local feminist literature on the 
                                                 
67 Specifically, Gill argues that “one of the things that makes the media today very different from the 
television, magazines, radio or press of the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, is that feminism is now part of 
the cultural field. That is, feminist discourses are expressed within the media, rather than simply being 
external, independent critical voices. […] Indeed, it might be argued that much of what counts as feminist 
debate in western countries takes place in the media rather than outside it”. (2007, p. 161). 
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subject, and borrowing its terminology – specifically, the terms “domestic violence” 
(családon belüli erőszak) and “terror in the family” (terror a családban)  (Morvai, 1998; 
Tóth, 1999a). In turn, when local feminist activists quickly picked up the case in order to 
call for wider social opposition to domestic violence, they adapted to the already 
established gender-neutral and child-focused construction of the issue in the media, 
prioritising victims who were , according to existing cultural norms, unambiguously 
worthy of pity and help. The petition launched in September 2002 is still widely considered 
as the beginning of local feminist activism against domestic violence (Morvai, 2004). 
However, the ambiguous ways in which this petition was portrayed in the news media were 
indicative of how, during this initial period, the news media remained sceptical of the 
relevance of (feminist) civic bottom-up actions against domestic violence, and instead saw 
the state exclusively as in the position of a competent social actor. 
 Nonetheless, between 2002 and 2013 mediated discourses on domestic violence 
notably shifted from gender neutrality towards gendered-ness, and the relevance of 
(feminist) bottom-up social actions on the issue were also gradually increasingly 
acknowledged. The media coverage of the Damu case  indicated already that by 2010 it 
was possible to present domestic violence as a “women’s issue” and moreover one that the 
Hungarian state had not resolved reassuringly, even if the price of this portrayal was that 
the embeddedness of experts’ discourses in feminism mostly needed to be concealed, so the 
connection of this type of violence to the issue of women's social inequality was not 
publicly discussed. The inadequate handling of domestic violence by the state, however, 
became a spectacular object of public dissatisfaction and also the trigger for a “women's 
uprising” (a networked bottom-up social action organised by feminists) in 2012, only 
shortly before the Balogh scandal broke, and this was also the historical moment when a 
characteristically anti-feminist, gender-blind governmental counter-discourse on domestic 
violence quite visibly emerged in the Hungarian mainstream news media. According to 
available research results, it was in 2012 that domestic violence spectacularly became a 
controversial public issue in the Hungarian mediated public sphere, with opposing 
discourses embraced by powerful social actors (such as both government and feminist 
activists, with the latter able to mobilise wide social support on the issue). The Balogh 
scandal only increased this discursive antagonism and put pressure on the government to 
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finally introduce a new policy instrument – a law – against domestic violence (although 
this law mostly reflected the government’s standpoint on the issue). 
 The media portrayal of my three cases from 2002–2013 also sheds light on the 
emotional regimes generated around domestic violence, and/or the actors in violence, 
including mediated solidarity (or the lack of it) with victims and/or repugnance towards 
perpetrators. that engaged the broader public with the issue. My three cases featured two 
victims (Kitti Simek and Tímea Palácsik) and two perpetrators (Roland Damu and József 
Balogh), whose personalities the media discursively constructed in depth, and with whom 
spectators, accordingly, could engage emotionally and morally through a variety of media 
texts. The Kitti Simek case created a discourse of gender-neutral victimhood around 
victims, by prioritising the age-related acpects of their victimisation, and therefore, its 
coverage was particularly rich in media proposals for compassion and pity as well as 
proposals for taking action for (innocent and vulnerable) children. On the other hand, it 
strictly filtered out victims that did not conform to this idealised image of innocent 
victimhood (first Kitti's mother, later Kitti, too). In contrast, Tímea Palácsik's victimhood 
was from the start constructed in terms of a complicit victimhood, strongly enabled by a 
lack of acknowledgement of the structural element of abuse (i.e. coercive control) that she 
had endured. Accordingly, media proposals for compassion, pity and blame were all 
present, and allocated to both the victim and the perpetrator. Overall, I found that media 
proposals for sympathy, compassion and pity towards victims, although relatively 
numerous, were repeatedly interrupted by other proposals disseminating doubt about either 
the victim’s personal integrity (Kitti Simek) or her assertiveness and agency (Tímea 
Palácsik). In this respect the least ambiguous case, at least in terms of the emotions that 
media texts discursively constructed as “adequate” emotional responses to domestic 
violence, was that of József Balogh, a perpetrator who undoubtedly became an object of 
public ridicule and indignation in the country (and, accordingly, the media activated a 
discourse of righteous victimhood around his ex-wife). The largely homogeneous 
emotional regime that broadcasters and internet memes created around this incident 
established certain social solidarities, too, around domestic violence, and this was also 
indicative of the fact that by 2013 the tolerance threshold of Hungarian society for 
perpetrators of woman-battering had decreased. The Balogh scandal, therefore, asserted 
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new norms of public conduct on the issue. 
 One of the most interesting aspects of the trajectory demonstrated by my cases was, 
however, as already mentioned, the centrality of commercial broadcasting and mediated 
intimacies to the discursive emergence of domestic violence. The public-service 
broadcaster M1 practically ignored both the Damu and the Balogh cases, although for 
different reasons, and they were covered only by the two national commercial broadcasters 
RTL Klub and TV2, which had a much more tabloid-style news agenda and were at the 
forefront of introducing new, hybridised, infotainment-oriented types of news programmes 
in the country (Bajomi-Lázár & Monori, 2007; Terestyényi, 2007). Tabloidisation and 
tabloid journalism – usually associated with attention to scandals, gossip, celebrities, 
unusual crime stories and other buzz-worthy topics and with a sensationalist reporting 
styles (see Ho & Abraham, 2009) – was a particular feature of my first two cases from 
2002 and 2010. In fact, the Damu story started as a tabloid story. This indicates how, 
despite all the negativities associated with this reporting style (for more details, see Boyle, 
2005, pp. 84-85, 91; Braber, 2015, p. 96; Cameron & Frazer, 1987; Soothill & Walby, 
1991), tabloidisation and sensationalism – at least when social awareness of the issue was 
still low – played an important role in making domestic violence reach high public 
visibility in Hungary, as media outlets began to cover these stories because of their 
sensation-provoking potential (in line with broadcasters economic interests). It also needs 
to be stressed, however, that the media coverage of these cases was always hybrid, since 
the sensation-provoking style was always combined with investigative – and, increasingly, 
feminist – voices. In other words, commercial broadcasters, with their more tabloidised 
news agenda, lent increased public visibility to the issue of domestic violence, which was 
otherwise usually still ignored or received publicity only sporadically and without any 
lasting effect. This generated a symbolic space for further public discussion of the issue, 
also introducing the voices of experts and even raising awareness of a need to take action 
against violence (as demonstrated by the protests and petitions that followed the Simek and 
Damu cases, which were both highly tabloidised).  
 Broadcasters’ increased focus on domestic violence also corresponded to a broader 
shift towards the rise of mediated intimacies in the Hungarian media during the early 
2000s. The commercial broadcasters TV2 and RTL Klub were at the forefront of the latter 
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trend, introducing new media genres specifically dedicated to citizens’ private and intimate 
lives – reality shows and celebrity-related programmes, among others. My cases can be 
regarded as part of this shift: both the Simek and the Damu cases brought unprecendented 
media attention to the previously unrevealed violent aspects of intimate/family 
relationships, and through them shocking details about child abuse and male violence 
against female intimate partners surfaced. The Simek case shed public light on domestic 
violence by documenting a “reality out there”. With most of the accounts and proof 
presented in the media about the crime mutually authenticating one other, violence was 
portrayed as something that had already been there, but had simply evaded public attention 
and mediation. The Damu case transformed domestic violence into an intertextual 
spectacle, with contrasting opinions, attempts at re-fashioning the perpetrator’s public 
image, and the concomitant constant re-circulation and re-mediation of additional media 
materials purporting to shed additional light on the perpetrator’s (and to a much lesser 
extent the victim’s) exploits and personal qualities. Finally, the Balogh case exploited 
mediated intimacy in terms of television’s capacity to bring spectators into close 
“intimacy” with the politician, “zooming in” to showing him in close-up, and thereby 
provide unique on-screen proof that he was lying about the battering. In other words, 
discursive change in the coverage of domestic violence also coincided in each of my cases 
with different media conventions of truth-finding, in the context of mediated intimacies. 
 In summary, my findings indicate that the discursive emergence of domestic 
violence in the Hungarian broadcast news media was, especially initially, primarily enabled 
and shaped by the rise of mediated intimacies, i.e. media representations of intimate 
relationships, which was connected to the emergence of commercial broadcasting, tabloid 
television and televisual celebrity culture in the country, and their specific media genres 
and reporting styles. My cases exemplify how domestic violence received high public 
visibility mostly due to the sensation-generating capacity of these stories that the media 
chose to cover, and how these stories consequently also tended to undergo intensive 
tabloidisation. However, once they achieved a  high level of publicity, these stories also 
brought unprecendented media attention to previously “unnoted” violent aspects of 
intimate/family relationships, and thereby opened up a symbolic space where the issue 
could be further discussed in public. Both feminist activists and news editors were able to 
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push the issue further in the direction of socially engaged approaches, and/or to shed light 
on the importance of the gender aspect of violence. As a result of all this, and despite the 
initial predominance of gender-neutral constructions of the issue, the tabloidisation that 
both the Simek and the Damu case underwent, and the often ambivalent media portrayal of 
victims (and of the emotions associated with these portrayals), by 2012 domestic violence 
had become a hot topic in the Hungarian media, with bottom-up and governmental 
discourses spectacularly clashing in the public arena, particularly over the importance of 
the gender aspect. The Balogh scandal, in this respect, served as a catalyst in the face of a 
much-debated issue and, for the first time in Hungarian history, created a largely 
homogeneous and undoubtedly negative emotional regime around a perpetrator. 
 In the next section I briefly outline the main changes that the discursive terrain 
around domestic violence has undergone in Hungary since 2013, giving particular 
consideration to the gradual consolidation of a new political regime, the establishment of a 
highly government-controlled media environment, and the rise of transnational anti-gender 
discourses in the country. These new developments, I argue, have created a highly 
ambivalent and politically divided discursive context around domestic violence. 
 
 
7.4 Hungarian discourses on domestic violence since 2013 and ways forward for 
future research 
 
In this section I give a brief overview of how the broader social-political context around 
discourses of domestic violence have changed in Hungary since 2013, a context which can 
be seen as a major “condition of possibility” for meaning-making regarding matters of 
domestic violence (Chouliaraki, 2008b, p. 674). I also give a short outline of how the 
Hungarian media landscape has been radically transformed since the conservative-
nationalist right-wing political party FIDESZ entered into power in 2010, forming a 
government with the Christian Democratic People's Party, KDNP, and began to build a new 
political regime. Specifically, I touch upon the declining freedom of the press in the 
country, dedicating special attention to developments since 2015, when a new, government-
friendly media empire emerged and consolidated itself. I particularly focus on two issues: 
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firstly, the emergence of the term “gender” as a symbolic enemy in the pro-government 
media discourse and the implications of this for gender-related issues; and secondly, how 
domestic violence has become instrumentalised in the pro-government media as a 
defamatory weapon for bringing down adversaries, thereby sidelining the social relevance 
of the issue in favour of its political use value. Finally, I give a short overview of some 
high-profile cases of violence against women (rape and sexual harrassment) that the 
Hungarian news media, despite the politically discouraging media environment, has started 
to cover in relatively large numbers since 2013. I also briefly discuss potential ways 
forward for future research into the subject: among others things, I argue that additional 
research would help us to acquire deeper insights into developments since 2013, especially 
with regard to the implications that the presence of an anti-gender discourse in the country 
may have for discourses on domestic violence.  
 As noted in now numerous international reports, since 2010, when the FIDESZ 
government entered into power with a two-thirds majority in parliament, freedom of the 
press has been in a steady decline in Hungary and the country’s media landscape, too, has 
been radically transformed (Freedom House, 2012, 2016, 2017; Murphy, 2017; Simon & 
Rácz, 2017; Urbán, 2016). First, a new media law entered into force on 1 January 2011, 
which significantly increased state control over the media (Freedom House, 2012), and 
after 2015 a new, government-friendly media empire was established (Freedom House, 
2016; Urbán, 2016). Specifically, a small group of government-linked companies have 
gradually and systematically taken control of a large part of the local media market: new 
pro-government media outlets have been launched (and, through state advertising, 
generouosly subsidised by state money), while already existing media outlets have been 
either sold to one of these government-linked companies and become government-friendly 
(as in the case of the second most-viewed TV channel TV2), or suspended, citing business 
reasons (as in the case of Hungary's leading broadsheet Népszabadság) (Urbán, 2016). The 
public-service channel M1, in turn, was transformed in 2015 into a 24-hour news channel, 
and thereby acquired a central role in disseminating the government’s message. As a result 
of these changes, pro-government media outlets have emerged into a hegemonic position 
over the Hungarian mediated public sphere as a whole, and only pockets of independent 
media are left, with journalists repeatedly reporting difficulties in carrying out independent 
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journalistic work (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2018; Freedom House, 2017; Simon, 
2018).  
 According to investigative reports, pro-government newsrooms and editorials, even 
before their recent subsumption in late November 2018 under one super-company (see 
Kingsley, 2018), have become subject to the direct control of the Cabinet Office of the 
Prime Minister. News media outlets receive guidelines not only on topics to be covered, 
but also regarding ways of reporting and even use of language (Freedom House, 2017; 
Murphy, 2017; Simon, 2018; Simon & Rácz, 2017). Accordingly, politically-motivated 
stories have often been cross-posted – thereby increasing their reach – across a large 
number of news media outlets forming part of this new pro-government media empire,  
which all used the same lingo, dubbed by some observers as an Orwellian ”newspeak” 
(Simon, 2018).68 These governmentally prescribed terms, topics and ways of reporting are 
clearly meant to create a parallel reality, and to eliminate and replace alternative terms and 
perspectives that would not fit into the government's narratives. Moreover, in recent years, 
pro-government media outlets have also become saturated with fake news items, which 
have often been used to smear political adversaries (see Bede, 2018; Kőműves, 2018; Milo 
& Klingová, 2017, pp. 22-24;).69 In brief, this new and highly centralised media empire has 
started to serve as a powerful propaganda machine for the government. 
 From the perspective of the present thesis, it is the recent emergence of the term 
“gender” in this governmental discourse – used either separately or in compound words, 
like ”gender craziness” (genderőrület), “gender ideology” (genderideológia) and “gender 
theory” (genderelmélet) – that is worthy of particular attention. These terms can be 
identified as part of a localised version of a transnational anti-gender discourse, which has 
                                                 
68 Journalists have been instructed to avoid, for example, the word “refugee”, and instead use “migrant”; to 
avoid calling the Central European University – a private American research university, which, after many 
failed attempts to negotiate with the FIDESZ government, is currently in the process of leaving the 
country (see Enyedi 2018) – by its own name and instead refer to it as “the Soros University”, so that the 
name fits into the current government propaganda against financier George Soros; or always to describe 
NGOs that work on human rights issues or other topics disapproved of by the government as “foreign-
financed civic organisations” (Simon, 2018; Simon & Rácz, 2017).  
69 Without going into further details, the Hungarian fake news industry has been described by independent 
observers as a specific case in Europe where a disinformation industry is financed by the government 
itself, and which mixes the Russian model – i.e. content directly “imported” from Russia – and the US 
model, i.e. the establishment of a fake news media empire of one’s own's, which then serves both 
propagandistic and business ends (Bede, 2018; Corruption Research Center Budapest, 2018; Kőműves, 
2018; Milo & Klingová, 2017, p. 23).  
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lately been described by gender scholars as specifically mobilised against a vaguely-
defined “gender ideology” and which has, since around 2010, spread quickly across a large 
number of countries around the globe (Corrêa, Paternotte & Kuhar, 2018; Grzebalska, 
Kováts & Pető, 2017; Korolczuk & Graff, 2018; Kováts, 2018; Kováts & Põim, 2015; 
Kumar & Paternotte, 2017 ).70 The local Hungarian version of this transnational anti-
gender discourse first appeared in the country around 2008-2009, intensely focused on 
sexual minorities and presenting “gender ideology” as an alleged master plan to “abolish 
the [biological] sexes”.71 But it mostly remained marginal until 2016,72 when it entered the 
specific discourse of the pro-government media empire. Thereby “gender” suddenly 
emerged into the focus of public attention, and by then the term had been re-fashioned also 
as a key symbol for a – similarly vaguely defined – (neo)liberalism and its alleged world-
wide attack on (traditional, patriarchal) families, the latter understood by FIDESZ as a key 
underpinning of a “strong nation” (on the importance of nation and family in the FIDESZ 
discourse, see Fabian, 2014a; on the relation between neoliberalism and feminisms, see 
Rottenberg, 2018). In brief, since 2016 “gender” has become an empty signifier, primarily 
used as a defamatory linguistic tool by the government to delegitimise discourses that use it 
as an analytical category to address issues related to gendered social inequalities. 
 This emergence of an anti-gender discourse marks a break with earlier times, when 
gender-related perspectives were ignored or downplayed but not demonised by the 
government, as was the case around 2012-2013, when governmental and feminist 
discourses spectacularly clashed on matters of domestic violence (discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6). The specific consequences of the emergence of this anti-gender discourse for 
domestic violence and its media portrayal need further research. Lately Pető (2018b) and 
                                                 
70 Recently it has also been argued that anti-colonial frames (i.e. mobilisation against allegedly oppressive 
powers) and theories of alleged master plans and conspiracies to seize political power with the help of 
gender ideology are also central to these anti-gender discourses (Corrêa, Paternotte & Kuhar, 2018; 
Grzebalska, Kováts & Pető, 2017; Korolczuk & Graff, 2018).  
71 For one of the earliest manifestations of this discourse in Hungary, see Mizsei, 2009. This article appeared 
in Magyar Nemzet, a conservative political daily, and, drawing on Gabriele Kuby – a German sociologist 
who had published, among other works, The Global Sexual Revolution (2012/2015), a landmark text of 
the anti-gender discourse – mentioned “gender ideology” (genderideológia) and “gender mainstreaming”,  
“unmasking” these as cover terms for an “ideology of blurring the [biological] sexes” (nemi összemosás 
ideológiája), where the latter, according to Magyar Nemzet, professed that sex and sexual orientation 
should be “freely chosen”, people should be changed, “their sex abolished”, and pedophilia legalised.  
72 See Anikó Félix’s diagnosis of 2015, according to which in Hungary this anti-gender discourse “has not 
intensified at the same level as the other analysed countries”, i.e. France, Germany, Poland and Slovakia 
(Kováts & Põim, 2015, p. 62).  
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Kováts (2018) have pointed out some key political decisions for which these anti-gender 
discourses, embraced by the Hungarian government, may have served as a discursive 
underpinning, including the government’s refusal to ratify the Istanbul Convention of the 
EU, which understands domestic violence as a form of violence against women – i.e. a 
gender-equality-related human rights issue – and obliges ratifying countries to introduce 
comprehensive preventive measures (for more on this, see Kováts 2018).73  
 In fact, the one and only high-profile case of domestic violence that the media has 
covered since 2013 – that of Péter Juhász, the leader of a (small) left-wing political party 
Együtt, in political opposition to the FIDESZ government – pointed more to the 
instrumentalisation of domestic violence as a political/defamatory weapon in the pro-
government media than to the emergence of anti-gender governmental discourses in media 
discussions of the issue. The dominance of this defamation function became particularly 
evident in the specific circumstances under which this story came to publicity, and in the 
fact that – in sharp contrast with my earlier domestic violence cases – an issue-based 
investigative approach was entirely missing. The case was not followed by any media 
discussions attempting to explore the events in the context of the broader issue of domestic 
violence. The news broke in pro-government media outlets, in February 2018, in the 
middle of the campaign season for the general elections of April 2018 (and therefore it 
seemed at first that this could be an instance of fake news). After a couple of days Juhász 
partly admitted the charges against him, and – in harsh contrast with how public service 
broadcaster M1 ignored and downplayed Balogh's domestic violence story in 2013 – 
independent news media outlets, too, started to cover the case (Windisch 2018).74  Despite 
                                                 
73 The latest development in this field – i.e. the government's announcement on 25 November 2018 
according to which it is opening new shelter places for victims of “partner violence” and is setting up a 
crisis ambulance service for them, partly with the help of funding from the EU, but at the same time 
ignoring expert knowledge on the subject – indicates a return to an earlier governmental strategy, that of 
ignoring feminist perspectives and NGOs, and instead sticking to a gender-blind notion of “partner 
violence” (on the critique of this new government policy from a feminist point of view see Betlen, 2018).  
74 Specifically, it was Bors, a government-friendly tabloid, that on 10 February 2018 broke the news about 
Juhász and his ex-girlfriend's ongoing child custody case, including the information that, according to 
Bors, court documents evidenced that Juhász had been accused by his ex-girlfriend of verbal, emotional 
and severe physical abuse, as well as illegal restraint (the documents have not been disclosed). Pro-
government media quickly picked up the story, and added some further “details” to it (see Windisch, 
2018). Juhász initially denied the claims, but after his ex released a press announcement in which, among 
other, things, she refuted Juhász's “false allegations” about her, he publicly admitted that during the 
Christmas break he had indeed “grappled with” his girlfriend (NT & MG, 2018). It was at this moment 
that independent news media outlets also started to cover the story. On 29 August 2018 Bors published an 
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this, overall, this new story did not facilitate, but rather closed down, possibilities for 
further discussing domestic violence in public. The case therefore marked a historical 
moment when, for the first time in Hungary, a domestic violence story was covered only 
because of its political use value. However, if considered in the light of the earlier 
discussed demonisation of the term “gender” in governmental discourses from 2016 
onwards, this case may also point to a broader ongoing discursive shift around domestic 
violence today in Hungary, in which gender-related social issues – including domestic 
violence – become empty signifiers, with their social relevance and context removed, so 
that they can be better instrumentalised as a political weapon.  
 Despite the media environment being politically discouraging for independent 
investigative journalism, and the fact that since 2013 the Hungarian news media have not 
covered another high-profile case of domestic violence, there have also been some positive 
developments, suggesting that forms of violence against women, in general, are more often 
considered newsworthy in Hungarian newsrooms, irrespective of their political value. 
These have also been followed, to an increasing extent, by media discussions that explore 
the structural element of violence, including its connection to gendered social inequalities 
in Hungary. There have been at least two high-profile sexual harrassment stories, in 2014 
and in 2017, in the media portrayal of which issue-based investigative voices played an 
important part. The first was the story of a group of female first-year university students 
who were sexually harrassed (one of them also raped) at a pre-university summer camp 
(“Az ELTE”, 2014). Then theatre director László Marton's case came to publicity in 
October 2017 as part of the Me Too movement (“Puszild meg”, 2017). These two stories 
(especially the second one, backed by a world-wide wave of digital grassroots activism) 
were followed by extensive public discussions that often explicitly addressed them within 
the context of gendered inequalities. The last couple of years have also seen, for the first 
time since 2007 in Hungary, a high-profile case of rape. In May 2016 László Kiss, former 
trainer of the Hungarian Olympic swimming team, was confronted in public by a 73-year-
old woman, the survivor of a rape that Kiss, together with his friends, had perpetrated on 
her 55 years earlier – the woman shared her story with the public after Kiss had publicly 
                                                                                                                                                    
announcement in which it acknowledged that it had earlier misinformed the public about the case, with 
regard to the accusations of severe physical abuse and illegal restraint. 
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referred to her as “dead” and of loose morals (“Nem tudtam”, 2016; on the 2007 case, see 
Kormos, 2011). Moreover, as I am writing this thesis in early December 2018, I see an 
independent online news magazine, Mérce, publishing investigative reports of domestic 
violence on a daily basis during the Sixteen Days of Activism (a world-wide campaign 
against violence against women, launched in 1991), something that a couple of years ago 
would have been unimaginable.  
 Therefore, one way forward to complement this research would be to investigate 
further the implications of the presence of an anti-gender discourse in Hungary – or 
elsewhere, given that this is a transnational discourse – for media portrayals of domestic 
violence and/or other forms of violence against women. Another way forward would be to 
contrast and compare how the findings presented here differ from the portrayal of domestic 
violence in other media genres or platforms (for example, women’s magazines, men’s 
magazines, blogs or digital journalism), especially since 2010, when the topic started to 
receive more public attention; or in other geographical locations, most importantly other 
post-communist EU countries, which, like Hungary, are  currently very much  under-
researched in terms of domestic violence in the media, at least by English-language 
publications. While this part of the European continent is increasingly attracting 
international scholarly attention, including the inclusion of its countries in cross-country 
comparative research on domestic violence (see e.g. European Commission, 2010), there is 
still a great deal to explore, unpack – and critically analyse. 
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Appendix: “Komondor Balogh” internet memes 
 
Figure 1.  Images using juxtaposition to mock the element of Balogh's fabricated story 
where the blind komondor dog took over the role of the perpetrator of battering (in Image 3 
the text translates as “Before” and “After”). 
 
Figure 2. Images mocking the domestic violence component of the Balogh story. 
 
“Let's play mummies and daddies!”   “Is that what an aggressive family man 
“Well, if you want it so much.”     would look like?” 
“You've got it now, bitch?!”
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O.K. then, I've broken Terike's nose. And     Don't get scared, Zoli, we'll just say she's 
now what? The komondor was indeed     fallen over the komondor dog, and it'll be 
blind.          fine. 
 
 
Figure 3. Images mocking the inadequate handling of the Balogh incident by the FIDESZ 
government. 
 
“Keep calm and      “I don't need feminism, only a 
blind komondor”        good pair of glasses” 
 
Figure 4.  Images containing only a (blind) komondor dog 
 
 
